Secretary for Justice v. Woo Tak Yan
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DCCJ 5700/2023 [2026] HKDC 1922 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO 5700 OF 2023 --------------------------------------- BETWEEN
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------------------------ DECISION ------------------------ A. INTRODUCTION 1.By an Amended Summons filed on 5 May 2026 (“the Amended Summons”)[1], the Plaintiff applies for summary judgment against the Defendant under Order 14 of the Rules of the District Court (Cap. 336H) (“RDC”), and for the striking out and dismissal of the Defendant’s Amended Counterclaim under Order 18 rule 19 of the RDC. 2.The Plaintiff is the Secretary for Justice, suing on behalf of the Director of the Environmental Protection Department (“EPD”). The Defendant, Mr Woo Tak Yan, is a former Senior Environmental Protection Inspector of the EPD. 3.The Plaintiff’s action is founded in trespass to land and involuntary bailment, arising from the Defendant’s failure to remove his personal belongings (“the Left Property”) from Room 3402 to 3410, 34/F, Hopewell Centre, 183 Queen’s Road East, Wan Chai (“the Office”) following his interdiction from duty in April 2021, and his subsequent failure to retrieve the Left Property after it was relocated to commercial mini-storages.[2] 4.The Defendant denies the Plaintiff’s claim and counterclaims for damages of not more than HK$3,000,000.00 for alleged loss and damage to his property, and for psychological harm.[3] 5.By the Amended Summons, the Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, for: (a) interlocutory judgment for mini-storage expenses incurred from 23 May 2021 until complete retrieval or disposal of the Left Property, with the amount to be assessed; (b) a declaration that the Left Property has been abandoned by the Defendant and that the Plaintiff is entitled to dispose of it at will; (c) an order that the Defendant pay the expenses incurred in disposing of the Left Property, to be assessed; and (d) the striking out and dismissal of the Defendant’s Amended Counterclaim.[4] 6.At the hearing before me on 20 July 2026 (“the Hearing”), the Plaintiff was represented by Miss Heidi Yuen, Senior Government Counsel. The Defendant appeared in person. 7.At the conclusion of the Hearing, I reserved judgment and indicated that I would hand down the judgment at a later date. I now do so. B. BACKGROUND B1. Factual Background 8.The background facts giving rise to this action can be briefly summarized as follows. 9.At all material times, the Financial Secretary Incorporated was the tenant on behalf of the Government of the Office, which was occupied and used by the EPD as office premises in Wan Chai. The Defendant was a Senior Environmental Protection Inspector of the EPD stationed at Room 3402.[5] 10.On 12 April 2021, the Defendant was served with a letter informing him that he was interdicted from duty with immediate effect. He was directed not to return to the Office during his interdiction period and was requested to remove his essential personal belongings before leaving. When the Defendant departed the Office that day, he left behind the Left Property, a substantial bulk of personal items comprising approximately 230 boxes, bags, and loose chattels which took up 5 mini-storage units.[6] 11.Between 20 and 23 April 2021, the EPD made offers to transport the Left Property to the Defendant’s residential address.[7] The Defendant did not accept these offers[8] and contended that they were unilateral orders, alleging he was told his belongings would be sent to a landfill if he refused delivery.[9] Afterward, the EPD arranged for the Left Property to be packed and relocated to mini-storages. The EPD further granted the Defendant a one-month grace period ending on 22 May 2021 to retrieve the Left Property free of storage charges[10], while giving written notice that storage expenses incurred thereafter would be recovered from him. While the Defendant alleges that EPD staff further gave oral undertakings regarding flexible access, video records of the packing process, and an extension of the grace period[11]; the Plaintiff denies that any such undertakings were given. 12.In May 2021, the Defendant submitted memos requesting written justifications and an itemized inventory list prior to agreeing to a “one-go” collection[12]. The EPD maintained that the relocation was a legitimate administrative arrangement and reminded him of the 22 May 2021 deadline. Since 27 April 2021, the EPD and the Department of Justice (“DoJ”) have regularly issued reminder letters and demand notes to the Defendant[13]. Up to the date of this hearing, the Left Property remains uncollected and stored in the mini-storages[14]. 