Moises Aleli Terredano v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 1488/2023

[2026] HKCFI 4814

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1488 of 2023

BETWEEN

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

	consideration of documents only;          or
	consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Val Chow:

1.  Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion that the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office be named as the Putative Respondent.

2.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.By Form 86 filed on 23 August 2023 (the “Form 86”), the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 17 August 2023 (the “Board’s Decision”).

2.To properly name the parties, I make an order to amend the Form 86 accordingly on the court’s own motion.

3.An oral hearing was requested by the Applicant. It took place before me on 15 July 2026 (the “Hearing”) and the Applicant attended in person.

Background

4.The Applicant’s background, the basis and history of her claim and the arguments she advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision, and it is unnecessary for me to repeat the same here. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[1] for reference. In essence, the Applicant came from the Philippines to Hong Kong to work as a domestic helper. She fears that she will be harmed by her husband (the “Husband”) who is alleged to be associated with a militant group known as New People’s Army (the “NPA”, together with the Husband, the “Adversaries”) if she were to return to the Philippines. She was subject to physical abuse and sexual assault from the Husband.

Discussion

5.The leave application is intended to be a filtering process and elaborate reasons are not necessary, see: Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23. Hence, I shall set out the brief reasons for my decision below.

6.The relevant general principles are well established. Judicial review does not operate as a further avenue of appeal. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court applies a high standard of fairness to review the decision of the Board with anxious scrutiny due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court must not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (“COI”) materials, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board, see: Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at §14.

7.Other than expressing her disagreement with the Board’s Decision, no ground of review has been provided in the Form 86 or the Applicant’s affidavit in support.

8.At the Hearing, the Applicant said she was not feeling well as she is suffering from diabetes, hypertension and high cholesterol. I do not see how that could assist her case. There is no suggestion that these conditions were life-threatening or that the Applicant could not receive the necessary medical treatment if she returns to the Philippines.

9.Having read the Board’s Decision: -

(1)  Despite having found the Applicant’s account of events to be credible, the Board is entitled to find that there was no genuine risk of serious harm to the Applicant in returning to her home country (§§42-43).

(2)  According to the Applicant, she has been subject to physical and sexual abuse by the Husband since they got married in 2002 (§24). Notwithstanding the abuse, there is no evidence that she was coerced or forced to stay with the Husband. The Applicant returned to her home from time to time for holidays during her employment in Hong Kong (§§22-32). Despite the Husband’s verbal threats to kill the Applicant (§31), he had never actually carried such threat (§42).

(3)  As admitted by the Applicant, she was the sole breadwinner of the family and there was no reason for the Husband to want to kill her (§40). The Husband has also never threatened or harmed the Applicant’s mother and children (§39).

10.Albeit unfortunate, the present case is, taken at its highest, only a case of domestic violence. There is no evidence that the NPA was ever involved in any perpetration of violence against the Applicant.

11.More fundamentally, the Applicant’s contention that she will not have protection in the Philippines or that she cannot relocate to other parts of the country is a bare assertion not supported by credible evidence:-

(1)  On state protection, having considered the relevant COI, the Board was entitled to form the view that adequate state protection is available against domestic violence notwithstanding the existence of certain shortcomings in the legal system such as inefficiencies. Given that the Husband has relied on the Applicant as the sole breadwinner of the family, there is no basis to infer that the Husband would have any genuine ability to influence the local police as claimed by the Applicant (§§44-46). If anything, the Applicant’s failure to seek police protection was of her own volition.

(2)  On the availability of internal relocation alternatives, it is clear that, the Applicant, as an able-bodied adult with reasonable education and working skills, should have no difficulty relocating to places such as Cebu or Davao. The threat from the Husband is at best localised. There is no evidence that the Husband would have the determination or capability to locate the Applicant throughout the country (§§47-48).

12.In such circumstances, the Board’s Decision satisfies the enhanced Wednesbury test and cannot be said to be irrational, even on the enhanced standard. I am also unable to discern any error of law or procedural impropriety.

13.In short, I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success. Accordingly, I refuse to grant leave for judicial review.

Conclusion

14.In the premises, I make an order that the Form 86 be amended as set out above and the Leave Application be dismissed.

Dated the 2^nd day of October 2026

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1