H, Rs v. X, Y

Read the full judgment text of FCMC 6583/2024 on BabelCite. This Family Court judgment was delivered on 2 July 2025 before His Honour Judge S. Lo.

Matrimonial Causes Rules – rule 121 – disclosure of documents – confidentiality of matrimonial proceedings – open justice principle – leave to issue summons despite delay – legitimate purpose for disclosure – balancing exercise – claims against lawyers weak and vague – application dismissed – Wife to pay costs summarily assessed at $28,000

Legal issues: Leave to issue summons · Disclosure against Husband's lawyers · Disclosure against Wife's lawyers · Balancing exercise

Outcome: r.121 Summons dismissed

Cited by 2 cases · Cites 6 cases

Case No.FCMC 6583/2024[2025] HKFC 113
Court
Family Court
Date02 Jul 2025
JudgeHis Honour Judge S. Lo
Case Document
100%Judiciary

FCMC 6583 / 2024

[2025] HKFC 113

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NO. 6583 OF 2024

(Formerly No. 6733 OF 2023)

----------------------------

BETWEEN

  H, RS Petitioner
  and  
  X, Y Respondent

----------------------------

Coram: His Honour Judge S. Lo in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of hearing: 4 March 2025
Date of petitioner’s submission: 18 March 2025
Date of respondent’s submission: 1 April 2025
Date of Judgment: 2 July 2025

-----------------------

JUDGMENT
( Disclosure under rule 121 MCR )

-----------------------

1.By the intended summons dated 27 February 2025 lodged by the Respondent (“Wife”), she seeks for disclosure of documents in these matrimonial proceedings as specified in Schedule A thereto under rule 121 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules (“r.121 Summons”).

2.Pursuant to the Order dated 22 May 2024 made by Master J. Lee, whereby the parties were directed to take out all necessary interlocutory applications or before 31 July 2024 (“Master J. Lee’s Order”).

Whether leave is required?

3.The Wife lodged the r.121 Summons and asked for leave to issue the same in view of Master J. Lee’s Order since she had delayed in issuing the same for about 7 months. Although she had not given any reason or good reason to explain for such delay, I am of the view that she is still entitled to issue the same without leave no matter she has any reason for delay or not. Nevertheless, since she fails to comply with Master J. Lee’s Order with good reason, the court will certainly retain unfettered discretion as to costs against her even though an order may be made in her favour eventually.

4.For the avoidance of doubt, the r.121 Summons be treated as issued on 27 February 2025 by the Wife, and filing and service of the same be dispensed with.

Relevant Legal Principles

5.Rule 121 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules (“MCR”) states that :

Inspection etc. of documents retained in court

(1) A party to any matrimonial proceedings or his solicitor or the Secretary for Justice may have a search made for, and may inspect and bespeak a copy of, any document filed or lodged in the registry in those proceedings. (L.N. 135 of 1972; 25 of 1998 s. 2)

(2) Except as provided by rules 47A(3) and 95(3) and paragraph (1) of this rule, no document filed or lodged in the registry, other than a decree or order made in open court, shall be open to inspection by any person without leave of the court, and no copy of any such document, or of an extract from any such document, shall be taken by, or issued to, any person without such leave. (L.N. 123 of 1974; L.N. 325 of 1982)

6.Disclosure of Family Court documents is not as of right. Other than a decree or an order made in open court, leave must be sought under rule 121 of the MCR for inspection by, production and disclosure to non-parties.

7.The relevant principles governing such application are succinctly summarised in the judgment of DJ (also known as DJJ) v LRM (also known as LRMJ), FCMC 8507/2013 (unreported, 7 July 2015) by Deputy District Judge KK Pang (as he then was):-

“13. Rule 121(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap. 179A (hereinafter called “MCR”) provides that no document filed in the matrimonial proceedings, other than a decree or order made in open court, shall be open to inspection by the public without the leave of the court.

14. The rationale of such rule is that matrimonial proceedings are private in nature. For the protection of the parties involved in the proceedings, the documents filed in such proceedings shall not be disclosed in public unless leave of the court seized with the matrimonial proceedings has been obtained: see Horst Joachim Franz Geicke v 1-Onasia Ltd, HCA 2379/2009, 17 October 2011 §32, per DHCJ Lok (now Lok J).

15. On top of MCR rule 121, the Family Court has the general power of control over access to documents within its custody in common law, and the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction is subject to a balancing test in terms of weighing the relevant conflicting interests and rights: see Secretary for Justice v FTCW & Ors [2014] 1 HKLRD 849, at §§16, 27-28, per Hon Lam VP.

16. At §114 of the abovementioned judgment, Lam VP at 85 referred to R (Guardian News and Media Ltd) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2013] QB 618 and adopted Toulson LJ’s approach as follows:

“In a case where documents have been placed before a judge and referred to in the course of proceedings, in my judgment the default position should be that access should be permitted on the open justice principle; and where access is sought for a proper journalistic purpose, the case for allowing it will be particularly strong. However, there may be countervailing reasons. … I do not think that it is sensible or practical to look for a standard formula for determining how strong the grounds of opposition need to be in order to outweigh the merits of the application. The court has to carry out a proportionality exercise which will be fact-specific. Central to the court’s evaluation will be the purpose of the open justice principle, the potential value of the material in advancing that purpose and, conversely, any risk of harm which access to the documents may cause to the legitimate interests of others.” (emphasis added)

8.Essentially, in considering an application under rule 121, the Court is tasked with a proportionality exercise to balance the need of privacy and confidentiality of matrimonial proceedings, the principle of open justice, value of the documents sought to be disclosed in advancing that purpose, and any risk of harm which disclosure may cause to the legitimate interests of the parties.

