Re Shaikh Nizamuddin

CACV 288/2025, [2026] HKCA 1335

On Appeal From [2026] HKCA 300

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 288 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 359 OF 2020)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 30 March 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 5 March 2026 (“the Judgment”) ([2026] HKCA 300).  In the Judgment, we dismissed a summons filed by the applicant on 29 July 2025 for relief from sanction imposed by an unless order dated 7 July 2025.

2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“With due respect and humble submission I let you know that I do not agree with the decision of the Court of First Instance and the decision of Appeal. So I request you to review my appeal and the summons for relief from the sanction imposed by an unless order.” (sic)

5.Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged written submissions on 30 March 2026.  In those submissions, he asserted that Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) erred in law in dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review on 8 May 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 1830) (“Leave Decision”), as the Judge failed to apply the principles of irrationality and procedural unfairness to the Director’s and the Board’s respective decisions.  He also asserted that the Board failed to give him sufficient chance to arrange for the relevant evidence to be provided in his non-refoulement claim and appeal, and that the Board failed to analyse whether state protection existed.  He further claimed that he would face hardship and be killed if refouled.

6.The applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit. His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any particulars or evidence and are not proper grounds of appeal.  More importantly, he has failed to point out any error in the Judgment with particulars.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  His assertions are not proper grounds of appeal and his intended appeal should be dismissed on this basis alone.

7.Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

9.For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit, and we dismiss the Notice of Motion.

The applicant acting in person