Qadir Fazal v. Hong Kong Housing Authority and Another

HCAL 2354/2025

[2026] HKCFI 5684

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2354 OF 2025

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D E C I S I O N

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A. Introduction

1.By his Form 86 dated 21 October 2025, the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review seeking to challenge decisions in relation to the termination of the tenancy of his public housing flat at the Sai Wan Estate, Hong Kong (“Flat”).  The Applicant named the Hong Kong Housing Authority (“HA”) and the Appeal Panel (Housing) (“AP”) as the Putative Respondents.  He also named his wife (“Wife”) and his daughter (“Daughter”) as the Interested Parties.

2.The Applicant sought the following relief:

(1)  an order of certiorari to quash the decision made by the AP dated 12 June 2025 (“AP Decision”);

(2)  further or alternatively, a declaration that the AP’s failure to give adequate reasons for the Decision rendered the AP Decision unfair;

(3)  an order of certiorari to quash the Notice-to-quit (“NTQ”) dated 30 December 2024 issued by the HA to the Applicant; and

(4)  further or other relief.

3.Together with the Form 86, the Applicant filed an affirmation attaching: (1) a tenancy agreement dated 28 November 1995, (2) a letter from HA dated 31 December 2024, (3) three letters from the AP dated 17 January 2025, 15 May 2025 and 12 June 2025, (4) two letters from the Applicant’s solicitors to the HA dated 20 June 2025 and 2 September 2025, and (5) a Deed of Declaration dated 8 July 2016, and an affirmation from his son Mahmood Khalid.

4.I gave directions permitting the HA and AP to file an Initial Response, and for the Applicant to file a Reply.  As would be expected of an independent statutory appeal panel, the AP took a neutral stance to these proceedings, though it provided objective facts and information, including the Notes of Hearing.  An Initial Response was filed by Fairbairn Catley Low & Kong (“FCLK”), Solicitors for the HA.  No Reply was filed by the Applicant, who is represented by David Fenn & Co (“DFC”) in these proceedings.

5.I am satisfied that this application can appropriately be dealt with on the papers.  This is my decision.

B.   Background

6.The Applicant is the former tenant of the Flat, and he resided there from 28 November 1995.  In the tenancy agreement for the Flat, the Applicant listed (alongside himself) the Wife, the Daughter and his son Arshad Mahmood (“Son”) as ‘household members’.

7.It is the Applicant’s case that at the material times, he and his Wife, recipients of the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) Scheme, were the only people living in the Flat, as his children gradually moved out over time.  He also provided the following information in relation to his family (which formed the basis for some of his arguments advanced in these proceedings):

(1)  They are a conservative family who strictly adhere to their traditions.  This includes, amongst other things, for the parents to give their blessing to their children’s marriages, and thus their children should refrain from marrying someone of whom the parents do not approve.  Where they are determined to do so, family conflicts may arise.

(2)  In 2010, the Daughter expressed the intention to marry someone of whom the Applicant did not approve.  This led to quarrels, and their relationship broke down, after which the Daughter moved out of the Flat and she had since been estranged from the family.

(3)  The Applicant, out of love, decided to keep her as a household member of the Flat so that she may have a place to stay in the event her marriage failed.

(4)  Since 2010, the Daughter had hardly contacted the family.  The Applicant had not met her since she moved out, and the Wife had only spoken to her once or twice over the phone each year.  Therefore, they were “clueless” about her situation.

(5)  As the Applicant and his Wife were illiterate, their other children (except the Daughter) would help them fill in all the necessary forms and documents.  After the forms and documents were filled in, the Applicant and his Wife would simply sign them, as they trusted that the content put down by the children was correct.

8.By letter dated 31 December 2024, the HA served a formal NTQ on the Applicant under section 19(1)(b) of the Housing Ordinance Cap 283 (“HO”), terminating the Tenancy Agreement on 31 January 2025.  The letter also notified the Applicant that he had the right to appeal under section 20(1) of the HO.

9.The basis for termination was identified to be the Applicant’s and listed household members’ false declarations in four ‘Well-off Tenants Policies’ (“WTP”) Declaration Forms (“Forms”) dated inMay of each of2018, 2020, 2022, and 2024.