13.On 3 September 2021, the Secretary for the Civil Service directed that the Defendant be retired from the public service in the public interest under section 12 of the Public Service (Administration) Order[15]. The Defendant asserts that the EPD acquiesced to his keeping personal belongings in office spaces, and then points to a 2018 office space dispute in which the EPD did not pursue an intended trespass action against him as evidence of waiver or estoppel.[16] The Plaintiff denies any waiver or acquiescence, relying on departmental circulars prohibiting personal use of office space and formal warning letters issued to the Defendant by the DoJ in October and November 2018.[17] B2. Procedural Background 14.On 3 June 2021, the Defendant commenced proceedings in the Small Claims Tribunal (“SCT”) in SCTC 20747/2021 (“the SCT Proceedings”) against the Secretary for Justice, claiming damages for alleged conversion, trespass to goods, and infringement of property rights in respect of the Left Property[18]. On 20 September 2021, the Plaintiff filed a counterclaim in the SCT Proceedings for the recovery of mini-storage rental fees. Because the accrued storage costs continued to accumulate and eventually exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of the SCT, the Plaintiff discontinued its counterclaim in the SCT on 16 November 2023[19]. On 18 December 2023, the Plaintiff commenced the present District Court action by issuing a Writ of Summons to recover the storage expenses and seek a declaration of abandonment. 15.The SCT Proceedings proceeded to trial before Deputy Adjudicator Amos Ma. On 10 October 2024, the learned Deputy Adjudicator handed down judgment (“the SCT Judgment”) dismissing the Defendant’s claim in its entirety with costs to the Plaintiff[20]. In the SCT Judgment, the Deputy Adjudicator found, inter alia, that the Defendant was an unreliable witness[21], that his claims were “plainly and utterly unmeritorious” and “essentially a set up”[22]. On the other hand, the Deputy Adjudicator ruled that the EPD had acted reasonably as an involuntary bailee and in self-help against trespass to land[23]. 16.Subsequently, the Defendant’s review application under section 27A of the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338) was dismissed on 29 November 2024[24]. On 17 February 2025, DHCJ Alan Kwong refused the Defendant’s application for leave to appeal in HCSA 67/2024 (“the HCSA Judgment”). 17.As far as the procedures in these proceedings are concerned:
C. THE PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT C1. Applicable Legal Principles 18.The principles governing an application for summary judgment under Order 14 of the RDC are well settled. Once the plaintiff’s application is properly constituted, the plaintiff is prima facie entitled to judgment unless the defendant shows cause to the contrary by demonstrating a real or bona fide defence, or that there is some other reason for a trial. As Bokhary JA (as he then was) observed in Re Safe Rich Industries Ltd[31]:
19.In Guanghua SS Holdings Ltd v Lim Yew Cheng [2022] HKCFI 1052, Ng J succinctly set out the proper approach under Order 14, which was recently applied by DHCJ Andrew Li in Oriental FA Ltd v To Yuen Fang Louise [2025] HKCFI 2689, as follows:
20.A defendant showing cause must therefore “condescend upon particulars” and state clearly what the defence is and what facts support it. A bare denial or general traverse is plainly insufficient[32]. Crucially, leave to defend will not be granted where the defence raised consists of matters or issues that have already been decided against the defendant in previous proceedings between the same parties[33]. Under the doctrine of issue estoppel, where a relevant issue of fact or law has been distinctly raised and finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties are precluded from re-litigating that same issue in subsequent proceedings, and an attempt to do so is an abuse of the process of the Court; see: Ko Hon Yue v Chiu Pik Yuk (2012) 15 HKCFAR 72, per Ma CJ at §83(5)(a). C2. The Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case 21.In my judgment, the Plaintiff has established a clear prima facie case on liability. 22.In respect of trespass to land, the Government, acting through the Financial Secretary Incorporated, was at all material times the lawful tenant in occupation and possession of the Office[34]. It is well established that placing or leaving chattels on land in the possession of another without consent constitutes an actionable trespass: Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (24th Ed.), at §§18-01, 18-02. An occupier subjected to such an ongoing intrusion is entitled, upon exercising reasonable care, to remove the offending chattels as a legitimate self-help remedy to regain the unhindered use and enjoyment of its premises, and to recover from the trespasser the reasonable costs of removal and storage as damages flowing directly from the trespass, see: Chan Cho Fai v Lam Kit Heung [2017] 4 HKLRD 794 per HHJ Andrew Li at §§17-18. 