H, Rs v. X, Y

Read the full judgment text of FCMC 6583/2024 on BabelCite. This Family Court judgment was delivered on 15 May 2026.

1. By the summons dated 17 March 2026 issued by the Respondent (“Wife”) (“MPS Summons”), she asks for, inter alia , maintenance pending suit (“MPS”) and litigation funding (“LCP”).

Cites 3 cases

Case No.FCMC 6583/2024[2026] HKFC 81
Court
Family Court
Date15 May 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

FCMC 6583 / 2024

[2026] HKFC 81

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NO. 6583 OF 2024

(Formerly No. 6733 OF 2023)

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BETWEEN

  H, RS Petitioner
and
  X, Y Respondent

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Coram: His Honour Judge S. Lo in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 16 April 2026
Date of Judgment: 15 May 2026

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J U D G M E N T
( MPS and Stay )

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MPS Summons

1.By the summons dated 17 March 2026 issued by the Respondent (“Wife”) (“MPS Summons”), she asks for, inter alia, maintenance pending suit (“MPS”) and litigation funding (“LCP”).

2.The trial of the ancillary relief and the preliminary issue proceedings has been fixed for 8 days commencing on 17 June 2026.

Legal Principles on MPS and LCP

3.The legal principles are well-established. Maintenance is a broad concept, but it must be restricted to those payments necessary to meet recurring costs of living. A “reasonable” amount of MPS means that it must be fair, having regard to the circumstances of the case: HJFG v KCY [2012] HKLRD 95, §§33-38.

4.The pre-requisites for LCP are governed by the test in Currey v Currey (No 2) [2007] 1 FLR 946. As summarised in LCYP v JEK [2018] HKCFI 1907, the Wife must show that:

(1) She has no assets, or none that can be reasonably deployed.

(2) She can provide no security for borrowing, or none which can be reasonably offered.

(3) She cannot reasonably obtain legal services by offering a charge on the outcome of the litigation.

(4) She cannot secure publicly funded legal help at the expertise apt to the proceedings.

5.Furthermore, it is a “fundamental requirement” for the Wife to supply a sufficiently detailed breakdown of anticipated costs in order to determine whether the LCP sought is reasonable: HJFG, §§78-79.

Discussion

6.According to the Wife’s 36th Affirmation, she claims that the MPS Summons is made on the grounds of “extreme” urgency and alleges that because of the Injunction Order, she has been “unlawfully deprived of all liquid capital, income, and financial resources.”

7.In her own Form E, the Wife reported net assets of close to HK$150 million, including at least 2 landed properties in Hong Kong (one in Parkview and other in Discovery Bay) and an income of HK$134,000 (most of which being comprised of stable rental income).

8.The Injunction Order mentioned by the Wife in her 36th Affirmation is the interim injunction granted by DDJ GT Lung on 19 June 2023. Since the Wife had agreed to continue with her undertakings under inter alia Recital D(1) of the Order dated 30 June 2023, the said interim injunction has been discharged by consent on 3 July 2023 pursuant to the Consent Summons by the parties.

9.According to the Recital D(1), the Wife’s undertaking is not to directly or indirectly remove any assets from Dancom’s and Bright Way’s BNP Paribas accounts. There are many other valuable assets held by the Wife in her own name based on her Form E, which are not covered by her undertaking. I consider that she is extremely wealthy and has had ample financial resources to sustain herself. Besides, there is no evidence before me that the Husband had ever paid any maintenance to the Wife in the past. In my view, it is entirely unfair and unnecessary for her to claim MPS from the Husband.

10.Besides, the Wife has never sought maintenance for the last 3 years since the making of the interim injunction or the giving of her undertaking in June 2023. Had the effect of the interim injunction or her undertaking been so drastic, she would not have waited until just few months before the trial to seek maintenance from the Husband. I entirely disagree with any urgency as alleged by the Wife. The proper course of action is to have all questions of financial relief, including but not limited to the issue whether the Husband shall pay any maintenance to the Wife, left for the impending trial.