10.As a matter of background, under the WTP, tenants of public rental housing and their household members are required to make a biennial declaration as to whether they hold any ownership or interest in domestic property.  Where such interest in domestic property is found, tenants are required to vacate their public rental flats regardless of their level of income or assets.  This is to ensure that there is a rational and reasonable allocation of public housing resources to eligible tenants, given the existing scarcity of public housing units in Hong Kong.

11.The asserted falsity in the Declaration Forms included:

(1)  failure to disclose the residential property ownership of the Daughter of a property at Elegance Gardens, 4-8 King Fung Path, Tuen Mun (“Elegance Gardens Property”) in the 2018 and 2020 Forms;

(2)  failure to disclose the residential property ownership of the Daughter of a property at Ocean Camino, 8 Kwun Chui Road, Tuen Mun, (“Ocean Camino Property”) in the 2022 and 2024 Forms; and

(3)  failure to disclose the residential property ownership of the Son in a property at Chung Hing Building, 33 Chung Wui Street, Kowloon (“Chung Hing Property”) in the 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2024 Forms.

12.The Applicant then exercised his right of appeal, which was heard by the AP on 5 June 2025 (“Hearing”).

13.As a result of the Applicant exercising the right to appeal the NTQ, and because that was an available alternative remedy and the matter was considered afresh by the AP, the focus of the present challenge could only be on the AP Decision.  Indeed, the right of appeal having been exercised, and full argument having been rehearsed before the AP, the prior decision of the HA was no longer amenable to review.

14.The Hearing before the AP was attended by the Applicant, his eldest son (who apparently did not participate in the affairs of the Flat), and his legal representative, Counsel Ms Ip Ching Man.

15.After the Hearing, the Applicant received a letter from the AP dated 12 June 2025.  In that letter, the AP confirmed the NTQ, i.e. the AP Decision, but did not attach any written reasons.

16.The events following the receipt of the letter are subject to dispute.  It was the Applicant’s case that following the receipt of the letter, he asked his eldest son to contact the HA and the AP.  He also alleged that he asked DFC to seek from the HA and the AP the reasons for the decision and the transcript of the Hearing (“Transcript”).

17.The Applicant further said that after DFC contacted the HA and the AP on several occasions between July to September 2025, they were informed that the AP Decision was made on the basis that the AP did not accept the Applicant’s explanations in relation to the Daughter’s ownership of property (despite allegedly not providing any detailed written reasons for the decision).  The Applicant also claimed that on 1 September 2025, DFC spoke with a Mr Chung from the HA over the phone to enquire about the reasons and obtain the Transcript and/or the audio recording of the Hearing.  DFC then informed him that the HA confirmed that there were no written reasons for the AP Decision, and that there was no transcript or audio recording of the Hearing available.

18.However, the Applicant’s version of events was not accepted by the HA.  Instead, the HA asserted, to the contrary, that in the telephone conversation between Mr Lee of DFC and Mr Chung on 1 September 2025, when DFC requested a written decision and the Transcript of the Hearing, he was informed by Mr Chung that the HA was not the party handling such request, and therefore he should request it from the AP instead.  Yet, it seemed no such request was subsequently made by DFC to the AP.

19.Regardless, for the purpose of the precent proceedings, the reasons for the AP Decision are noted in §§37-38 of the AP’s Notes of Hearing, and can be summarised as follows:

(1)  The investigation of the HA revealed that the Daughter and the Son, as household members of the Flat, failed to declare their respective domestic property ownership in Hong Kong on the Forms.

(2)  The Applicant submitted that he and his Wife did not have any knowledge about the property ownership of the Daughter and Son, although the Daughter did inform the Wife that she has bought a property in Hong Kong, which the Wife did not communicate to the other family members.

(3)  The Daughter, being a household member of the Flat, duly signed on the Forms, explicitly declaring that all the particulars furnished on the Forms (including domestic property ownership) were true and correct – and it was her responsibility to make sure that what was stated was true and correct.

(4)  Equally, the Wife also signed and declared that all the particulars (including the Daughter’s property ownership status) were true and correct.

(5)  Whilst the Applicant claimed that the Son held the private property as a trustee, it was clear according to Section B of the Forms (in particular the 2018, 2020, and 2022 Forms) that ownership of domestic property in Hong Kong includes interest in any domestic property as, amongst others, owner, trustee, executor, administrator and beneficiary.

