Re Ratna

CACV 797/2026, [2026] HKCA 1847

On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 4210

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 797 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 455 OF 2022)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon K Yeung JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

Introduction

1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Lewis Law dated 28 July 2026[1] (the “Judge” and the “Judge’s Decision”) refusing her application for leave to apply for judicial review.  The intended judicial review was against the decision dated 2 June 2022 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board” and the “Board’s Decision”) dismissing her appeal against the decision dated 25 November 2021 of the Director of Immigration rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim (the “Director” and the “Director’s Decision”).

Background

2.The applicant is a national of Indonesia.  She came to Hong Kong as a foreign domestic helper.  She had had three separate employment contracts.  The first one started in November 2016, and was completed.  The second and third contracts were terminated prematurely.  The third one was terminated just one day after it began on 12 August 2019.  Instead of returning to Indonesia by 27 August 2019 as required by her visa conditions, the applicant overstayed in Hong Kong.  She was arrested by the police on 13 February 2021.  After her arrest, she applied for non-refoulement protection with the Immigration Department.  Her claim was assessed on all risks: torture risk[2], BOR 3 risk[3], persecution risk[4] and BOR 2[5] risk.  Her claim was made on the basis that if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by a moneylender named “Selamat” for a loan of approximately HK$80,000 (about 148 million IDR) borrowed in early 2018 to pay for her father’s medical expenses after he had a stroke.  Her father passed away in April 2018.  After that, she stopped repaying the debt.  Selamat, who had triad background, threatened to kill her and vandalised her home.

3.The Board in the Board’s Decision set out in detail the applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and the Board’s reasons for rejecting her appeal[6].  In gist, the Board found the applicant to be wholly incredible and rejected her core narrative as a fabrication[7]. The Board identified material inconsistencies in her evidence, including conflicting evidence about her father’s illness, the loan amount, and the interest payments[8]. The Board found it implausible that the moneylender would have lent her money when her monthly income was less than the required interest payment[9]. Crucially, even if her account was true, the Board found that the alleged harm came from a non-state actor and did not reach the minimum level of severity for torture or CIDTP[10]. Further, the Board determined on the basis of the country of origin information (COI) that sufficient state protection was available and that internal relocation within Indonesia was a viable alternative[11]. Consequently, the Board concluded that the applicant had failed to substantiate her claim for protection under any applicable grounds.

4.By a Form 86 filed on 10 June 2022, the applicant applied for leave to seek judicial review of the Board’s Decision.  In her Form 86, she sought inter alia an order of certiorari to quash the Director’s Decision and the Board’s Decision.  Her grounds for seeking relief are summarised at [8] to [10] of the Form CALL-1 dated 28 July 2026.  For the reasons given at [11] to [15], the Judge dismissed the applicant’s application without an oral hearing.  In gist, the Judge refused leave as none of the applicant’s grounds were reasonably arguable.  The Board had applied the correct legal threshold and its factual findings were not irrational.  The Board found the applicant’s claim not credible.  The Board was justified in giving more weight to the COI than the applicant’s assertions.  There was no procedural unfairness as the applicant had been given the opportunity to explain her case at an oral hearing.

Appeal to this Court

5.On 3 August 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Appeal against the Judge’s Decision.  She states therein the following as her grounds of appeal:

“[The applicant] will face hardship if he [sic.] is to return back to his home country and that the Torture Claims Appeal Board has significantly relied on the source of news which is not officially recognized, or it is simply hearsay.  They have also relied on some cases which are outdated considering the dramatic changes.  The lack of credible source of information has resulted in them making groundless speculations.”

6.The applicant’s written submissions lodged on 12 August 2026 may be summarised as follows:

(a)  The Board’s Decision has a significant effect on the applicant’s torture claim, and high standards of fairness are hence required: Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289 at [43] to [45] and [51]; and ST v Betty Kwan[12] [2014] 4 HKLRD 277;

(b)  The appeal before the Board was a rehearing.  The Board erred in approaching the matter by trying to see if it could “find fault with the decision of the Immigration Officer”.  As part of the rehearing, the Board ought to have considered matters such as the country conditions;

(c)  At common law, there are minimum standards of procedural fairness required in decision-making process, and the decision-maker is under a constitutional duty to act fairly: The Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at 383D; Pearl Securities Limited v Stock Exchange of Hong Kong [1999] 2 HKLRD 243 at 253C-D; and Rowse v Secretary for the Civil Service & Ors [2008] 5 HKLRD 217 at [134].

7.At the hearing, the applicant indicated that she had nothing to add to her written submissions.

Discussion

8.In assessing the merits of the appeal, we shall have regard to the legal principles which this Court has adopted in dealing with appeals in non-refoulement cases: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714 at [13]; and Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at [11].  In particular, the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal.  The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.  In the determination of an appeal against the refusal of leave by the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.  It is not the role of this Court to examine the decision of the Board afresh as if the appeal were a fresh application for judicial review.

9.Further, it is well-established that assessments of evidence, COI, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director as they are primary decision makers.  The Court, in its supervisory role, will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022.  

10.For the following reasons, and in the light of the established legal principles set out above, we are of the view that the grounds and arguments put forward by the applicant have no merits:

(a)  Firstly and importantly, the applicant’s submissions are directed at the Board’s Decision.  The applicant has not pointed to any error in the Judge’s Decision;

(b)  We have in any event considered her grounds and submissions;

(c)  The complaint in the Notice of Appeal about the use of and reliance on the COI is vague and general.  The applicant did not identify which item of the COI was incorrect, outdated or unverified, or how they could have materially affected the assessment of the Board;

(d)  In any event, the Board found that the applicant was not a credible witness, and her story about she having borrowed money from the moneylender a fabrication.  That was the main reason for dismissing her appeal.  Any reference to COI was subsidiary and insignificant;

(e)  The complaint that the Board failed to approach the appeal as a rehearing is factually incorrect.  It is evident from the Board’s Decision that it did not approach the appeal by simply reviewing the Director’s Decision to see if it was justified.  On the contrary, the Board gave independent and detailed consideration to and analysis of the applicant’s claim and evidence before reaching its own findings and conclusions on the case;

(f)  As to the cases and legal principles cited in the written submissions, the applicant has not explained how they relate or apply to her case or this appeal.  We are in any event satisfied that the requisite standards which the applicant raises have been attained.

11.Having considered the materials before us, we are of the view that none of the grounds advanced by the applicant is reasonably arguable.  There is no proper basis for us to disturb the Judge’s Decision.  The applicant’s appeal has no merits.  We dismiss the same.

The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person.

[1]  [2026] HKCFI 4210.

[2]  This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

[3]  This refers to risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[4]  This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non‑refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

[5]  This refers to the risk of being arbitrarily deprived of life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[6]  https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2022/HCAL000455_2022_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

[7]  §§80 to 85, 133 of the Board’s Decision.

[8]  §§44-47, 65-68 of the Board’s Decision.

[9]  §§62-64 of the Board’s Decision.

[10]  §§71-74, 103, 112 of the Board’s Decision.

[11]  §§96, 124-131 of the Board’s Decision.

[12]  It was mistakenly cited as ST v Director orImmigration.