Chan Chi Lim Felix, Sole Administrator of the Estate of Koo Shui Bing , Deceased v. Koo Cheuk Wa and Another
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DCCJ 7273/2024 [2026] HKDC 1773 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO 7273 OF 2024 ---------------------------------------
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------------------------ DECISION ------------------------ 1.This is the 2nd Defendant’s appeal, brought under Order 58 of the Rules of the District Court (“RDC”), against the following orders made by Registrar M Soong on 5 June 2026 (“Registrar Soong’s Order”):
2.The 2nd Defendant also issued a summons on 7 August 2026 seeking a stay of execution of Registrar Soong’s Order (“Stay Summons”). However, at the appeal hearing, Mr Suen, counsel for the Plaintiff, indicated that the Plaintiff would not seek to enforce Registrar Soong’s Order before the determination of the 2nd Defendant’s appeal. Both parties therefore agreed that it was unnecessary for me to address the Stay Summons. Accordingly, this judgment is concerned solely with the 2nd Defendant’s appeal. Background and the Plaintiff’s claim 3.The following factual background is drawn primarily from the Statement of Claim and the Affirmation of Chan Chi Lim, Felix, filed by the Plaintiff (“PL”) in support of his original summary judgment application dated 13 March 2026. 4.Ms Koo Shui Bing (古瑞冰) (the “Deceased”), who resided at Flat E, 19/F, The Blue Yard, 1 Tai Uk Street, Tsuen Wan, New Territories, Hong Kong (“Blue Yard Flat 19E”), passed away on 10 March 2020. 5.PL is the nephew of the Deceased. On 2 April 2024, the Court of First Instance granted PL Letters of Administration of all the real and personal estate and effects of the Deceased under Grant No HCAG0012l6/2022, making him the sole lawfully appointed administrator of the Deceased’s estate in Hong Kong. 6.The Schedule of Assets and Liabilities annexed to the Letters of Administration lists the following two real properties: (a) Blue Yard Flat 19E and (b) Godown 1, located at 2/F, Elite Industrial Centre, No 883 Cheung Sha Wan Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong (“Godown 1”). 7.Land Registry records show that the Deceased became the sole owner of Godown 1 on 3 January 2006 and remained the owner until the date of death. 8.The 1st Defendant (“D1”), the elder brother of the Deceased, was an ordinary resident of Hong Kong, with his usual or last known address at Flat F, 19/F, The Blue Yard, 1 Tai Uk Street, Tsuen Wan, New Territories, Hong Kong (“Blue Yard Flat 19F”). 9.The 2nd Defendant (“D2”) was the wife of D1, with her usual or last known address also at Blue Yard Flat 19F. Detention of the title deeds of Blue Yard Flat 19E and Godown 1 10.At the date of the Deceased’s death, both (a) Blue Yard Flat 19E and (b) Godown 1 were registered solely in the Deceased’s name on the Land Register of the Land Registry of Hong Kong. Accordingly, there was no dispute that the Deceased was the legal owner of both properties at the time of his death. 11.Furthermore, at the time of the Deceased’s death, the relevant title deeds and documents for the two properties (“Title Deeds”) were secured in an iron box (“Iron Box”), which was itself kept in safe deposit box no 293-51261 at Hang Seng Bank, Kowloon Main Branch, 618 Nathan Road, Mongkok, Kowloon, Hong Kong (“Safe Deposit Box”). The Safe Deposit Box was, at the material time, registered in the joint names of the Deceased and D1. 12.After the Deceased’s passing, in or about May or June 2020, D1 and D2 accessed the Safe Deposit Box. Shortly thereafter, D1 informed PL of the locked Iron Box inside and stated that the key to the Iron Box was missing. 13.Subsequently, in or about May or June 2020, while sorting through the Deceased’s personal belongings at Blue Yard Flat 19E, PL found a chain of miscellaneous keys. He informed D1 and D2 of this discovery, and they took the keys away in order to attempt to open the Iron Box. 14.Then, in or about June or July 2020, while PL was again sorting through the Deceased’s personal effects at Blue Yard Flat 19E, D2 informed PL that she and D1 had successfully opened the Iron Box and removed the Title Deeds. According to D2, D1 gave the Title Deeds to her to take away. 15.Thereafter, D2 showed PL the Title Deeds. Since then, the Title Deeds have been retained by D1 and/or D2. 16.On 26 August 2024, during a telephone conversation, D2 admitted to PL that she and/or D1 had removed the Title Deeds from the Iron Box inside the Safe Deposit Box. 17.On 3 September 2024, after PL became the sole administrator of the Deceased’s estate, he requested D2 to hand over the Title Deeds for the lawful administration of the Deceased’s two properties. 18.In addition, PL’s solicitors issued written demands by letters dated 2 August 2024, 5 September 2024, and 9 October 2024 to D1 and D2, requesting the return of the Title Deeds. 