(6)  Therefore, the Son had to declare his domestic property ownership on the Forms, and having duly signed them and explicitly declared that all the particulars furnished in the Declaration Forms were true and correct, it was his responsibility to make sure that what was stated was true and correct.

(7)  Due to these reasons, two (of the three) members of the Tribunal were satisfied that the HA’s decision was correct, and decided to confirm the NTQ.  They also found no sufficient ground to exercise their discretion (after taking into consideration the evidence and circumstances of the Applicant).

(8)  The remaining member would have cancelled the NTQ, having considered the submissions and evidence, because he thought the Applicant had no knowledge about the property ownership of the Daughter and Son.  In addition, he would have decided to exercise discretion because the Applicant and his Wife were elderly.

(9)  Hence, by a two-to-one decision, the NTQ was upheld and confirmed.

20.It was in this context that these judicial review proceedings were brought.

C.   Delay

21.It is trite that under the Rules of the High Court Order 53 rule 3(4), an application for leave to apply for judicial review must be made promptly, and in any event within a ‘long stop’ period of three months from the date when the grounds for the application first arose – unless the Court exercises its discretion to extend the period where it considers that there is good reason to do so.

22.The Applicant acknowledged that the application was brought out of time – more than one month beyond the three-month period.  Nonetheless, he contended the Court should exercise its discretion to allow an extension of time, because he had been in poor health and had been mentally stressed due to his Wife’s failing health condition (since August 2025), and as a result it had been very difficult for him to provide legal instructions to DFC to make the application.

23.On the other side, the HA submitted that the Applicant’s reason was not sufficient to support an extension of time.  It submitted that not only did the Applicant have to show a realistic prospect of success (to override the delay), but he also had to satisfy the other requirements set out in Re Thomas Lai [2014] 6 HKC 1 at §45.  Those requirements – which are non-exhaustive and dependent on the circumstances of the case, but nevertheless significant in the Court’s consideration of extending time – include (1) the length of the delay, (2) the explanation for the delay, (3) the merits of the substantive application, (4) whether there is any prejudice, and (5) whether the application raises a point of general public importance.

24.Being just over one month, the delay here was not that significant, but not negligible.  However, I tend to think that the reasons for the delay provided by the Applicant were insufficient.  The Applicant stated that he was informed by DFC that the AP Decision (from the 12 June Letter) was final, and hence he had no other alternative but to seek judicial review.  Whilst it is unfortunate that his Wife may have faced health issues, the Applicant specified that his poor health and mental stress only started in August 2025, which would mean that he had two months after receiving the letter to provide instructions to DFC to begin a judicial review application.  His Wife, on the other hand, has been in poor health throughout all material times (especially since the Applicant has stated that she suffered a stroke on 11 April 2025, and has been in hospital ever since).

25.Therefore, it was at least doubtful that the Applicant could rely on medical conditions to suggest that he was incapable of issuing instructions when receiving the AP Decision.  It was also not clear why he could not have engaged the help of his sons in issuing instructions, especially since he consistently relied on his sons to assist him in many matters, such as filling in forms and attending the Hearing.

26.Consequently, the application would likely have failed on the basis of delay, but in any event an extension of time would not be granted where there were no sufficient merits in the intended challenge and grounds of review, as will be seen below.

D.   Grounds of Review

27.In his Form 86, the Applicant submitted intended grounds of review, which can be broadly set out as follows:

(1)  Ground 1: The failure to provide reasons for the AP Decision was a breach of the high standards of fairness, and even if the AP and/or the HA did give reasons, it was inadequate.

(2)  Ground 2: The AP Decision was tainted due to procedural unfairness, as the AP failed to give the Applicant’s representatives an opportunity to address the case and the AP and/or the HA refused to provide the Transcript of the Hearing.

(3)  Ground 3: The AP and/or the HA failed to give sufficient consideration to the Applicant’s explanation and circumstances.

(4)  Ground 4: The AP Decision was grossly unreasonable.

(5)  Ground 5: The AP fettered its discretion by failing to have sufficient regard, if any, to the Applicant and his family’s circumstances in reaching the AP Decision.