23.Alternatively, in involuntary bailment, by leaving the Left Property behind in the Office without permission upon his interdiction, the Defendant thrust upon the EPD the status of an involuntary bailee; see: Chan Cho Fai at §6. Further, the obligations of an involuntary bailee are well established in law. It has no positive duty to transport or deliver the chattels to the bailor’s residence at its own expense; its responsibility is limited to acting in good faith, exercising reasonable care, and keeping the goods available for collection[35]. Where, in the discharge of that duty and in reasonable mitigation of the disruption to its own premises, the bailee incurs expenses in warehousing and safekeeping the chattels, it is entitled to recoup those reasonable storage charges from the owner: British Motors Limited v Pedruco Luiz A Da Silva, unrep. DCCJ 3783/2012, 2 July 2014 per DDJ Dick Ho (as he then was) at §§78-83; Palmer on Bailment (3rd Ed.), §13-051. 24.In this case, following his interdiction on 12 April 2021, the Defendant left the Left Property behind in the Office. He declined the EPD’s offers to transport them to his residential address, leaving the department to warehouse them in commercial mini-storage. Despite repeated reminders over the years, the Defendant has, to this day, left the property uncollected. 25.Here, the Plaintiff has established a clear prima facie case on liability, the burden shifts to the Defendant to satisfy the Court that he has an arguable defence or that there is other reason why there ought to be a trial[36]. C3. The Defendant’s Defence 26.As is not uncommon with self-represented litigants, the Defendant’s pleadings, affirmations, and submissions lack the disciplined structure of legal drafting. Nevertheless, looking past matters of form to the substance of his grievances, I have examined his materials with care. Doing my best to distil from his papers and oral submissions the grounds on which he seeks to resist summary judgment, I find his defence resolves into the following contentions. I examine each below. C3.1. Alleged Lack of Authority 27.First, the Defendant contends that the removal of his property was unlawful because it was executed pursuant to an unauthorized oral order given by Mr Tsui, the Deputy Director of EPD on 20 April 2021, in the course of which Mr Tsui is alleged to have threatened that the Defendant’s belongings would be dumped in a landfill if not removed[37]. 28.With respect, this contention, which in substance asserts that the EPD acted without lawful authority, is unsustainable. Even if that were relevant, such an assertion was tried and rejected in the SCT Proceedings, where the learned Deputy Adjudicator made the finding of fact that Tsui never made the alleged order, nor did he or anyone else represent that the belongings would be sent to a landfill[38]. Second, the SCT found that the EPD acted as an occupier exercising a common law self-help remedy to regain office space, rather than exercising a statutory or public power[39]. When specifically questioned at the Hearing, the Defendant confirmed that he does not challenge the determinations of the SCT. Having raised this issue and had it determined against him at trial of the SCT Proceedings, he is precluded by issue estoppel from reviving it, and the point cannot afford an arguable defence to liability under Order 14 of the RDC. C3.2 Alleged Breach of Undertakings 29.The Defendant asserts that on 23 April 2021, the EPD orally undertook to provide him with unlimited access to the mini-storages, an extension of the one-month grace period, video recordings of the packing process and a list of his personal items[40]. 30.This defence encounters the identical estoppel. In the SCT Proceedings, the learned Deputy Adjudicator adjudicated upon this issue and made the finding of fact that no such promises or undertakings were ever given by the EPD[41]. 31.Before me, the Defendant could not identify any contemporaneous EPD document substantiating the existence of any such undertakings. The issue cannot be relitigated to create a triable issue, and the Defendant’s assertion in this regard must be rejected. C3.3 Alleged Unreasonable Conduct by EPD 32.The Defendant also complains that the EPD acted unreasonably by insisting that he retrieve the Left Property “in one go” by 22 May 2021, refusing him piecemeal access, and withholding an itemized inventory list[42]. 