19.Despite PL’s oral request and the written demands from his solicitors, neither D1 nor D2 returned the Title Deeds to PL. 20.On 9 December 2024, D1 also passed away. Since then, D2 has had possession and control of the Title Deeds, and has continued to retain them up to the present. Trespass to Blue Yard Flat 19E 21.On 7 November 2024, PL, as the sole administrator of the Deceased’s estate, authorized Mr Lee Yiu Kwan (“Mr Lee”) to enter Blue Yard Flat 19E and recover vacant possession. 22.That afternoon, Mr Lee arrived at The Blue Yard. Upon learning the reason for his visit, the management office staff alerted D2 to Mr Lee’s presence and the purpose of his visit. 23.At that time, D2 was not present in Blue Yard Flat 19F. She soon returned to The Blue Yard and adamantly opposed Mr Lee’s attempt to enter and recover vacant possession of Blue Yard Flat 19E. 24.Although Mr Lee presented D2 with a true copy of the Letters of Administration, D2 refused to recognize PL’s rights as the sole administrator of the Deceased’s estate and prevented Mr Lee from entering Blue Yard Flat 19E. She further claimed that some of her belongings remained inside the flat. 25.In these circumstances, PL commenced the present action on 9 December 2024, seeking (a) against D1 and D2, among other relief, the delivery up of the Title Deeds, and (b) against D2 alone, the delivery up of vacant possession of Blue Yard Flat 19E and an injunction restraining D2 from entering or taking possession of the same. 26.On 9 June 2025, D2 filed and served her Defence. 27.By way of an Order 14 summons dated 13 March 2026, PL sought to enter final judgment against D2 for the delivery up of the title deeds and documents relating to Godown 1, as well as an extension of time to file a reply to D2’s Defence until 28 days after the determination of the summary judgment application. 28.On 5 June 2026, PL’s application was heard by Registrar Soong, who entered summary judgment against D2 (the “Registrar Soong’s Order”). 29.On 18 June 2026, D2 filed a Notice of Appeal to the Judge in Chambers against Registrar Soong’s Order. 30.In compliance with the order, PL filed and served his Reply to Defence of the 2nd Defendant on 22 June 2026. The relevant legal principles 31.An appeal under Order 58, rule 1 of the RDC is a re-hearing of the application before the master whose decision is being challenged. 32.The principles governing an Order 14 Summons are well-established. While the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the claim, the defendant, in an application for summary judgment, must demonstrate a credible defence that raises triable issues, or otherwise show that the case ought to proceed to trial for some other reason: see Order 14, rule 3(1) of the RDC. 33.In discharging this burden, the defendant must provide particulars. Mere assertions are insufficient; the defence must be credible, though not necessarily believed. See Ontone Finance Company Limited v Leung Siu Kee and Others (unreported; HCA 408/2011, 28 February 2012) at §23:
34.The credibility of the defence is assessed by reference to inherent probability and the contemporaneous documentary evidence: see Paul Y Management Limited v Eternal Unity Development Limited & Ors CACV 16/2008 (12 August 2008) at §19. However, the hearing is not a mini-trial on affidavits: see On Loong Investment Company Ltd v IO of Wah Luen Industrial Centre HCA 341/2014 (8 January 2016) at §20. The defence of the 2nd Defendant 35.In her Defence filed on 9 June 2025, D2 made the following admissions:
36.In respect of Blue Yard Flat 19E, D2 pleaded that D1 paid the purchase price and that, as a result, the Deceased held the property on a resulting trust for D1. Consequently, D1 was the beneficial owner of Blue Yard Flat 19E. 37.Notably, D2 did not raise any defence to PL’s claim regarding Godown 1 in her Defence. 38.In opposition to PL’s application for summary judgment, D2 filed the 2nd Affirmation of Lau Mee Ho on 3 June 2026 (“D2 Affirmation”). Although D2 also filed and served her 3rd Affirmation on 7 August 2026, that affirmation was submitted solely in support of her stay application, which is not addressed here. 39.In the D2 Affirmation, she confirms that she took the Title Deeds from Hang Seng Bank, Kowloon Main Branch, on D1’s instructions, and that the Title Deeds were kept by D1 until his death on 9 December 2024. She further asserts that she has no power or authority to deal with or deliver up the Title Deeds to PL. However, she does not deny being in possession of the Title Deeds. 40.Instead, D2 claims that the Title Deeds form part of D1’s estate. Although she is applying for a grant of probate, she has not yet been appointed as the administrator of D1’s estate and therefore has no standing to deal with it. 41.The above summarises the relevant evidence presented by D2; the remainder of her affirmation consists of irrelevant factual assertions or arguments in opposition. 