Gallego Valdes Maria Melek (A Minor) By Her Mother and Next Friend Anzola Sanchez Yesica Daniela v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2551/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 July 2026.
1. On 11 February 2026 I refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) in dismissing her appeal regarding her non-refoulement claim upon finding that none of the grounds put forward on her behalf reasonably arguable for her intended challenge, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in the process before the Director of Immigration (“Director”) or the Board or in their decisions, that the Board di
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HCAL 2551/2024 [2026] HKCFI 3660 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2551 OF 2024 ________________________ BETWEEN
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__________________ D E C I S I O N __________________ 1.On 11 February 2026 I refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) in dismissing her appeal regarding her non-refoulement claim upon finding that none of the grounds put forward on her behalf reasonably arguable for her intended challenge, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in the process before the Director of Immigration (“Director”) or the Board or in their decisions, that the Board did properly and correctly apply the principles laid down by the Court of Appeal in Fabio Arlyn Timogan [2020] HKCA 971 and Re Jasvir Singh [2021] HKCA 53 in its assessment and determination of the Applicant’s claim as a minor separately from those of her parents, and that there was no reasonable prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application. 2.The Applicant now by a summons issued on her behalf by her mother on 27 February 2026 to seek leave to appeal against that decision out of time, as the 14-day period for her to file her appeal under Order 53 rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A ended on 25 February 2026, and hence she was 2 days late with her intended appeal. 3.In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted: see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017; Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346. 4.In the Applicant’s case, a delay of 2 days cannot on any view be considered as significant, for which she did not provide any explanation in the summons or affirmation, and that the court record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 11 February 2026 to her then reported address without being returned through undelivered post, but given the insignificance of the delay, I propose to focus on the prospect of success of her intended appeal. 5.However, the Applicant in her supporting affirmation merely made some bare assertions about the Court’s decision but without providing any relevant or necessary details or particulars or elaboration as to any particular error in the decision or why it may be reasonably arguable that the decision was unfair or unreasonable. As such, and in the absence of any error in the decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not see any prospect of success in her intended appeal. 6.In the premises, and for the reasons given, it would be futile to extend time for what appears to be a hopeless appeal. Accordingly, I refuse her application for leave to appeal out of time, and dismiss the Applicant’s summons.
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