Re Tualufo Joao Francisco

CACV 14/2025, [2026] HKCA 1661

On Appeal From [2024] HKCFI 3674

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 14 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 1836 OF 2019)

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DECISION

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Hon Cheung JA (giving the Decision of the Court) :

1.  Leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal

1.On 25 June 2025, this Court handed down the judgment ([2025] HKCA 576) dismissing the applicant’s application to appeal an order of Deputy High Court Judge Reuden Lai given on 27 December 2024 refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of his non ‑ refoulement claim. 

2.On 8 July 2025, the applicant filed a notice of motion applying for leave to appeal this Court’s order to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant also lodged written submission consisting of 6 pages on 23 July 2025 which was one day late under the directions of the Registrar of Civil Appeals dated 8 July 2025. 

2)  Our view

3.Having considered the applicant’s documents, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing.  We have, therefore, proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case.

4.The background to this case and the applicant’s claim have been set out in our judgment.  We will not repeat them.

5.Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484) (‘Ordinance’) leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal will only be granted if the question to be determined involves great general or public importance or otherwise ought to be determined by the Court of Final Appeal.

6.The notice of motion simply asked for a chance to be given to the applicant for him to appeal to the ‘supreme court’ and that the applicant has all the information to prove his application.

7.The 6‑page written submission by the applicant can be summarized as follow :

(1)  It is the applicant’s fundamental right not to be subjected to torture: ST v Director of Immigration [2014] 4 HKLRD 277;

(2)  The Decision has a significant effect on the applicant’s torture claim;

(3)  High standards of fairness is required for determining torture claims: Secretary for Security v Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289;

(4)  Appropriate standard of fairness depends on an examination of all aspects relating to the decision in question: R v Home Secretary ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 at 560D-G;

(5)  The applicant’s life and limb are in jeopardy and high standard of fairness must be observed;

(6)  The Court should not usurp the function of the decision maker;

(7)  The Court should determine non-refoulement cases with anxious scrutiny and rigorous examination: R v Home Secretary, Ex-Parte Bugdaycay [1987] 1 AC 514 at 531E-G;

(8)  The applicant should be given every reasonable opportunity to establish his claim;

(9)  The Adjudicator did not properly assess the applicant’s credibility;

(10)  The Court has the power to interfere in a public body’s decision if it is Wednesbury unreasonable;

(11)  Reference is made to the modified Wednesbury test; and

(12)  Reference is made to section 37ZT of the Immigration Ordinance.

8.We are of the view that the grounds and arguments put forward by the applicant do not constitute viable grounds for giving leave to appeal.  Importantly, no question of great general or public importance has been identified as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

9.Nor do we see any basis for the ‘or otherwise’ limb under section 22(1)(b).

3)  Disposition

10.For these reasons, the notice of motion filed on 8 July 2025 is dismissed.

Applicant, unrepresented, acting in person