42.Notably, D2 does not deny that she is in possession and control of the Title Deeds. Further, in the D2 Affirmation, she makes no assertion that either D1 or D2 has any right or interest in Godown 1, nor does she suggest that the Deceased was not the sole beneficial owner of Godown 1. Discussion 43.Not only has D2 admitted in her pleadings that the Title Deeds belong to the estate of the Deceased, but as a matter of law, the registered owner of a property is entitled to all title deeds relating to it: Hung Kwai Ching v Lo Sut Po (1912) 7 HKLR 175 per Rees Davies CJ at p 178, citing Harrington v Price (1832) 110 ER 63. 44.Accordingly, since the Deceased was the sole registered owner of Godown 1 and PL is the sole administrator of the Deceased’s estate, PL is entitled to recover the relevant title deeds of Godown 1 from D2. 45.D2 has not raised any defence to PL’s claim regarding Godown 1 in her pleadings, let alone a real or bona fide defence capable of belief. Nor did D2 raise any triable issue concerning Godown 1 in her Affirmation. 46.At the appeal hearing, Ms Josie Lee, counsel for D2, again confirmed that both properties are registered in the name of the Deceased and that PL is the sole administrator of the Deceased’s estate. In paragraph 13 of Ms Lee’s skeleton submissions, she further confirmed that D2 is in possession of the Title Deeds. 47.However, Ms Lee argued that:
48.In her oral submissions, Ms Lee added a third point: when D2 becomes the executrix of D1’s estate, she may obtain further information, and at that stage, D1’s estate might be able to assert a claim over Godown 1 (the “Potential Claim Argument”). 49.With respect to the Bailee Argument, there is no evidence that D1 owned the Title Deeds; on the contrary, D2 has admitted that the Title Deeds belong to the estate of the Deceased. 50.Furthermore, the mere fact that D1 handed the Title Deeds to D2 does not confer any right on D1 to the Title Deeds, let alone a title superior to that of the registered owner of the properties. Accordingly, there is no basis for D2 or Ms Lee to argue that the Title Deeds vested in D1’s estate upon his death. In any event, a bare assertion to that effect is insufficient to justify leave to defend. 51.As to Ms Lee’s argument that D2 was merely a bailee, in my judgment, her possessory title to the Title Deeds does not override the rights of the legal owner. The Deceased, and after his death, his estate, as the sole legal owner of Blue Yard Flat 19E and Godown 1, clearly has a superior title to the Title Deeds and an immediate right to possession. 52.Furthermore, it is well established that D2’s unlawful detention of the Title Deeds belonging to the Deceased’s estate constitutes conversion. D2 cannot evade liability by claiming she was merely a bailee acting for D1 or D1’s estate. In Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Finch and Read [1962] 1 QB 701 at p 706, cited in Fook Woo Waste Paper Co Ltd v Leung Kai Kuen (unreported, HCA 1922/2012, 24 September 2015) at §37, Danckwerts LJ summarised the tort of conversion as follows:
53.In addition, D2’s reliance on agency, or the manner in which she came into possession of the Title Deeds, is legally irrelevant. Where an agent personally commits the acts constituting a tort, the agent remains personally liable for those acts, even if they were performed on behalf of or attributed to the principal: Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (Nos 2 and 4) [2003] 1 AC 959 at §§35–40. 54.The Bailee Argument is therefore rejected. 55.For the same reasons, the Triable Issue Argument is equally unarguable. 56.With respect to the Potential Claim Argument, as Ms Lee admitted at the hearing, this argument is based purely on speculation at this stage and is unsupported by any evidence. Moreover, given that D2 was D1’s wife and has no knowledge of whether D1 had any interest in Godown 1, it is highly unlikely that she will be able to add anything further after becoming the personal representative or executrix of D1’s estate. This argument is therefore rejected. 57.In my judgment, D2 has raised no triable issue in relation to the title deeds of Godown 1, whether in her Defence or her Affirmation. Summary judgment should therefore be entered against D2, as Registrar Soong did. Conclusion 58.Accordingly, I affirm the order of Registrar Soong made on 5 June 2026, and D2’s Notice of Appeal dated 18 June 2026 is dismissed. 59.As to costs, there shall be an order nisi that D2 shall pay PL the costs of this appeal, summarily assessed at HK$65,000. This costs order nisi shall become absolute unless any party applies by summons to vary it within 14 days.
Mr Ivan Suen, instructed by H Y Leung & Co LLP, for the Plaintiff Ms Josie Lee, instructed by Peter W K Lo & Co, for the 2nd Defendant The 1st Defendant died on 9th December 2024, was not represented and did not appear | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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