11.In her written submissions, the Wife asks for a lump sum of $10 million rather than periodic payment by way of MPS without giving any explanation. No doubt, I find that her request for lump sum is unacceptable in law.

12.For LCP, the Wife has not shown that she has no assets (or none that can be reasonably deployed) or is unable to borrow to meet her litigation costs. In the circumstances, she has failed to satisfy the jurisdictional hurdle in Currey. Furthermore, she has failed to provide an accurate estimate of her costs for the trial. All she has said in her 36th Affirmation is that the estimated costs for trial would be approximately HK$8 million, without producing any breakdown. More confusingly, in her written submissions for the CMH on 6 February 2026, she claims in paragraph 9(a) that she had:

“… hired a different set of lawyers: one group focus on the trust, but they are not divorce solicitors. The other group are divorce lawyers who knows the family law….”

13.Up to this moment, no legal representative is formally engaged by her on record. Whether she will engage counsel or not, and the identities of the alleged different set of lawyers are unclear. In the circumstances, I find that the Wife fails to provide any confirmation of her lawyers’ fee estimates for the trial, and therefore, her claims for LCP must be refused.

Conclusion

14.Having considered all the relevant circumstances, the MPS Summons be dismissed with costs and certificate for counsel.

Stay Summons

15.By another summons also dated 17 March 2026 issued by the Wife, she asks for, inter alia, essentially a general stay of proceedings (“Stay Summons”) pending:

(a) her appeal[1] against my ruling made on 6 February 2026 dismissing her Summons dated 8 October 2025 to set aside the Injunction Order of DDJ G T Lung made on 19 June 2023.

(b) her Summons dated 10 February 2026 to recuse me.

(c) her appeal[2] against the ruling of DDJ Jeffrey Li on 4 March 2026 dismissing her Summons dated 30 April 2025 to transfer these proceedings to the Court of First Instance.

(d) certain matters described by the Wife as “preliminary issues”, which include not only her Amended Trust Summons in these proceedings but also:

(i) so-called “allegations of money laundering” and “alleged misuse of these divorce proceedings for improper collateral purposes”; and

(ii) “any other related proceedings pending in the High Court including HCZZ 22/2026”.

16.It is trite that trial is a milestone date which shall not be removed save in exceptional circumstances[3].

17.If I allow the Stay Summons, the trial must be vacated. In my view, the Wife fails to show that it is an exceptional circumstance to remove the milestone date. Further, I consider that this application is flagrant abuse of procedure. It would be a travesty of justice if an uncooperative litigant can compel the vacating of trial dates simply by inundating the Court with hopeless interlocutory summonses at eleventh hour.

18.It is so obvious that the only purpose of the application is to delay the upcoming trial. There is no reason to stay the proceedings. The so-called “preliminary issues” alleged by the Wife are not a basis for imposing a stay. They are either:

(1) matters that will be resolved at the upcoming trial (e.g., the alleged fraud of the Husband, the ownership of Dancom and Belsea, and whether they constitute trust assets and/or general assertions of litigation misconduct); or

(2) are irrelevant to the outcome of the trial.

19.Mr Kwan submitted that the Husband has already briefed trial counsel and would incur very substantial costs should trial dates be vacated. I agree that the Husband would suffer great prejudice if stay is granted and that the balance of convenience rests wholly in favour of proceeding with the trial. It is also plainly in the interests of justice for parties’ disputes to be expeditiously resolved.

20.After carefully consider all the relevant circumstances, the Stay Summons must be dismissed with costs and certificate for counsel.

  ( Simon Lo )
  District Judge

Mr Adrian Kwan instructed by ONC Lawyers for the Petitioner

Respondent acting in person



[1]   By Summons for Leave to Appeal dated 25 February 2026.

[2]   By Summons for Leave to Appeal dated 13 March 2026.

[3]   See Para. 42 of PD 5.2