33.This complaint is also addressed by the SCT Judgment, which found that the EPD’s proposals were reasonable[43], that the EPD made exhaustive efforts to contact the Defendant[44], that the Defendant was never denied access to his property[45], and that he had deliberately evaded contact[46]. Moreover, the detailed List and Appendix Table have been available to the Defendant since 7 January 2026[47], yet he has still failed to retrieve his property. Clearly, the Defendant’s assertion of unreasonable conduct on the EPD’s part cannot stand and does not amount to any arguable defence. C3.4 Waiver, Acquiescence, and Estoppel 34.The Defendant further alleges that because he stored personal items in office premises throughout his 30-year civil service career, and because the EPD did not pursue an intended trespass action against him in 2018, the Plaintiff waived its rights, acquiesced in his conduct, and is estopped from asserting trespass or claiming storage costs[48]. 35.This defence cannot withstand scrutiny:
36.Having considered the above, it is clear that no waiver, acquiescence or estoppel can arise in these circumstances. Accordingly, that contention must fail. C3.5 General Denial and the 2025 Joint Inspection (“New Evidence”) 37.The Defendant further argues that his general traverse in paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Amended Defence warrants a trial[52], and that the Joint Inspection in 2025 revealed missing, damaged, or expired items, giving rise to “new and fresh evidence” not covered by the SCT Judgment[53]. 38.I cannot accept this argument. 39.First, in law, a general denial does not survive an O.14 application for summary judgment: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, Vol. 1, para. 14/4/4. 40.Second, the Joint Inspection was a court-ordered exercise conducted in late 2025 to ascertain the items in storage and to facilitate disposal or retrieval[54]. In any event, the physical condition of the goods (after four years of uncollected storage) simply does not impugn the Plaintiff’s cause of action for trespass in April 2021, nor does it affect the EPD’s entitlement as an involuntary bailee to relocate the chattels. It provides no defence to liability at all. 41.In any event, such an argument does not constitute an arguable defence. C3.6 Challenge to the Number of Mini-Storage Units 42.The Defendant further asserts that only 3 mini-storage units, rather than 5, were necessary to store the Left Property[55]. 43.With respect, this contention goes strictly to the assessment of quantum. Where a defendant’s only dispute is as to the quantum of damages, the Court’s duty under Order 14, rule 3 RDC is to enter interlocutory judgment for the plaintiff with damages or expenses to be assessed. It does not entitle the defendant to leave to defend on liability. C4. Conclusion on Order 14 Liability 44.Applying the principles in Guanghua SS Holdings Ltd (supra.) and Re Safe Rich Industries Ltd (supra.), and for the reasons above, I am satisfied that the Defendant has shown no real or bona fide defence to liability on the Plaintiff’s claim. 45.For completeness, although the Defendant counterclaims for substantial damages, he explicitly confirmed at the Hearing, when questioned by the Court, that he did not plead any defence of set-off in his Amended Defence. In any event, for the reasons elaborated in Section D below, the Amended Counterclaim is entirely unsustainable and must be struck out. It follows that there is no counterclaim capable of operating as an equitable set-off or justifying a stay of execution. 46.The Plaintiff is accordingly entitled to summary judgment on liability for the mini-storage expenses, with quantum to be assessed. The Plaintiff’s further prayer for relief concerning the abandonment and disposal of the Left Property involves distinct considerations, which I address under Section E below. 47.Now I turn to the Plaintiff’s striking out application. D. STRIKING OUT THE COUNTERCLAIM D1. The Defendant’s Counterclaim 48.By his Amended Defence and Counterclaim filed on 8 April 2026, the Defendant claims unliquidated damages capped at HK$3,000,000.00, together with an order requiring the Plaintiff to return and deliver the Left Property to him at the Plaintiff’s sole expense. The Amended Counterclaim sets out four main categories of complaint:
D2. The Applicable Principles 49.The Plaintiff applies pursuant to Order 18, rule 19(1) of the RDC to strike out the Defendant’s Amended Counterclaim in its entirety. 50.The principles governing an application to strike out under Order 18, rule 19 of the RDC are trite:-
D3. Analysis 51.Having considered the pleadings, the affirmations, and the written and oral submissions made at the hearing, I am satisfied that the Counterclaim is unsustainable and should be struck out in its entirety under Order 18, rule 19(1) of the RDC. 52.Insofar as the Defendant claims damages for the initial removal of his chattels in April 2021, these matters are barred by res judicata and represent a clear abuse of process:-
