Tran Van Hoang v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

HCAL 1275/2024

[2026] HKCFI 4030

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1275 OF 2024

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court / the Applicant being absent in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

1.The Applicant is a 32-year-old national of Vietnam who entered Hong Kong illegally on 1 July 2014 and surrendered to the Immigration Department on 3 July 2014 when he raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if he returned to Vietnam he would be harmed or killed by his father’s creditor over his father’s debts. He was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim.

2.The Applicant was born and raised in Village Tu Son, Kien Thuy County, Hai Phong, Vietnam. After leaving school he continued to reside with his parents and relied on his father’s support in his home village.

3.In 2011 his father left the country for Hong Kong to avoid his creditor over his debts, and later died there from his illness.

4.Upon learning of his father’s death in Hong Kong, his creditor and associates soon came to the Applicant’s home in Vietnam to demand that he should repay his father’s debts, and when he was unable to do so, they then beat him severely, and warned him that they would kill him if next time he still failed to repay his father’s debts.

5.As a result the Applicant became fearful for his life and fled from his home to hide in a friend’s place, and on 28 June 2014 he departed Vietnam for China, and from there he later sneaked into Hong Kong and raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 21 June 2016 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).

6.By a Notice of Decision dated 25 July 2016 and a Notice of Further Decision dated 21 December 2016 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

7.In his decisions the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his father’s creditor and associates upon his return to Vietnam as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no evidence of any real intention of his father’s creditor to seriously harm or kill him other than to press him to repay his father’s debts, that in any event it was a private monetary dispute between him and his father’s creditor only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Vietnam with a large population of 94 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 310,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able‑bodied young adult to move to other areas of the country away from his home district in large cities where it would be difficult if not impossible for his father’s creditor to locate him.

8.On 21 June 2018 the Applicant lodged his late appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decisions but was initially refused by the Board, and for reasons not necessary to mention here, the late filing of his notice of appeal was subsequently allowed by a second and differently constituted Board, and for his appeal the Applicant attended an oral hearing on 22 September 2023 before the Board during which he gave evidence and answered questions raised of his claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 9 October 2023 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decisions.

9.In its decision[1] the Board accepted the Applicant’s claim of fear of harm from his father’s creditor over his father’s debts but found no reliable evidence of any real intention of his father’s creditor to seriously harm or kill him other than to press him to repay his father’s debts, and that in any event it was a private monetary dispute between him and his father’s creditor only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon his return to Vietnam as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for him to move safely to other parts of the country away from his home district without any risk of being located by his father’s creditor that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.

10.On 5 August 2024 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and put forward the following grounds for his intended challenge:

(1)  That the Board reached the decision wrongly in assessing his non‑refoulement claim as the decision was not fair or reasonable as required by the Wednesbury test in failing to recognize that his life must be protected by the criminal law from the killings that he may face if deported back to his home country;

(2)  That the Board failed to appreciate or place proper or sufficient weight or importance to the presence of State Acquiescence in his case which led to an unfair outcome of rejecting his claim;

(3)  That the Adjudicator acted unreasonable and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on COI but failed to take into account the Applicant’s personal background and experience in assessing his claim;

(4)  That the Board had listed relevant COI which supported the Applicant’s aversions that the police in his country would not be able to protect but failed to consider or give sufficient weight to such evidence and instead ruled otherwise against the Applicant’s case which was a clear case of unfair attitude shown by the Board which in itself is enough to render its decision void;

(5)  That the Board failed to attain the high standard of fairness required by the Wednesbury test in failing to take into account the Applicant’s argument that corruption and incompetency of the administration in the Applicant’s country is still a very serious problem as various human rights organizations had compiled reports that stated testament to the Applicant’s assertions;

(6)  That the Adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing whether or not to accept the Applicant’s explanations and unreasonably required him to respond to questions that he was not in a position to offer any response;

(7)  That the Adjudicator made a ruling to dismiss the Applicant’s appeal based on findings which the Adjudicator ought to allow and thus the decision was irrational.

11.By then the Applicant was however out of time with his application, as Order 53 rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the day when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason to extend the period within which the application shall be made.

12.As the last day of the three-month period for him to file his Form 86 fell on 9 January 2024, the Applicant was therefore some 7 months late with his application, and in considering whether to extend time, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration: AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393.

13.In the Applicant’s case, a delay of 7 months must be considered as very substantial and inordinate, for which he did not provide any explanation or reasons in his Form or affirmation, and as the record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 9 October 2023 to his then reported address without being returned through undelivered post, I am unable to see any good or valid reason for his such serious delay.

14.As for the merits, if any, of his intended application, those grounds put forward by the Applicant are all just some bare and vague assertions containing a few key words or phrases but without any necessary or relevant particulars or specifics or elaborations as to how they apply to his case or how the Board or the Adjudicator had erred in the decision, or in what way was the decision unfair or unreasonable or that the Adjudicator had acted procedurally unfair or irrational, or how did the Adjudicator fail to take into account of relevant COI or being selective or improperly rely on irrelevant COI, or what relevancy was state acquiescence relevant to the Applicant’s case when on the factual basis of even his own case that it was a private monetary dispute between him and his father’s creditor only without any official involvement or political element at all. As such, and as none of these assertions were properly elaborated or presented with any relevant particulars or specifics by the Applicant, I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for his intended challenge or any merits in his intended application either.

15.As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

16.In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risk of harm in his claim if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of Vietnam, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.

17.In the premises, and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.

18.Moreover, the Applicant has recently on 27 May 2026 filed an affirmation requesting to withdraw his application as it is now safe for him to return to his home country.

19.As I am for the given reasons not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and in view of his latest confirmation that it is safe for him to return to his home country, I accordingly dismiss his leave application.

Dated the 21^st day of July 2026

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1