Yuen Yick Hang Aliston v. Yuen Chi Kwong and Another
|
HCMP 163/2024 [2026] HKCFI 5635 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 163 OF 2024 _________________ BETWEEN
_________________
_______________________________ DECISION ON COSTS _______________________________ 1.I refer to my judgment herein dated 26 August 2026 (the “Judgment”) ([2026] HKCFI 3930)[1]. 2.Pursuant to paragraph 143 of the Judgment, the question of costs shall be dealt with on paper, and the parties have lodged written submissions (which I have considered). 3.This is my decision on costs. 4.To recap briefly: -
5.As stated in paragraph 4 of the Judgment, the nature of the proceedings under the present action (which was taken out pursuant to Order 85) was not necessarily adversarial in nature. However, having heard the trial and having canvassed the submissions and evidence from the parties, I have no doubt that the Applicant and the 2nd Respondent had fought a full-blown hostile litigation against each other. 6.I am not of the view that this is a typical case where the beneficiaries of a trust seek the court’s guidance as to how the trust should be administered properly. 7.On the contrary, it appears to me that the underlying agendas of the parties are as follows: -
8.As already pointed out in paragraph 4 of the Judgment, the interests of the Applicant and the 10 Individuals are, in reality, averse to the interests of the 2nd Respondent and the 47 persons he represents. Obviously, if there are members of the Two Tsos living in the Luohu Village (as contended by the 2nd Respondent), the 10 Individuals’ share in the interests under the Two Tso would be smaller. 9.Against this background, it is understandable as to why the parties would fight a full-blow battle against each other in the most hostile manner. 10.In this connection, I have no doubt that instead of rendering assistance to the court in a helpful and neutral manner, the stance of the Applicant was hostile. As evidenced by the Judgment itself, the Applicant’s legal representatives had left no stone unturned. They pursued all plausible arguments for the purpose of advancing the proposition that no residents in Luohu Village could be the descendants of Yuen Wun U (袁煥宇). The Applicant even sought to dispute the authenticity of various historical documents issued by public authorities (when there was no proper basis for him to do so)[2]. 11.In the premises, I accept the submissions of Mr Stewart Wong SC (for the 2nd Respondent) that the general rule of costs follows the event should apply. 12.Since the 2nd Respondent has persuaded this court that the questions raised in the originating summons should not be answered in favour of the Applicant, the 2nd Respondent is the successful party and the Applicant is the unsuccessful party. Hence, the starting point is that the 2nd Respondent is entitled to recover his costs from the Applicant. 13.However, it should be pointed out that one of the discrete issues that was resolved under my Judgment was whether the 10 Individuals are the descendants of Yuen Wun U (袁煥宇) and hence members of the Two Tsos. Despite the submissions advanced on behalf of the 2nd Respondent, I eventually accept the Applicant’s case that the 10 Individuals are in fact the descendants of Yuen Wun U (袁煥宇) and hence members of the Two Tsos. 14.In my view, the costs order that I make shall reflect the fact that although the Applicant was the overall unsuccessful party, the Applicant was successful on the aforesaid discrete issue. 15.Be that as it may, the reality was such that the bulk of the submissions advanced by the parties and the bulk of the evidence adduced by the parties concerned the question of whether there have been living members of the Two Tsos in the Luohu Village. 16.I am only minded to deduct the costs to which the Applicant is entitled by 20%. 17.In light of the factual complexity involved in the dispute between the parties, it was plainly justifiable for the 2nd Respondent to engage a senior counsel and a junior counsel. 18.For all the above reasons, I make a costs order absolute that the Applicant shall pay 80% of the 2nd Respondent’s costs in these proceedings, including (i) all costs previously reserved (except the costs in respect of the 2nd Respondent’s summons filed on 26 November 2025)[3]; (ii) all costs in the cause; and (iii) the costs incurred in lodging submissions on the question of costs, to be taxed on a party-to-party basis if not agreed (with certificate for 2 counsel). 19.I thank Mr Valentine Yim, Mr Aidan Tam, Ms Chelsea Lau, Ms Reina Lee, Mr Stewart Wong SC and Mr Philips SY Li for their helpful assistance.
Mr Valentine Yim, Mr Aidan Tam, Ms Chelsea Lau and Ms Reina Lee, instructed by Johnny KK Leung & Co, for Applicant Mr Steward Wong SC and Mr Philip SY Li, instructed by Chen & Lee Law Office, for 2nd Respondent [1] In this Decision on Costs, I adopt the same definitions and nomenclature that were used in the Judgment dated 26 August 2026. [2] See eg Judgment, paras 51 and 59 [3] By summons dated 26 November 2025 (the “Substitution Summons”), the 2nd Respondent sought substitution of witnesses by reason of his illness, and the Applicant and YKH had respectively filed their 5th affirmation and 2nd affirmation in reply to the 2nd Respondent’s assertions in his affirmations filed earlier (the “Reply Affirmations”). The costs in respect of the Substitution Summons and the Reply Affirmations have been reserved. Insofar as the Substitution Summons is concerned, I am not of the view that the 2nd Respondent could be blamed for being seriously ill. This is simply a vicissitude of life. Meanwhile, his litigation conduct has reasonable and cooperative. I make no order as to costs in respect of the Substitution Summons. As submitted by Mr Stewart Wong SC, the Applicant had filed the Reply Affirmations long before the 2nd Respondent became ill in May 2025. It appears to me that the Reply Affirmations did address the substantive issues in question. This was exactly why the Reply Affirmations were adopted as part of the Applicant and YKH’s evidence in the course of the trial. Thus, it cannot be said that the costs incurred in respect of the Reply Affirmation were wasted by reason of the 3rd Respondent’s illness. The costs in respect of the Reply Affirmations should form part of the costs in these proceedings. Since the 2nd Applicant is by and large the successful party in these proceedings, he should be entitled to 80% of the costs in relation to the Reply Affirmations. |
Summaries and metadata are generated from the judgment. Report an error
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCMP 163/2024