53.To re-package those concluded grievances into a HK$3,000,000.00 counterclaim is, with respect, nothing but a blatant attempt to re-litigate matters finally decided by a competent tribunal, vexing the Plaintiff twice for the same matter, amount to an abuse of the process of the Court under the rule in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, see: Ko Hon Yue v Chiu Pik Yuk (2012) 15 HKCFAR 72, per Ma CJ at §§82-83. 54.Turning to the complaints arising out of the Joint Inspection in 2025, the Counterclaim fails to disclose any reasonable cause of action under Order 18, rule 19(1)(a) of the RDC:
55.Similarly, the Defendant’s demand that the Plaintiff arrange and pay for the delivery of the Left Property is equally bad in law[67]. As noted, it is trite that an involuntary bailee owes no positive common law duty to transport or deliver goods to the bailor’s residence. Its obligation is limited to making the chattels available for collection from the place of lawful storage; see: Palmer on Bailment (3rd Ed.) at §13-023; Chitty on Contracts - Hong Kong Specific Contracts (7th Ed.), §§3-030, 032. 56.Worse still, the Defendant’s claim flies in the face of the findings of the SCT, where the learned Deputy Adjudicator found at paragraph 13 of the SCT Judgment that the Defendant had made no genuine attempts to retrieve his belongings[68]. The Defendant conceded, when questioned by the Court at the Hearing, that he had never provided a delivery address to the EPD in all five years since 2021. Pleading a counterclaim to compel delivery at public expense while systematically withholding the delivery address discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous, and, with respect, borders on the absurd. 57.On the other hand, the high-value claims advanced in the Amended Counterclaim[69] and itemised at paragraph 29 of the Defendant’s Supplemental Affirmation dated 27 February 2026[70], most notably the belated assertion that the Defendant left no less than HK2,000,000.00 in cash and a laptop containing valuable Bitcoin worth no less than HK$500,000.00 on his office desk, fall squarely within the “tissue of improbabilities” category: Chinachem Charitable Foundation Ltd v Chan Wai Tong Christopher & Ors [2022] HKCA 1907 at §6:
58.I therefore find that these high-value claims are inherently incredible. They represent nothing but a tissue of improbabilities that ought not to be sent to proof at trial, see: Chinachem (supra.) at §6; Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, Vol. 1, §18/19/9. D4. Conclusion on Striking Out 59.For these reasons, the Amended Counterclaim discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous and vexatious, and constitutes a clear abuse of the process of the Court. It is ordered that the Defendant’s Amended Counterclaim be struck out in its entirety. E. DISPOSAL OF THE LEFT PROPERTY 60.Turning to the question of disposal, the Plaintiff seeks by paragraph 2 of the Amended Summons a declaration that the Left Property has been abandoned by the Defendant and that the Plaintiff is entitled to dispose of it at will[73]. 61.However, the authorities illustrate the acute dilemma confronting an involuntary bailee burdened with uncollected goods. In Desir Anthony C v Knight Frank (Services) Ltd & Ors (unrep, HCSA 36/2013, 9 January 2015), DHCJ Marlene Ng (as she then was) at §§82-83 observed that at common law there is no general right for an involuntary bailee to destroy or dispose of chattels which the owner has neglected or refused to collect merely because they occupy space or have become an inconvenience. In the absence of an emergency or commercial necessity, an involuntary bailee who unilaterally disposes of chattels for its own benefit, even after serving warning notices, acts at its own risks incurring liability in conversion[74]. This dilemma is accentuated in Hong Kong by the absence of any statutory counterpart to the English Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, which gives bailees with a statutory procedure to sell or dispose of uncollected/abandoned goods following requisite notice and to obtain the prior sanction and protection of the Court rather than resorting to self-help disposal[75]. 62.The Plaintiff invites the Court to resolve this matter by summarily declaring, under Order 14 RDC, that the Left Property has already been abandoned by the Defendant[76]. 63.I decline to grant an immediate, retrospective declaration on those unqualified terms. 64.At common law, the abandonment of a chattel divests the owner of proprietary title, rendering the goods an abandoned thing (res derelicta). As Mr Colin Edelman QC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) observed in Robot Arenas Ltd v Simon Waterfield [2010] EWHC 115 (QB) at §§13-14 (citing Palmer on Bailment, para. 26-030), abandonment is not to be lightly inferred. It requires clear evidence of both a physical act of relinquishment and an unequivocal intention to abandon. 