Tran Van Bac v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

HCAL 1692/2025

[2026] HKCFI 3640

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1692 OF 2025

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

1.The Applicant is a 36-year-old national of Vietnam who entered Hong Kong illegally on 28 October 2023 and was arrested by police on the same day.  After he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if he returned to Vietnam he would be harmed or killed by his creditor for failing to repay his debts.  He was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim.

2.The Applicant was born and raised in Huyen Yen Phong, Bac Ninh Province, Vietnam.  After leaving school he worked as a construction worker to make his living, got married and raised a family with 3 children in his home district.

3.In about 2010 he started his own building materials business with the help of a loan borrowed from some local money-lender to be repaid within 5 years and with monthly interests payments which he initially managed to make from his business income.

4.However, his business did not fare well, and by 2015 he lost his business and defaulted in his loan repayment, whereupon his creditor sent men to threaten him, and after being beaten by those men on one occasion and with a warning that they would kill him if next time he still failed to repay his debts, the Applicant became fearful for his life and went into hiding, and on 24 October 2023 he departed Vietnam for China, and from there he later sneaked into Hong Kong, and upon his arrest by the police he then raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 20 December 2023 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).             

5.By a Notice of Decision dated 25 January 2024 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

6.In his decision the Director took into account all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his creditor and followers upon his return to Vietnam as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from that there is no evidence of any real intention of his creditor to seriously harm or kill him other than to press him to repay his debts, that in any event it was a private monetary dispute between him and his creditor only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) shows that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Vietnam with a large population of 104 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 330,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Ho Chi Minh City where it would be difficult if not impossible for his creditor to locate him.

7.On 1 February 2024 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which he attended an oral hearing on 28 March 2024 before the Board during which he gave evidence and answered questions raised of his claim by the Adjudicator for the Board.  On 4 June 2024 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.

8.In its decision[1] the Board found material inconsistencies and discrepancies in the Applicant’s evidence that it doubted the credibility of his claim of fear of harm from some creditor over some outstanding debts that caused him to leave his country to come to Hong Kong to seek protection, that even his account of events prior to his departure from Vietnam were true that there was no reliable evidence of any real intention of his creditor to seriously harm or kill him other than to press him to repay his debts, and that in any event it was a private monetary dispute between him and his creditor only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon his return to Vietnam as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for him to move safely to other parts of the country away from his home district without any risk of being located by his creditor that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.    

9.On 28 July 2025 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and put forward the following grounds for his intended challenge:

(1)    That the Board reached the decision wrongly in assessing his non‑refoulement claim as the decision was not fair or reasonable as required by the Wednesbury test in failing to recognize that his life must be protected by the criminal law from the killings that he may face if deported back to his home country;

(2)    That the Board failed to appreciate or place proper or sufficient weight or importance to the presence of State Acquiescence in his case which led to an unfair outcome of rejecting his claim;

(3)    That the Adjudicator acted unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on COI but failed to take into account the Applicant’s personal background and experience in assessing his claim;

(4)    That the Board had listed relevant COI which supported the Applicant’s aversions that the police in his country would not be able to protect but failed to consider or give sufficient weight to such evidence and instead ruled otherwise against the Applicant’s case which was a clear case of unfair attitude shown by the Board which in itself is enough to render its decision void;

(5)    That the Board failed to attain the high standard of fairness required by the Wednesbury test in failing to take into account the Applicant’s argument that corruption and incompetency of the administration in the Applicant’s country is still a very serious problem as various human rights organizations had compiled reports that stated testament to the Applicant’s assertions;

(6)    That the Adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing whether or not to accept the Applicant’s explanations and unreasonably required him to respond to questions that he was not in a position to offer any response;

(7)    That the Adjudicator made a ruling to dismiss the Applicant’s appeal based on findings which the Adjudicator ought to allow and thus the decision was irrational.     

10.By then the Applicant was however out of time with his application, as Order 53 rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the day when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason to extend the period within which the application shall be made.

11.As the last day of the three-month period for him to file his Form 86 fell on 4 October 2024 after discounting the month of August 2024 for court’s vacation, the Applicant was therefore more than 9 months late with his application, and in considering whether to extend time, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration: AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393.

12.In the Applicant’s case, a delay of more than 9 months must be considered as substantial and inordinate, for which he did not provide any explanation or reasons in his Form or affirmation, nor did he request any oral hearing for his application, and as the record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 4 June 2024 to his then reported address without being returned through undelivered post, I am unable to see any good or valid reason for his such serious delay.      

13.As for the merits, if any, of his intended application, those grounds put forward by the Applicant are all just some bare and vague assertions containing a few key words or phrases but without any necessary or relevant particulars or specifics or elaborations as to how they apply to his case or how the Board or the Adjudicator had erred in the decision, or in what way was the decision unfair or unreasonable or that the Adjudicator had acted procedurally unfair or irrational, or how did the Adjudicator fail to take into account relevant COI or being selective or improperly rely on irrelevant COI, or what relevancy was state acquiescence to the Applicant’s case when on the factual basis of even his own case that it was a private monetary dispute between him and his creditor only without any official involvement or political element.  As such, and as none of these assertions were properly elaborated or presented with any relevant particulars or specifics by the Applicant, I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for his intended challenge.

14.As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

15.In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risk of harm in his claim even if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other parts of Vietnam, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.                

16.In the premises, and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.

17.It is also of note that the Applicant on 20 April 2026 filed an affirmation requesting to withdraw his application as he wanted to be repatriated back to Vietnam, but 2 months later on 23 June 2026 he filed another affirmation requesting to “cancel” his repatriation as he is still in danger from his creditor in his home country.

18.As I am for the given reasons not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I therefore refuse to grant leave and accordingly dismiss his application.

Dated the 30^th day of June 2026

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1