Background

9.The salient facts have been set out in §§ 1 to 15 of My Decision (Costs and Discovery) handed down on 12 October 2023[1] and my Judgment (Discharge of Undertaking) handed down on 19 June 2025[2]. Insofar as applicable, I would use the same abbreviations below as that in my Decision and my Judgment.

Disclosure against the Husband and his former lawyers

10.Part of the sought disclosure relates to the Wife’s intended action in the High Court, intended complaints to the Law Society of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Bar Association against the Husband’s former solicitors (“HW”) and his 2 former Counsel.

11.The Wife alleged that the Husband and his former legal team (especially HW) has abused the legal process in obtaining the injunction in 2023, by misrepresenting the facts and misleading the court. He took wrong advice from HW and HW has used “manipulative”, “intimidating” and “unethical” tactics in litigation. As such, he has destroyed their family and the Wife suffered psychological trauma and emotional distress.

12.In my view, the Husband’s legal representatives owe a professional duty to him, but not the Wife. It follows that there is prima facie no ground for her to lodge a complaint to the Law Society of Hong Kong against the Husband’s former firms of solicitors or Hong Kong Bar Association against his former barristers.

13.Despite the Wife’s allegation of misconducts on the part of the Husband and his lawyers, the documents specified in Schedule A do not even remotely suggest any sort of “deliberate infliction of emotional stress, abuse of process or fraud”. Objectively, they merely showcase the parties’ respective positions and evidence in respect of the injunction, and nothing further.

14.I consider that the Wife has failed to identify what type of High Court action she is contemplating. Whilst she seems to suggest a claim in the tort of harassment and/or intimidation, the Schedule A documents would not give rise to such causes of action or come to proof in her favour.

15.The injunction sought by the Husband at the beginning of the divorce proceedings is indeed very common in civil and particularly matrimonial suits. It could be overwhelming and stressful, when a petition or litigation is thrust upon them and a close or familial relationship instantaneously falls apart. Nonetheless, it is part of the reality of litigation and does not give rise to any cause of action or relief in addition to the underlying suit.

16.To sum up, the Wife’s application for disclosure against the Husband and his lawyers does not reveal any legitimate purpose for disclosure, nor does it disclose any prospect of success in her contemplated actions against him and his lawyers. No disclosure should be made in aid of such fanciful actions. There is simply no good reason for disclosure.

Disclosure against the Wife’s former lawyers

17.The Wife also said that she intends to commence action in the High Court, complaints to the Law Society of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Bar Association against her former solicitors (CCBH and OLN) and Senior Counsel.

18.As observed in her 22nd Affirmation in support, there is no evidence to substantiate a claim against her own lawyers for “abusing legal process or deliberately causing [her] substantial damage using questionable practices” either. I am of the view that the potential claims against the former lawyers appear weak and vague and that there is insufficient evidential basis for the relevant relief to be granted by the Court.

Balancing exercise

19.The rule 121 is designed to protect the confidentiality of matrimonial proceedings and applies even to the parties who filed the documents. The Court has discretion to grant leave but must carefully balance the strong public policy of confidentiality in matrimonial proceedings against the Wife’s rights.

20.The Court must consider whether the Wife has demonstrated a clear and specific need for them. Disclosure should not be granted merely to facilitate collateral litigation unless the claims have a reasonable prospect of success and the documents are essential to those claims. In other words, the Court should weigh the potential prejudice to the former lawyers of the matrimonial parties against the Wife’s own interest in disclosure. If her claims are weak, the balance will tilt against disclosure.

21.Further I accept the submission of Ms Huang for the Husband that allowing the disclosure sought by the Wife would be effectively endorsing her potential abuse of process of the court. In view of the procedural history in the present case, the r.121 Summons is only one of her many satellite applications, such as her application to transfer to High Court[3]. Against this background, the danger in allowing for disclosure looms large. There is no legitimate purpose for disclosure, whilst there is pressing need to maintain confidentiality. The rationale behind the rule 121 is to afford protection of the parties’ privacy in their divorce, and this case is no exception. Contrary to the Wife’s contention, the Schedule A documents do contain sensitive information on the parties’ financial arrangements and wealth, including but not limited to their personal account information. Furthermore, there are grave concerns regarding her baseless and repeated slanderous attacks on the Husband’s personal character and “faults” leading to the breakdown of the marital relationship in her multiple affirmations. Privacy and confidentiality should be upheld in this case.

22.In any event, I consider that the Wife may pursue her claims in the High Court against the Husband, his former lawyers, the Wife’s former lawyers as well as her complaints to the Law Society and Bar Association even without disclosure of court documents. That is to say, non-disclosure would not prevent her from making full and fair use of her rights to sue or complain.

Conclusion

23.Therefore, balancing all the circumstances, including the strong public policy of confidentiality in matrimonial proceedings, the interests and potential prejudice to the parties, the Court’s discretion should be exercised against the Wife and the sought disclosure ought to be declined. I order the r.121 Summons be dismissed.

24.As the Wife fails in this application, she shall pay costs of this application to the Husband with certificate for Counsel. The Husband’s Statement of Costs was submitted claiming $29,211. On board brush approach, I summarily assessed at $28,000 payable forthwith by the Wife.

( Simon Lo )
District Judge

Ms Bridget Huang instructed by ONC Lawyers for the Petitioner

Respondent acting in person



[1]  [2023] HKFC 208

[2]  [2025] HKFC 103

[3]  Hearing for substantive argument fixed on 8 July 2025.