Imran Muhammad v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 726/2023 [2026] HKCFI 5187 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 726 of 2023 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 15 May 2023, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decisions of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 30 March 2023 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 2 November 2018 rejecting the applicant's non-refoulement claim on the applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlinks: - 2.In his Form 86, the applicant named the “Hong Kong Immigration (Non‑Refoulement) as the proposed respondent, and “My Own Self” as the interested party. As the Board should have been proper putative respondent, and the Director the putative interested party, the Form 86 shall be amended accordingly. 3.The applicant is a Kashmiri and was an active member of the Jammu & Kashmir National Awami Party, which fought for the self-determination for the Kashmiris. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Pakistan, he would be harmed or killed by the opposite parties - Pakistan People Party, the Pakistan Muslim League (N) and Tehreek-e-Insaf. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision. 4.Pursuant to the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave Application, this court scheduled a hearing on 3 September 2026. A notice of hearing with a reminder[2] of the consequence of absence dated 27 July 2026 was sent to the applicant’s last known address by ordinary post. The applicant was absent from the hearing. Before the hearing, phone calls were made to the applicant’s given telephone number before the hearing but to no avail. Since the information before this court shows that the said notice of hearing has not been returned undelivered through the post, and that the applicant had been separately notified by phone, this court will dispose of the Leave Application according to the materials already placed before the court. Discussion 5.A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision[3]. It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced. 6.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[4], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The Form 86 and the supporting affirmation provided no such grounds. 7.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.[5] In the present case, due to the discrepancies, inconsistencies and contradictions found in the applicant’s crucial evidence in relation to the assaults in the past, the Board found that the applicant was not telling the truth about the circumstances of the assaults. Whilst the Board believed that there were serious clashes between the various political parties in Pakistan, it did not believe what the applicant had claimed about his involvement in the various incidents of the assaults and threats. The Board concluded that he would unlikely face any risk of harm if refouled. The Board further found that internal relocation would be reasonably viable. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there being any public law errors. 8.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high standard of fairness. The applicant advanced no grounds at all in support of the Leave Application. Hence, I find that the applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[6]. Order 9.The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion. 10.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Dated the 23rd day of September 2026. Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293. [2] “If the Applicant does not appear at the hearing, he/she will be deemed to have waived his/her right to make oral submissions at the hearing and the Court will deal with his/her application according to the paper already placed before the Court”. [3] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]. [4] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142]. [5] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. [6] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 |
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