28.It seems to me that there was some overlap amongst the intended grounds of review.  Thus, I shall deal with each ground whilst keeping in mind points that are applicable to multiple grounds.

E.   Ground 1

29.The Applicant’s submissions under Ground 1 were twofold:

(1)  Firstly, he asserted that the AP and/or the HA did not give reasons for the AP Decision.  This is seen by the 12 June letter, which merely confirmed the HA’s decision in the NTQ but did not provide any specific reasons.  He also claimed that despite repeated requests and demands, the AP and the HA failed to provide any written reasons for the decision.

(2)  Secondly, the Applicant submitted that even if the AP and/or the HA did give reasons, they were inadequate.  This is because the 12 June Letter only stated that the AP confirmed the NTQ.  Therefore, the failure to provide reasons fails to meet the high standard of fairness.

30.The AP Decision was an administrative decision.  The legal principles in relation to a public authority’s duty to give reasons for administrative decisions have been previously stated in my decision of Fortune Chance Ltd v The Appeal Board Nominated Under Section 27 of the Urban Renewal Authority Ordinance Cap 563 [2025] HKCFI 1874 at §80, and can be stated again as follows:

(1)  There is no general duty to give reasons for administrative decisions, but the nature or circumstances of an adjudication might indicate a necessity for giving reasons.

(2)  If and when a duty to give reasons arises, what is regarded as adequate depends on the particular facts of each case.

(3)  The Court should consider a reasons challenge with practical reality in order to prevent an application for judicial review from being turned into a merits review, and to avoid treating day-to-day administrative decision-making processes as if they were judgment-writing.

(4)  The reasons given should show that the decision-maker has addressed the substantial issues and show why the decision-maker has come to its decision.  It should also show that the issues that arise for serious consideration have been considered.

(5)  But the reasons in any given case may not require great elaboration, and they may be brief.  They must also be viewed in the context of that case.

(6)  However, sufficient reasons may be required so as to enable the affected individual to exercise effectively any right to appeal or review.

(7)  Where the decision-maker purports to have given reasons, the reasons should be subject to the same level of scrutiny as if there was an express duty to give reasons.

(8)  A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the Court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure of the decision-maker to provide an adequately reasoned decision.

31.Applying these principles, the AP in this case was not under a general duty to provide reasons.  I also do not think that this was a situation where the nature and circumstances of the adjudication rendered it necessary for the AP to provide reasons.  A reading of the statute also shows the AP was under no statutory duty to provide reasons (and/or the audio recording of the appeal hearing).  Section 10 of the Housing (Tenancy Appeals) Rules Cap 283D only requires that the parties be informed of the determination of the tribunal by notice in writing.  It does not provide that the reasons for determination must be included in the notice.

32.In any event, though the Applicant requested the HA to provide him with reasons (in the 1 September 2025 telephone conversation), the HA was not the party giving reasons in relation to the AP Decision.  Instead, that was the AP, to which it seems the Applicant never made a request – though it may also be noted that the Legal Aid Department, in assessing the merits of the Applicant’s application, made a request, which was fulfilled by the AP.  The Applicant’s own fault for failing to identify the correct party to request cannot shift the blame onto the HA, even more so given that the HA representative informed the Applicant (through DFC) of the correct party to contact (i.e. the AP).

33.Further, I do not think it reasonably arguable that the reasons given by the AP were inadequate.  The reasons (which I have rehearsed above) were fully detailed with explanations as to what the Applicant did wrong and what he should have done.  This was more than what was required – and was certainly sufficient to enable the Applicant to exercise any right to review.

34.I also agree that this Ground became academic, given that the Notes of Hearing and the Transcript of the Hearing were provided in the Initial Response.

35.Hence, Ground 1 was not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

F.   Ground 2

36.Ground 2 was one of procedural unfairness.  The Applicant claimed that the AP failed to give his representatives (i.e. his Counsel and his eldest son) an opportunity to address the case during the Hearing, and that the AP and HA refused to provide the Transcript of the Hearing.  In particular, when the eldest son wanted to make further representations to the AP regarding the Wife’s deteriorating health condition, he allegedly was stopped by the AP.  As a result, it was argued that the AP Decision was procedurally unfair.