65.On the other hand, as Kiefel J (as she then was) explained in the Australian case Re Jigrose Pty Ltd [1994] 1 Qd R 382, at 384-386, “intention” is the decisive threshold inquiry. As in this case, where an owner maintains assertions of ownership and pursues a counterclaim for damages for conversion, the Court will be slow to make a ruling of past abandonment on affirmation evidence alone[77]. Indeed, as Mr Colin Edelman QC observed in Robot Arenas Ltd v Waterfield (supra.) at §§86-88, where a claimant allowed equipment to languish in a building but nonetheless maintained correspondence asserting an interest in recovering it, the court held that the bailee had failed to discharge the burden of proving that the owner possessed the requisite subjective intent to abandon. 66.I further note that recently in Exxon Limited v Zeng Cheng Engineering Co Limited [2024] HKDC 869 at §§20-23, Her Honour Judge G. Chow refused to grant a declaration of abandonment against a defaulting defendant, holding (citing Robot Arenas and Palmer on Bailment) that clear evidence of both intention and relinquishment is indispensable. Similarly, in Fine Gold Developments Ltd v Persons Whose Properties Are Left Uncollected [2025] HKDC 2213, DDJ Gekko Lan declined to make a declaration of abandonment regarding uncollected mini-storage goods[78]. If the court was hesitant in those cases to make a declaration of abandonment summarily against absent defendants who had disappeared and were absent at the hearing, a fortiori it will not make an immediate retrospective declaration against a defendant (like the Defendant Mr Woo in this case) who appears in person, swears affirmations, and vigorously claims ownership. 67.It does not follow, however, that an owner may insulate himself behind empty verbal protests and hold an involuntary bailee hostage as an indefinite warehouseman at public expense. An involuntary bailee is not required to submit to a perpetual encumbrance or endure a never-ending disruption. 68.Notably, in the present case, the SCT previously found as a matter of fact that the Defendant had no genuine intention of retrieving his property. It is a finding which binds the Defendant by way of issue estoppel. As set out at paragraph 102 of the SCT Judgment[79]:
69.Further, the decision in Campbell v Redstone Mortgages Ltd [2015] 1 P & C R DG18; [2014] EWHC 3081 (Ch) (which is not cited by the parties) provides guidance to this court on how it evaluates an owner who relies on assertions of ownership to obstruct a bailee[80]. 70.In that case, upon executing a warrant for possession over a farm, the mortgagee in possession became an involuntary bailee of a vast quantity of uncollected chattels left behind by the mortgagor. The court intervened by granting orders that set specific and supervised access windows for the owner to remove her belongings. Despite ample time over several court-ordered access periods, the owner refused to engage constructively, removed only a fraction of the items, and barricaded herself inside the premises in defiance of the access orders. Dismissing the owner’s claim against the bailee for conversion by disposal, Mr Andrew Sutcliffe QC held that the owner had no genuine intention of taking steps to remove her chattels and her real objective but to make life as difficult as she possibly could for the defendant’s agents (at §65); and her tactic of leaving the chattels behind was a deliberate device designed to prevent the bailee from having unencumbered possession and to impede the marketing of the property (at §118). The learned Judge held that because the bailee had provided reasonable opportunities and court-sanctioned access to collect, its decision to clear and dispose of the uncollected chattels was right and reasonable, attracting no liability in damages (at §§122, 126). 71.It appears to me that the Defendant’s conduct in the present action mirrors that pattern:
