Guo Huifang v. Tam Pak Wing
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HCMP 615/2025 [2025] HKCFI 6252 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 615 OF 2025 ____________
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_______________ D E C I S I O N _______________ 1.Today is the adjourned hearing of an Originating Summons dated 24 April 2025 (“OS”) taken out by the Applicant, Guo Huifang (“Guo”), against the Respondent (“R”). By the OS, essentially the Applicant seeks:
2.In the Affirmation of Guo filed on 24 April 2025 (“Guo 1st”) in support of the OS, in gist, it is stated:
3.R has acknowledged service of the OS and indicated that he does not intend to contest the OS. 4.It is well-established that the court has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. In Convoy Global Holdings Ltd & Anor v Kwok Hiu Kwan & Anor [2022] 1 HKC 551, the Court of Appeal at §29 endorsed the following three requirements before the court’s discretionary jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief can be invoked:
5.Furthermore, the rule of the court that a declaration will not be granted when giving judgment by consent is a rule of practice and not of law and will give way to the paramount duty of the court to do fullest justice to the plaintiff to which he is entitled: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025, Vol.1, §15/16/2. 6.However, a well-established reason to refuse to grant declaratory relief is where the exercise does not serve any useful purpose: see Tang Siu Chung v The Hong Kong Society for the Deaf & Ors [2023] 4 HKLRD 176, at §95 per Anthony Chan J (as he then was). The court will also not decide academic or hypothetical questions. See also Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025, Vol. 1, §§15/16/2 and 15/16/3. 7.At the first hearing of the OS on 9 October 2025, I raised the query with the Applicant’s counsel whether a declaration should be granted when there was no suggestion in Guo 1st that the Applicant and R wished to sell the Property and whether a requisition would be raised on their title in view of the discrepancy in the names of Guo and Wang is hypothetical. I also raised the query whether the proper contradictor was R who does not oppose the application or it should be the previous vendor who sold the Property to the Applicant and R. The hearing was adjourned to today with leave to the Applicant to file a further affirmation in light of my queries. 8.Having now considered the 2nd Affirmation of Guo filed on 3 December 2025 (“Guo 2nd”) and the further submissions of Mr Lau, counsel for the Applicant (who also appeared at the first hearing of the OS), I am now satisfied that the relief sought in the OS should be granted. In particular, in Guo 2nd, the Applicant confirmed that she has the intention to sell the Property and had sought legal advice from two solicitors’ firm on this matter in March and August 2024. 9.In respect of the two declarations sought, I am satisfied that the Applicant has a real interest in the subject matter of those declarations which concerns her change of name and interest in the Property and further, she has a real interest obtaining the declaration. I am also satisfied that R is the proper contradictor, that is, someone presently existing who has a true interest in opposing the declaration sought, as he is the other joint tenant of the Property. The previous vendor has already transferred and disposed of its entire legal and beneficial interest in the Property to the Applicant and R, and has no interest in opposing the present application. 10.In Guo 2nd, it has been affirmed that the Applicant had sought two separate independent legal advice in conveyancing that the difference in both her name and HKID number would be an obstacle in any potential sale of the Property. In particular, she has been advised that the Deed Poll would not rectify past records such as the Land Registry records. Mr Lau had also referred me to Qin Tian v 譚震 (unrep) DCCJ 3712/2014, 22 July 2016 at §§111-112 where DHCJ Winnie Tsui (as she then was) held that there is no absolute rule that a statutory declaration from the relevant individual would resolve all doubts on identity. Part and parcel of proving title is to check for names and identity numbers of previous and present parties for consistency: see Sihombing and Wilkinson, Hong Kong Conveyancing Law and Practice, Vol.1A, at §VI [256]. 11.In the circumstances, I accept that the declarations sought will serve a useful purpose to assist the Applicant to prove good title when the Property is sold and to reduce the scope of dispute in the future. See West Ham Corporation v Sharp [1907] 1 KB 445 and Woolf, The Declaratory Judgment, §4-81. 12.I have not overlooked that the jurisdiction to grant relief in cases which involve future events which may or may not occur and therefore can be said to hypothetical should be exercised with great caution (see Leung T C William Roy v Secretary for Justice [2006] 4 HKLRD 211 at §28 per Ma CJHC (as he then was)), but in my view this is one of those exceptional cases. The Applicant should not have to wait until a vendor and purchaser summons is issued by the future intended purchaser to see if any requisition raised on her identity and HKID number is satisfactorily answered and risk if it is not being satisfactorily answered, payment of costs and possibly damages for breach of her duty to show good title. Alternatively, the Applicant and R might be forced to sell the Property below market price given the uncertainty over title. 13.It follows from the declarations being granted that the records at the Land Registry should be updated accordingly. 14.I make no order as to costs.
Mr Acorn Lau, instructed by Messrs. Hastings & Co., for the Applicant The Respondent was not represented and did not appear |
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