Re Anggi La

CACV 970/2025, [2026] HKCA 1689

On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 5029

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 970 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 436 OF 2021)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) dated 23 October 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 5029) (“the Leave Decision”) dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) against an alleged decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 20 August 2019.  However, as noted by the Judge at [9] of the Leave Decision, the Board has confirmed that no appeal has ever been lodged by the applicant under section 37ZR of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) (“the Ordinance”).  Hence, the alleged decision of the Board does not exist.  In this respect, it is noted that the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) previously refused his non‑refoulement claim by a decision dated 7 November 2019 (“the Director’s Decision”).  The Judge therefore treated the Leave Application.

2.The applicant is a national of Indonesia.  The basis of his non‑refoulement claim is, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by a ship captain whom he previously worked for over some monetary dispute.  His background, the basis of his claim and arguments advanced before the Director as well as the Director’s reasons for rejecting his appeal are all set out at [1] ‑ [7] of the Leave Decision.  The Judge has set out his reasons for refusing the Leave Application at [8] ‑ [12] of the Leave Decision.  We will not repeat the details herein.

3.By the Notice of Appeal filed on 5 November 2025, the applicant claimed:

“I want to appeal against the decision.  Please review my application.  The decision is unreasonable.” (sic)

4.In support of his appeal, the applicant also lodged written submissions on 18 June 2026.  In those submissions, he reiterated the factual history of his non-refoulement claim.  He claimed that his boss was cruel and heartless and hired a hitman in Indonesia to kill his men.  He further claimed that he received a message from his boss on 18 June 2026 and that he was threatened by his boss.  He also attached three pages of undated WhatsApp messages to his written submissions (“the New Evidence”) but failed to provide any English translation of the same.

5.We heard the appeal on 2 September 2026.  An Indonesian interpreter was also present to provide language assistance.  During the hearing, the applicant confirmed that he had nothing to add to his written materials.

DISCUSSION

6.The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non‑refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].

7.In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.  The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review.  See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)].

8.As properly noted by the Judge at [8] ‑ [11] of the Leave Decision, under section 37ZR of the Ordinance, it was open to the applicant to appeal against the Director’s Decision to the Board, but he did not do so.  He had not exhausted all the alternative remedies before seeking to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court by way of judicial review and thus the Leave Application should be dismissed.  The Judge is clearly correct in his decision.  We are unable to see any reason why the applicant should be allowed to bypass this statutory appeal process and apply to the High Court directly for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.  See also Sudarmanto v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2026] HKCA 703 at [10] and Yuliani v Director of Immigration [2022] HKCA 1831 at [24].  In the premises, the appeal must be dismissed.

9.For completeness, the applicant also failed to demonstrate any special ground as to why the New Evidence should be admitted on appeal under Order 59, rule 10(2) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A).  Even taking them at their highest, the New Evidence are subsequent to the Board’s Decision and are irrelevant to his intended judicial review and the present appeal.

10.For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision is hereby dismissed.

The applicant acting in person