72.Here, the Court is not confined to a binary choice between declaring the chattels immediately abandoned or permitting the Defendant to perpetuate this trespass indefinitely. Under Order 14, rule 3(1) of the RDC, having determined that the Defendant has shown no defence on liability, the Court is empowered to give such judgment for the plaintiff against that defendant on that claim or part as may be just having regard to the nature of the remedy or relief claimed. 73.In exercising that jurisdiction, I consider that justice is achieved not by an immediate retrospective declaration, but by a conditional order. In both Exxon Limited and Fine Gold Developments Ltd, the learned judges held that the appropriate remedy is a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to dispose of the chattels, thereby affording the occupier peace of mind that disposal is lawful without fear of conversion liability[84]. Unlike the absent defendants in those cases, however, the Defendant here is before the Court. While the Defendant is in no way disabled from recovering the Left Property, he should be afforded one final opportunity to retrieve them at his own expense. In fact, this also reflects the mechanism approved in Campbell v Redstone Mortgages Ltd (supra), where the Court set fixed timetables for the owner to remove her chattels, holding that her subsequent failure to collect them justified the bailee in clearing and disposing of the goods without incurring liability in damages[85]. 74.At the hearing, the Court canvassed with the parties the time required to collect the Left Property. While the Defendant indicated that he would need a minimum of 2 days and the Plaintiff agreed, I consider it fair and proportionate to grant the Defendant a window of 28 days from the date of this Order to remove the Left Property from the mini-storage facilities at his own expense. To facilitate the collection, the Plaintiff shall arrange reasonable access to the storage units during normal business hours upon receiving not less than 48 hours’ prior written notice from the Defendant. 75.If the Defendant fails to remove the Left Property within that 28-day window, his failure to do so in the face of this Order will constitute a conclusive manifestation of intention to abandon the goods, see: Re Jigrose Pty Ltd (supra.); Robot Arenas (supra.). In that event, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to dispose of, clear, or destroy the Left Property at will without incurring any liability in conversion or damages to the Defendant, and the reasonable expenses incurred in such disposal shall be borne by the Defendant, to be assessed if not agreed, see: Chan Cho Fai (supra) at §26; Exxon Limited (supra) at §25; Fine Gold Developments (supra) at §25. F. QUANTUM AND ASSESSMENT OF EXPENSES 76.Under paragraph 1 of the Amended Summons[86], the Plaintiff claims interlocutory judgment against the Defendant for the storage and related expenses incurred in renting mini-storage units to safe-keep the Left Property from May 2021 onwards, with damages to be assessed, together with interest. The Plaintiff’s claim under this head is for an unliquidated sum[87]. 77.The Plaintiff’s entitlement in principle to recover these expenses as an involuntary bailee discharging a duty of care, or as consequential damages flowing from the Defendant’s continuing trespass, is well settled:
78.In paragraphs 31 and 33 of his Amended Defence and Counterclaim[88], the Defendant challenges these expenses on two grounds:
79.Although advanced under the rubric of the Counterclaim, the substance of the Defendant’s complaint concerns the quantum of damages and the reasonableness of the Plaintiff's expenditure. Miss Yuen has referred the Court to Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, Vol 1, §14/4/8, which provides that where, in an action for unliquidated damages, the defendant’s liability is clearly established, the Court should give judgment for the plaintiff, with damages and interest to be assessed. Here, questions concerning whether the engagement of 5 units was reasonably required, the prevailing market rates for commercial storage, and whether the Plaintiff properly mitigated its loss over the multi-year storage period are matters of quantum. They cannot and should not be determined summarily on affidavit evidence. Interlocutory judgment should therefore be entered for the Plaintiff on liability, with the quantum of storage and related expenses to be assessed by a Master pursuant to Order 37 of the RDC. G. COSTS 80.The Plaintiff has been wholly successful in establishing liability on the claim and securing the striking out of the Defendant’s Counterclaim. Costs should follow the event. 81.Further, although the Defendant’s conduct in seeking to re-litigate matters conclusively decided against him by the SCT (which was affirmed in the HCSA Judgment) and maintaining an unparticularized counterclaim which presents a tissue of improbabilities might well have justified a higher measure of costs, the Plaintiff in its Amended Summons and skeleton submissions did not seek costs on an indemnity basis or on a higher scale of taxation. I therefore award costs on the standard party-and-party basis, to be taxed if not agreed. As I have not had the opportunity to hear the parties specifically on the issue of costs, this order shall be an order nisi. H. ORDER 82.Accordingly, I make the following orders:
83.Lastly, it remains for me to thank Miss Yuen for her helpful submissions.
