Ahmed Gamal Ibrahim Gad v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

Case No.HCAL 1330/2026[2026] HKCFI 5543
Court
High Court CFI
Date06 Oct 2026
Judge—
Case Document
100%

HCAL 1330/2026

[2026] HKCFI 5543

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1330 OF 2026

BETWEEN

  Ahmed Gamal Ibrahim Gad Applicant
  and  
  Torture Claims Appeal Board Putative
    Respondent
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative
    Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

    consideration of the documents only;            or
   consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

Leave to apply for judicial review be refused.

Observations for the Applicant:

1.The Applicant is a 42-year-old national of Egypt who arrived in Hong Kong on 3 May 2017 with his wife and 3 children but when they were refused entry by the Immigration Department, the Applicant raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the then stated basis that if he and his family returned to Egypt they would be harmed or killed by the Muslim community for having converted his religion from Islam to Christianity. The Applicant and his family were subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of their claims.

2.The Applicant was born and raised as a Muslim in Kalyobiya, Egypt. After leaving school he worked as a construction carpenter to make his living, married his wife and raised their family with their 3 children in his home district.

3.In 2013 or 2014 the Applicant moved his family to Cairo before taking up some construction job in Saudi Arabia, whereupon his wife and children then moved back to her family in Shubra El Kheima, but shortly thereafter he lost contacts with his wife, and upon making enquiries with her parents, he suspected that his wife might have gone into hiding after having converting her religion from Islam to Christianity.

4.The Applicant therefore left Saudi Arabia to return to Egypt to look for his wife and children, and it was later in 2016 that he was contacted by his wife who admitted her religion conversion from Islam to Christianity and had gone into hiding due to her fear of being harmed or killed by her parents, and that she wanted him to join her as her church could help them to leave Egypt to move to another country with dominantly Christians such as Germany.

5.As a result the Applicant met up with his wife and children in Hurghada where they stayed for a week in a flat arranged by his wife’s church, during which he was persuaded by a priest from the church to agree to also convert his religion to Christianity so as to facilitate their relocation to Germany, and although he had heard about Muslims in his country being prosecuted by the authorities for such religion conversion, he agreed to the arrangements by the church due to his love for his wife and children and in order to save her from her family’s threats.

6.Although the church subsequently changed their destination from Germany to Hong Kong, the Applicant and his family on 3 May 2017 departed Egypt, and upon arriving in Hong Kong when they were refused entry by the Immigration Department, he then raised a non-refoulement claim for protection for him and his family, and that they were subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of their claims.

7.However, shortly thereafter his wife and children disappeared without news, and that the Applicant also failed to return his NCF within the required time that his claim was treated by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) as withdrawn on 11 July 2017, while his subsequent appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision was also dismissed, and his subsequent application for judicial review of the Board’s decision was refused by this Court (HCAL 314/2018 [2019] HKCFI 1046).

8.The Applicant shortly thereafter failed to report on his recognizance to the Immigration Department, and had since 2019 absconded until his eventual arrest by the police some 6 years later on 18 March 2025, and while being detained by the Immigration Department pending his deportation, the Applicant made a request to raise a subsequent claim on the bases that in addition of his fear of being harmed by the Muslim community in his home country over his religion conversion, that he has also been told by his family that the church which had earlier assisted and arranged for him and his family to leave Egypt for Hong Kong had subsequently reported his religion conversion to the authorities that he feared of being arrested and prosecuted by the authorities if refouled to Egypt, that he also suspected that his wife had all along wanted to leave him and conspired with her church to take the children away from him which explained her disappearance with the children after arriving in Hong Kong, and that she is now having an extra-marital relationship with another man that he fears that she may conspire with her lover to end their marriage by murdering him and which also explains why her church had helped her to bring false charges against him, all of which also explained his earlier failure to return his NCF for his previous claim as he had been busy all these years looking for his wife and children everywhere in Hong Kong and was eventually able to discover her plots against him.

9.The Applicant was subsequently allowed by the Director to make his subsequent claim, and for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 12 November 2025 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).

10.By a Notice of Decision dated 25 February 2026 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

11.In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and found material inconsistencies discrepancies and contradictions in his evidence that his story as a whole was considered as factually unacceptable, unreliable and incredible that it is not accepted that he has ever converted his religion from Islam to Christianity as alleged, and hence it is not accepted that there will be any risk which may arise from such false claim of his religion conversion upon his return to Egypt, and that whatever risk that may come from his wife or her family or her lover against him over their domestic or marital disputes which is a private personal and matter between him and his wife only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Egypt with a large population of 118 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 1 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Alexandria Port Said where it would be difficult if not impossible for anyone to locate him.

12.On 4 March 2026 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which he attended an oral hearing on 10 June 2026 with his lawyer from DLS before the Board during which he gave evidence and answered questions raised of his claim by the Adjudicator for the Board and with submissions made on his behalf by his lawyer. On 6 July 2026 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.

13.In its decision the Board[1] similarly found material inconsistencies and discrepancies as well as lack of internal coherence in the Applicant’s evidence of his claimed religion conversion from Islam to Christianity as incredible and wholly unreliable that it is not accepted that he would be perceived as a Christian convert upon his return to Egypt, nor is it accepted that there is any risk of him being arrested or prosecuted by the Egyptian authorities in the absence of any reliable evidence of any false charges alleged to have been brought by his wife’s church against him or any adverse interests that the authorities might have in him, while his claimed risk of harm from his wife or her family or lover is equally unreliable in the absence of any credible evidence other than his own suspicions or speculations, that his credibility is further undermined by his failure to properly proceed with his previous claim all these years since his arrival in Hong Kong in May 2017 even after it had subsequently been treated as withdrawn in August 2017 until almost 8 years later in March 2025 and only after his arrest by the police that he requested to raise his subsequent claim based essentially on his previous claim, and that in the absence of any evidence of any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon his return to Egypt if resorted to as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for him to move safely to other parts of the country away from his home district without any risk of being located by anyone that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.

14.On 23 July 2026 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and in his supporting affirmation of the same date he put forward the following grounds for his intended challenge:

(1)  That the Board’s decision in rejecting his appeal is unreasonable that he is not satisfied with the decision;

(2)  That the Board’s reasons for rejecting his claim of having converted to Christianity were not logical or based on reasonable analysis of the facts and evidence provided by the Applicant.

15.These are however just some bare and bald assertions of the Applicant without any relevant or necessary details or particulars or elaborations as to how they apply to his case or how the Board or the Adjudicator had erred in the decision, or in what way was the decision unfair or unreasonable or that the Adjudicator had acted procedurally unfair or irrational, or how did the Adjudicator fail to take into account of relevant COI or being selective or improperly rely on irrelevant COI in the assessment and determination of his claim, or how did the Board fail to assess his claim without proper analysis or reasoning in its decision in which the Board clearly set out in details its proper consideration and correct analysis of his claims as well as their various credibility issues. As such, and as none of these assertions were properly elaborated or presented with any relevant particulars or specifics by the Applicant, nor was he able to do so at the hearing of his application, I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for his intended challenge.

16.As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

17.In the Applicant’s case, the Board rejected his claim essentially on its adverse finding on his credibility for the thorough and detailed analysis and reasoning set out in its decision with the benefit of hearing him in his oral evidence and his answers to questions raised of his claim, and in the absence of any error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis to challenge the findings of the Board.

18.Furthermore, the fact is that it has also been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risk of harm in his claim even if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of Egypt, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.

19.Having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.

20.In the premises, as I am for the given reasons not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I refuse to grant leave and accordingly dismiss his application.

Dated the 6th day of October 2026

  (Chung Lai Fan, Christine)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant on 6 October 2026

Ahmed Gamal Ibrahim Gad

Applicant’s ref. no.:
Nil.
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 6 October 2026

Torture Claims Appeal Board
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 28228

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 2203/25 (formerly RBCZ 5002094/25)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)



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