37.However, as pointed out by the HA, a reading of the Transcript shows the contrary.  It is clear that both the Applicant’s Counsel and the eldest son were given a fair opportunity to present their case to the AP:

(1)  Firstly, as seen at 6F-8F of the Transcript, Ms Ip was able to submit fully her arguments in support of the appeal, which related to (a) the Son’s ownership of the Chung Hing Property (which was stated to be held on trust), (b) the policy on holding domestic property for public housing tenants, and (c) the knowledge of the Applicant and his Wife with regards to the Daughter and Son’s ownership of domestic property.  Ms Ip even proposed two possible orders in relation to the AP’s decision, which was either to suspend the NTQ, pending the transfer of the Son’s property back to the trust owner with a rent increase implemented on the Applicant’s property, or alternatively, to amend or suspend the NTQ, pending the removal of the Daughter and the Son from the tenancy.

(2)  Secondly, whenever Ms Ip wished to take further instructions from the eldest son before continuing with the appeal, the AP gave her the chance to do so: see 10E-F, 11F, 12M-N, 12Q-13B, 14D-G, 14N-Q, and 19B-F of the Transcript.  It can also be seen that when the eldest son wished to speak during the Hearing, he was provided the opportunity to do so, and the AP properly acknowledged his submissions: see 15J-17E, 19L-R, 20P-21N of the Transcript.

38.It is unclear why the Applicant alleges that the AP prevented his representatives from making further representations to the AP regarding the Wife’s deteriorating health condition.  In Ms Ip’s submissions (see 7F-G of the Transcript), she noted specifically that the Wife was then in hospital, and the tenant had to travel back and forth to take care of the Wife.  Therefore, it seems to me that the Applicant had the chance to inform the AP about the Wife’s health condition.

39.The same can be said about the Applicant’s submission that the AP prevented the eldest son from making further representations towards the end of the Hearing.  When the Applicant’s legal representatives were given the chance to ask any further questions or for any further clarifications, they themselves chose not to do so.  This is seen at 21N-Q, where the Chairman asked whether there were any further questions or clarification, and Ms Ip replied that she had no further submission.

40.As a result, Ground 2 was not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

G.   Ground 3

41.Ground 3 focused on the alleged failure of the AP to give sufficient consideration to the Applicant’s explanation and circumstances, which included (1) the Applicant’s illiteracy, (2) the Applicant’s age and cultural background, (3) the Applicant and the Daughter’s estranged relationship, and (4) the fact that the Son held the property on trust for his brother’s friend and did not receive any benefit from it.

42.However, the weight that the AP was to give each factor was a matter of discretion.  The Court will only interfere in an exercise of discretion where it is unreasonable on a public law standard (i.e. Wednesbury unreasonableness).  The complaint of a failure to give sufficient weight to any particular matter or factor is usually not fertile territory for an application for leave to apply for judicial review.

43.In any event, a reading of the Transcript clearly shows that the Applicant referred to all four of these factors in submission (both orally and in writing), and that the AP acknowledged these submissions:

(1)  The Applicant’s illiteracy was addressed by Ms Ip at both 7E, and 9C-D of the Transcript, where she mentioned twice that the Applicant had a poor level of education.  I also think that it was clear from the circumstances, given the Applicant’s continuous utilisation of his children in carrying out duties (such as filling in documents, filing papers and attending hearings), that the AP (and the HA) would know that the Applicant is illiterate.

(2)  Likewise, the Applicant’s age and cultural background were cited in the Applicant’s oral submissions.  References to his age can be seen at 7E, where Ms Ip explicitly mentioned that he was “now 79 years old”, and also at 7J-K. References to the Applicant’s and his family’s cultural background can be seen at 10O-R, where Ms Ip explained why the Applicant wishfully thought that the Daughter might return to the household in the future.  The HA also addressed this point directly at 11B-C.

(3)  The Applicant and the Daughter’s estranged relationship was also fully explained in the Hearing.  A “bad relationship” is referred to by Ms Ip on multiple occasions: see, for example, 9E-G, 9K-M, 11G-H, 14H, 14O-Q, 20K of the Transcript.  This “bad relationship” was clearly acknowledged by the AP, which questioned the logic of implications that were said to have arisen out of this estranged relationship, at 14J-M.

