Tamang Sharada v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 1575/2022 [2026] HKCFI 4450 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1575 of 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Isaac Chan:
Observations for the Applicant: 1.By a Form 86 filed on 28 December 2022 (“Form 86”), the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claim Appeal Board / the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 3 November 2022 (“Board’s Decision”)[1] confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 13 August 2021 and rejecting the applicant’s non‑refoulement claim. 2.In the Form 86, the Board was named as both the putative respondent and the putative interested party. Also, the Immigration Department was named as another putative interested party. The Director should be the only putative interested party instead. The Form 86 shall be amended accordingly on the court’s own motion. 3.I refer to the Board’s Decision for the background of the applicant, the basis of the claim, the evidence and the argument the applicant has relied upon, which will not be repeated herein. 4.The Court’s role in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Given the seriousness of the issue involved in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decisions of the Board. However, the Court will not intervene unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in those decisions: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at paragraph 14. 5.General assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review: see Re Fabio Arlyn Timogan [2020] HKCA 971, at paragraph 23. 6.The present application for leave is meant to be a filtering process, and I am not expected to give elaborated reasons for my decision: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at paragraph 23. I will therefore provide brief reasons for my decision as follows. Discussion 7.In the affirmation in support of the present application, other than certain factual background, the applicant has made the several complaints which can broadly be summarized as follows:
8.At the hearing on 8 May 2026, at which the applicant was assisted by an interpreter arranged by the Court:
9.Having considered all the applicant’s complaints set out in the affirmation in support, I find none of them to have any merits. 10.The applicant’s various complaints about procedural unfairness are based on the lack of legal and language assistance, in particular the lack of translation of the Board’s Decision. 11.As the Court of Appeal has repeatedly held, the high standard of fairness requires by law does not mean that legal or interpretation service has to be made available at any time the applicant desires: Re Sanjaya Kumar Magar [2022] HKCA 299 at paragraph 23, also Re Tariq Farhan [2018] HKCA 17 at paragraph 11. The applicant already had the benefit of legal representation in presenting his case to the Director (see paragraph 2 of the Board’s Decision). 12.Further, the applicant has made no complaint about the language assistance she received at the appeal hearing before the Board, which was a rehearing of the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. At paragraph 17 of the Board’s Decision, it was recorded that the applicant confirmed the truth of all of the claims she had made to the Immigration Department, and she did not wish to alter or amend those documents. 13.The complaint of not having translation of the Board’s Decision is unmeritorious. The Board’s Decision is fully reasoned and was drafted in English which is one of official languages in Hong Kong. There is no basis to assert that the Board has failed its duty to give reasons under law. As stated above, the high standard of fairness by law does not mean that interpretation service has to be made available at any time the applicant desires. In any event, both the Form 86 and the supporting affirmation are written in English, which suggests either the applicant is reasonably proficient in English or she has received assistance in that language. The applicant’s explanation at the hearing before this Court that it did not occur to her to invite the friend who purportedly assisted her in preparing the English documents to translate the Board’s Decision for her is unconvincing. I see no merits in any complaint based on the lack of translation for the Board’s Decision. 14.Therefore, the lack of legal and language assistance as complained by the applicant could not be a valid ground for asserting any procedural unfairness. 15.Also, the complaint the Immigration Department was simply trying to dispose of the case quickly and therefore had not considered the facts and evidence flies in the face of the contents of the Director’s decision, which contained a detailed assessment of all the facts and evidence of the claim. In any event, the Director’s decision was superseded by the Board’s Decision, which contains a reassessment of the whole claim in detail. 16.The Board’s Decision has, with respect, correctly and comprehensively set out the applicable legal principles. I do not see any errors in either the summary or the application of those legal principles. 17.After a detailed analysis of the applicant’s evidence given both before and at the hearing, the Board was not satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility, as well as the credibility of the claim she had made (see paragraphs 31 to 36 of the Board’s Decision). The Board rejected the applicant’s claim, that she was threatened by a moneylender who lent to her, as such assertions were either greatly exaggerated or completely untrue (see paragraphs 37 to 40). The Board concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that there were substantial grounds to support the conclusion that she would face a real risk of ill-treatment by a moneylender should she return to India (see paragraph 41). Based on the available materials, the conclusions of the Board were clearly justifiable. I do not see any basis to suggest that the Board was irrational based on the principle set out in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 18.Applying the enhanced standard of scrutiny, I do not see any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. 19.I therefore dismiss the application for leave to apply for judicial review under the Form 86. Dated the 11th day of August 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment