Yuni Ritawati v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

Case No.HCAL 1815/2023[2026] HKCFI 5460
Court
High Court CFI
Date06 Oct 2026
Judge—
Case Document
100%

HCAL 1815/2023

[2026] HKCFI 5460

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1815 of 2023

BETWEEN

  Yuni Ritawati Applicant
  and  
  Torture Claims Appeal Board / Putative
  Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office Respondent
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative
    Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

    consideration of the documents only;            or
   consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:

1.  The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.

2.  The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Background

1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 10 October 2023, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 26 September 2023 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 30 March 2021 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim based on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision is set out in the following hyperlink: -

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL001815_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

2.In the Form 86, the applicant named the Board as the proposed interested party in addition to it having also been named as the proposed respondent. As the Director should have been the proper putative interested party, the Form 86 shall be amended accordingly on the court’s own motion.

3.The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by her ex-husband who demanded the applicant to repay the loan they jointly borrowed. The reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.

4.The applicant has requested for an oral hearing. On 24 August 2026, the Removal Assessment and Litigation (Removal and Deportation) Section (1) of the Immigration Department faxed a letter to the court, informing the court that the applicant would like to withdraw her judicial review application. Enclosed with the said letter was the applicant’s signed memo dated 17 August 2026 in the applicant’s native language together as well as in English. In the memo, the applicant stated that she would like to withdraw the Leave Application as the issues at home has been resolved. In the circumstances, this court will dispose of the Leave Application on paper.

Discussion

5.A leave application operates as a “filtering” process. Hence, there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced.

6.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The applicant’s Form 86 provided no such grounds. In the supporting affirmation, the applicant exhibited a submission, which averred that the Board had acted unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by having placed too much reliance on the country-of-origin information without taking into account the applicant’s personal background and experience. It was also averred that the Board had relied on some web news which were not officially recognized.

7.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the Board found that the applicant’s evidence in relation to the loan was inconsistent, unreasonable and illogical, and that she was not a credible witness. It further found that the past ill-treatment failed to reach the requisite level of severity. It further found that state protection and internal relocation would be reasonably available. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with subject to there being any public law errors.

8.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the decision of the Board, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a very high standard of fairness. The matters the applicant raised in the written submission are all general allegations without particulars. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[5].

Withdrawal application

9.Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application referred to above, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the circumstances, I make an order to dismiss the Leave Application, and hereby order the dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471; Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1140.

Order

10.The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.

11.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Dated the 6th day of October 2026

  (Alfred Chan)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant
on 6/10/2026

Yuni Ritawati

Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil.
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 6/10/2026

Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 17809

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 110/21 (formerly RBCZ 10053/21) (T2I118)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)



Form CALL-1



[1]  The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293.

[2]  Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23.

[3]  Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at §142.

[4]  Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

[5]  Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.

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