Case Document

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HCAL 770/2025

[2026] HKCFI 5136

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 770 OF 2025

BETWEEN

	Rashid Md Haruner	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board	Putative
		Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative
		Interested Party

Application for leave to apply for judicial review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)

Following:

consideration of the documents only; or

consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:

1. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the applicant:

The Leave Application

1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 27 March 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 31 October 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2025/HCAL000770_2025_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

2.The Board found that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong failed on all the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Accordingly, the Board affirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 24 May 2024, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

The applicant’s case

3.It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.

4.In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Bangladesh, he feared harm from members of Awami League (“AL”), but not anyone in particular, due to his support for and connections with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”). The applicant claimed that he was asked to quit BNP and join AL, but he refused. He was once threatened to be killed for his refusal.

Late application

5.By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the Board’s Decision was made.

6.However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 27 March 2025, which was more than 4 months after the Board’s Decision (made on 31 October 2024). The applicant was hence late for more than one month in making the Leave Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any good reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave Application.

7.As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria for granting an extension of time are:

(i)  the length of the delay;

(ii)  the reason for the delay;

(iii)  the merits of the intended application; and

(iv)  any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration.

8.The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and provided no explanation for the delay when he filed the Leave Application.

9.At the oral hearing before this court on 3 September 2026, the applicant explained that he did not receive the letter from the Immigration Department or the Board. He only came to know that his appeal/petition was rejected by the Board when he reported to the Immigration Department on 26 September 2025, and he made the Leave Application the following day.

10.However, this could not be true. As aforesaid, albeit late, the Leave Application was filed on 27 March 2025, which was half a year before the applicant allegedly came to know about the Board’s Decision on 26 September 2025. The applicant only changed his story to say that he came to know about the Board’s Decision on 27 March 2025 when this court pointed out to him that he filed the Leave Application on 27 March 2025. Thus, such an untruthful explanation cannot be accepted.

11.A delay of more than one month is not insubstantial, and the applicant’s explanation for the delay was not plausible. More importantly, there is no merit in the Leave Application at all.

12.Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to grant any extension of time to the applicant to file the Leave Application. The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the ground of being made out of time alone.

13.However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still deal with the Leave Application as discussed below.

Oral hearing

14.The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application and his case was heard on 3 September 2026.

15.When this court asked the applicant for the grounds of his intended judicial review, the applicant merely replied that he was not safe in his area in Bangladesh, he still had danger there and he only left his country to save his life.

Grounds for judicial review

16.The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).

17.The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial review in Form 86, nor in his supporting affirmation dated 27 March 2025.

18.As aforesaid, at the oral hearing, the applicant only said he was not safe in Bangladesh and danger still existed there.

Discussion

19.First of all, the applicant’s danger in his country had been duly assessed but rejected by the Board. If he intends to challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for judicial review.

20.The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

21.Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the intended judicial review.

22.In assessing the applicant’s appeal/petition, the Board held an oral hearing on 2 September 2024 and the applicant was present. Thus, the applicant was given the opportunity to present his case to the Board in person.

23.As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had analyzed the applicant’s claims with due care. The Board had laid out its material findings of fact of the applicant’s claims in paragraphs 56 to 96 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.

24.In gist, the Board found no reliable evidence that the applicant was a supporter of BNP as alleged, and the Board did not find his allegation that he had been a supporter of BNP credible or reliable. Considering all the evidence submitted by the applicant, the Board found that even if all claimed events did take place, the nature and low intensity of ill-treatment from AL people on the applicant in the past were indicative of a small future risk of harm if the applicant was to return to Bangladesh.

25.The Board found no or no reliable evidence that (1) the applicant had suffered physical and/or mental sufferings of the requisite severity; (2) the alleged perpetrators had ill-treated the applicant with an intention listed in the definition of torture in section 37U of the Immigration Ordinance; (3) the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant had any relevance to the interest and/or benefit of the Bangladeshi government; (4) the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for any RC[1] reasons; (5) the state of Bangladesh was unwilling or unable to afford protection to the applicant; and (6) the state of Bangladesh was unwilling to help the applicant for a RC reason.

26.Further, in relation to the applicant’s complaint about the general situation of violence in Bangladesh and the inadequacy of state protection, the Board found that reasonable state protection would be available to the applicant, and there was nothing before the Board to indicate that the applicant would not be afforded the requisite level of protection from the government of Bangladesh.

27.Given its findings as summarised above, the Board noted that the assessment of the viability of internal relocation for the applicant was not strictly necessary. Nevertheless, the Board still did so for the sake of completeness. The Board had given its reasons for the finding that internal relocation was appropriate and reasonable for the applicant in paragraph 138 of the Board’s Decision.

28.Thus, the Board found that the applicant’s non-refoulement claim failed on all the applicable grounds under the USM.

29.The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, country of origin information and risk of harm, was primarily within the realm of the Board in dealing with his appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to come to its own conclusion. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.

30.Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision.

31.As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.

Conclusion

32.For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed for being made out of time and for devoid of merits.

Dated the 16^th day of September 2026

( Gladys LEE )
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence

Notes for the applicant: If leave has been granted, the applicant or his solicitors must:
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).		Sent/Handed to the applicant/the applicant’s solicitors on: 16/09/2026 Applicant’s ref. no: Nil		Sent/Handed to the putative respondent / the putative respondent’s solicitors / such putative interested parties as may be directed by the Court / the putative interested parties’ solicitors on: 16/09/2026 Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office Putative respondent’s ref. no.: USM 23804 Director of Immigration Putative interested party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 636/24 (Formerly RBCZ 5001887/23) (T4S14) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)