Miss Heidi Yuen, Senior Government Counsel of Department of Justice, for the plaintiff The defendant appeared in person [1] [C/8/62-65] [2] Plaintiff’s Skeleton Submissions, §3 [3] Amended Defence and Counterclaim, [A/4/37-44] [4] [C/8/62-65] [5] Statement of Claim, [A/2/21], §§3-4 [6] Statement of Claim, [A/2/23] at §6 [7] Statement of Claim, [A/2/23] §§7–9; Affirmation of Lee Sui On, [F/19/99] at §6 [8] Supplemental Affirmation of Woo Tak Yan, F/23/123 at §6 [9] [L/52/504-506] [10] [F/19/99–100] §§7-8 [11] [F/23/123] §7 [12] [K/46/464-476] [13] [A/2/24] §10 [14] [F/24/132] §10 [15] [H/39/244] [16] [F/23/124-125] §§15-21 [17] [A/5/49] §10; [K/50/488-494] [18] SCT Judgment [G/28/150] [19] [G/28/153] [20] [G/28/207] at §§178-180; [G/29/208] [21] [G/28/178] at §96 [22] [G/28/185, 207] at §§111, 178 [23] [G/28/185, 202, 205] at §§164, 171-172 [24] [G/30/209] [25] [B/6/58-60] [26] [C/8/62-65] [27] [D/9/66-67] [28] [E/14/80-82] [29] [F/21/108-109]; [J/45/316-455] [30] [A/5/45-57] [31] unrep, CACV 81 of 1994, 3 November 1994 at [13] [32] Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026 §14/4/4 [33] Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026 §14/4/4 [34] [F/19/98; H/31/210-218] [35] See: Palmer on Bailment (3rd Ed.), §§13-023, 13-051; Chitty on Contracts - Hong Kong Specific Contracts (7th Ed.), §§ 3-030, 3-032 [36] See §16 above. [37] [A/4/38] at §§8-9; [F/23/122] at §§4-5 [38] [G/28/183] at §110(ii) [39] [G/28/189, 190-191, 204-205] at §§116, 120, 168-172 [40] Amended Defence and Counterclaim para. [A/4/39] at §11; Supplemental Affirmation of Woo Tak Yan [Hearing Bundle F/23/123] at §7 [41] [G/28/183] at §110(vi) [42] Amended Defence and Counterclaim [A/4/39-40] at §§13-16; see also Defendant's Skeleton Submission (filed 13 Jul 2026), at §14. [43] SCT Judgment, [G/28/181-182, 185] at §§106, 110(xiii), 110(xiv) [44] SCT Judgment, [G/28/181, 184-185] at §§103, 104, 110(vii), 110(ix) [45] SCT Judgment, [G/28/185] at §110(xii) [46] SCT Judgment, [G/28/181, 185] at §§105, 110(x), 110(xi) [47] [F/21/108-109; J/45/316-455] [48] Amended Defence and Counterclaim, [A/4/40-41] at §§19-25; [F/23/124–125]. [49] SCT Judgment, [G/28/199] at §§151-153 [50] DoJ Letters dated 24 Oct, 7 Nov & 20 Nov 2018 [K/50/488-494]; 2nd Affirmation of Lee Sui On, §12 [F/24/133] [51] SCT Judgment, [G/28/183] at §110(i) [52] Defendant's Skeleton Submission at §12 [53] Defendant's Skeleton Submission at §§20, 29 [54] Order of Madam Registrar M Soong dated 1 Aug 2025 [E/14/80-82] [55] Amended Defence and Counterclaim [A/4/42], at §31 [56] Amended Defence and Counterclaim [A/4/41-42] at §§26-29 [57] Amended Defence and Counterclaim [A/4/43], at §35 [58] Amended Defence and Counterclaim, [A/4/42-44] at §§34(i)-(viii); 38(i); Supplemental Affirmation of Woo Tak Yan [F/23/126-127], at §§29(i)-(viii) [59] Amended Defence and Counterclaim, [A/4/43-44] at §§37, 38(ii) [60] [G/28/150-151] [61] [A/4/42-44] [62] [L/52/510] at §48 [63] SCT Judgment, [G/28/183–191, 206] [64] [M/30/209] [65] at §48 [66] [A/4/43] at §34(vi); Supplemental Affirmation of Woo Tak Yan, [F/23/126-127] at §29(vi) [67] Amended Defence and Counterclaim, [A/4/43-44] at §§37 and 38(ii) [68] [G/28/152] at §13 [69] [A/4/41–44] [70] [F/23/126-127] [71] 3rd Affirmation of Yuen Heidi Hoi Ki, [F/25/140] at §12 [72] [F/25/140], at §12; [L/52/504-510] §§28, 30 [73] [C/8/63] at §2 [74] Desir Anthony C v Knight Frank (Services) Ltd & Ors, supra, at §§82, 97 [75] See UK Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 ss. 12-13 [76] Plaintiff's Skeleton Submissions §3 [77] Amended Defence and Counterclaim, [A/4/41–43] at §§26-36 [78] at §24 [79] SCT Judgment, para. 102 [G/28/180] [80] at §§58-75, 117-126 [81] [G/28/180] [82] At the oral hearing, the Defendant further confirmed that he would not challenge the findings of the SCT Judgment. [83] See §15 above [84] See Exxon Limited at paras. §§23-24; Fine Gold Developments Limited at §23 [85] at §§ 61-65, 120-122, 126 [86] [A/8/62-63] [87] Plaintiff’s Skeleton Submission at §52 [88] [A/4/42, 44] |
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