(4)  The point on the Son holding the Chung Hing Property on trust for his brother’s friend was also addressed directly by both the AP and the HA at the Hearing, as seen by 11I-12K of the Transcript.  The HA was challenging the merit and logic of Ms Ip’s submissions, particularly on the argument that the Son was a layman and as a result did not know that he had to declare his interest in the property as a trustee.  The AP even went further, by considering the Declaration of Trust that was provided by the Applicant.  The AP questioned why the Declaration of Trust was not submitted to the Stamp Office for adjudication, and why the Son assumed personal liability in paying the entire purchase amount of the mortgage (of the Chung Hing Property): see 13A-14G of the Transcript.

44.After consideration of all these factors and other relevant information submitted by the Applicant, the AP found that it was insufficient to warrant the exercise of discretion to overturn the NTQ.  It was reasonably open for two members of the AP to come to this conclusion.

45.Therefore, Ground 3 was not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

H.   Ground 4

46.Under Ground 4, the Applicant asserted that the AP Decision was grossly (i.e. Wednesbury) unreasonable, particularly that the AP erred in finding that the Son had an interest in the Chung Hing Property, and finding that the Applicant made false statements regarding the Daughter’s interest in the Elegance Gardens Property and the Ocean Camino Property.

47.It is trite that the threshold for Wednesbury unreasonableness is high, and an applicant must show that the decision made was one so outrageous in its defiance of logic that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached it.

48.Here, it was undisputable that the Daughter and the Son did not declare any interest in or ownership of any domestic properties in Hong Kong in the 2018, 2020, 2022, and 2024 Forms.

49.The Daughter was required to declare her interest in the Elegance Gardens Property and the Ocean Camino Property.  I do not see any reasonably arguable basis for the Applicant to allege that the AP was unreasonable in finding that the Applicant made a false statement in the Forms.  It is simply true that the Daughter had ownership in domestic properties, and that they were not declared in the Forms.

50.The essence of the Applicant’s submission in relation to the Son’s interest in the Chung Hing Property was that as a trustee, he did not hold any legal or beneficial interest in the property, and this was shown by the Declaration of Trust submitted by the Applicant.  However, a trustee does hold the legal ownership, and the ‘Guidelines for Completing the Part I on Domestic Property Ownership in Hong Kong of the Declaration Form’ in the 2018, 2020 and 2022 Forms clearly notes at §1 that Ownership of Domestic Property in Hong Kong referred to a tenant/licensee/household member that “own[ed] or co-own[ed] or [had] an interest in any domestic property in Hong Kong (including but not limited to trustee, executor, administrator or beneficiary having an interest in any domestic property in Hong Kong)”.  This meant that even as a trustee, the Son was obliged to declare his interest in the Chung Hing property on the Forms.

51.Consequently, the AP’s decision to uphold the NTQ (for these reasons) was not arguably Wednesbury unreasonable.  Ground 4 was not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

I.   Ground 5

52.Ground 5 asserted the fettering of discretion by the AP, by failing to have sufficient regard if any to the Applicant’s and his family’s circumstances in reaching the AP decision, including that (1) the Applicant was not the legal or beneficial owner of the properties, and he never received any benefit from them, (2) the Applicant had no knowledge of the Daughter’s property, (3) the Applicant was illiterate and would hence not have had any knowledge of the content of the declarations in question, and (4) the Wife was in poor health and any eviction order on short notice may compromise her health condition.

53.This ground is essentially a repeat of Grounds 2 and 3.  But, as I have noted above, it is clear that the AP considered all of these factors in its determination of the appeal, and came to the conclusion that it was not enough to justify the exercise of discretion to set aside the NTQ – which was upheld in relation to the false statements made in the Forms, which the Daughter and the Son, as listed household members of the Flat, should not have made.

54.Ground 5 was not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

J.   Result

55.Even if an extension of time might otherwise have been granted for the application, the Applicant failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds of review with any realistic prospect of success.  As a result, any extension would be inapt.

56.For these reasons, the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.  I make no order as to costs.

David Fenn & Co, solicitors for the applicant

Fairbairn Catley Low & Kong, solicitors for the 1^st putative respondent