Tailor Siraj Nizamuddin v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

CACV 91/2026, [2026] HKCA 1802

On Appeal from [2026] HKCFI 85

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 91 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1290 OF 2020)

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BETWEEN

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JUDGMENT

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Hon H. Au-Yeung J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

THE APPLICATION

1.On 8 April 2026, this Court handed down a judgment ([2026] HKCA 611) (“the Judgment”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) YW Hew (“the Judge”) dated 28 January 2026 refusing to grant leave to apply for judicial review.  The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) rejecting his non-refoulement claim.

2.The facts and issues in the applicant’s appeal, as well as the reasons for dismissing it, were set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.

3.By a Notice of Motion filed on 15 April 2026, the applicant applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal by stating that:

“Dear Sir/Madam,

With due respect and humble request to review my appeal and the claim, because I do not agree with the decision of the Court and the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board. The all the decisions are made by the decision maker simply. No decision makers did scrutinize my claim properly. My problem is very severe in my home country and if I return there I will be killed by my enemies.”

4.In his written submissions lodged on 27 April 2026, he repeats the gist of the Notice of Motion.  He further alleges various unparticularised deficiencies in the decisions of the Director, Board and the Judge (such as the Judge’s failure to “apply” irrationality and procedural unfairness to the decisions of the Director and the Board, irrationality in the Board’s decision as to state protection and the Board failed to give him sufficient chance to arrange relevant evidence).  He also states that he will face hardship and death and that he fears torture if refouled.  These further arguments were not raised in the substantive appeal before us. 

5.Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on paper.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents before the Court.

DISCUSSION

6.Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484, Laws of Hong Kong) (“the Ordinance”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Final Appeal, from any judgment of the Court of Appeal in any civil cause or matter, whether final or interlocutory, if, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Final Appeal, as the case may be, the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

7.In the present application, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters which he has raised.

8.Further, the Notice of Motion has not identified any error in the Judgment.

9.As for the applicant’s new arguments in the written submissions, it is not permissible for him to raise them at this stage.  In any event, they are bare allegations.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: see Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. 

10.We are therefore satisfied that this application has no merits.  Neither do we see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the Ordinance.

DISPOSITION

11.For the above reasons, the matters advanced by the applicant do not constitute valid grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. 

12.The Notice of Motion filed on 15 April 2026 is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs.

The applicant, acting in person