Ahmat Alfandi v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 1793/2023 [2026] HKCFI 5785 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1793 of 2023 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Keith Lam:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By Form 86 filed on 6 October 2023 (“Form 86”), the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”) dated 21 June 2023 (“TCAB Decision”), which affirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“DOI”) dated 25 September 2020 (“DOI Decision”). 2.The Form 86 incorrectly named the DOI as the putative respondent. I therefore amend the Form 86 on my own motion to name the TCAB as the putative respondent. 3.The Applicant requested for a hearing of this application, which was held on 14 September 2026. When asked, he said he had nothing to add. Background 4.The Applicant is a national of Indonesia. In gist, he fears that he will be harmed or even killed by the gangsters and/or the family of a person he killed in a car accident, and he also fears prosecution in Indonesia regarding the same car accident. The Applicant’s personal background, the relevant facts and relevant procedural history have been sufficiently set out in the TCAB Decision, which can be viewed through a hyperlink.[1] There is no need for me to repeat the same. Unless otherwise specified, the abbreviations and descriptions used in the TCAB Decision are adopted herein. Legal Principles 5.The leave application operates as a filtering process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision: Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23. I therefore set out below brief reasons for my decision, which I have reached upon considering all the materials before me. 6.In a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of appeal. While I remind myself that in non-refoulement cases, I would adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the TCAB given the seriousness of the issue at hand, this court would not usurp the role of the TCAB, which together with the DOI are the primary decision-makers. A finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the TCAB, and this court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB: Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at §14(1). There must be a reasonably arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for judicial review will be granted: Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at §§14-17. 7.An applicant is required to clearly and succinctly identify the grounds of judicial review relied upon in the Form 86 and the supporting affirmation: Ho Loy v Director of Environment Protection, HCAL 21/2015 (unrep.) 22.12.2016 at §142. He or she is also under a duty to make full and frank disclosure of material facts: Kan Hung Cheung v The Director of Immigration [2008] HKC 323 at §§14-17. 8.Given RHC O 53 r 4(1) and s 21K(6) of the High Court Ordinance (CAP 4), where an Applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review more than 3 months after the decision:
See: Thing Sunil v TCAB [2025] HKCFI 4366, at §9, citing AW v Director of Immigration & anor. [2016] 2 HKC 393 (CA) at §§23-36 and Thomas Lai [2014] 6 HKC 1 at §§43-45; H v Director of Immigration (2020) 23 HKCFAR 248 at §§17-22, 36-44. Discussion 9.The application by the Form 86 was out of time by 16 days. Such a delay is relatively short. When asked about the reason for the delay, the Applicant said that he did not know about the decision earlier. In light of my view below on the lack of merits of the leave application, I do not think it is necessary for me to base my decision on the delay and I will overlook it. 10.The Applicant stated the following grounds of judicial review in the supporting affirmation: -
11.I have scrutinised the TCAB Decision carefully and come to the view that none of the above Grounds can be established or considered as valid or effective public law grounds. 12.Most if not all of the grounds merely consist of generic, vague and/or unparticularised assertions without reference to any underlying facts or matters establishing why, how and where each of those complaints arise in relation to the TCAB Decision. General assertions without particulars are not effective grounds and cannot assist the Applicant: Re Haider Khalil [2021] HKCA 223 at §16. 13.Ground 1 is clearly not correct given that the TCAB Decision considered the Applicant’s evidence about the alleged threat to his life in detail, as discussed in §16 below. 14.Ground 2 to Ground 5 are bare assertions and are contrary to what was recorded in the DOI Decision and the TCAB Decision and must be rejected: -
15.Ground 6 self-evidently has no substance. 16.As can be seen from the TCAB Decision, the TCAB took into account all the evidence available and found that on the basis of the same, applying the correct legal principles in respect of all applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism, the Applicant’s allegations were insufficient to make out any of the applicable grounds: §§34-79. It is clear that the TCAB considered the evidence available thoroughly and in detail. In particular, after noting various anomalies and internal inconsistencies in the account of the events by the Applicant, the TCAB concluded that it did not accept as true that the Applicant was ever involved in a road fatality in Indonesia, or that he was hiding, or pursued or threatened as claimed, or that he fears or faces a real chance of harm, death or prosecution in Indonesia: §§54-59. It therefore found that all of the grounds are not established: §§66-67, 72-73, 75, 79. I consider that the TCAB was entitled to come to such conclusion. Conclusion 17.Therefore, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the TCAB Decision. I conclude that the Applicant’s intended challenge against the TCAB Decision is not reasonably arguable, and accordingly the application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed. Dated the 23rd day of October 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL001793_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf [2] In that the presence of a credibly valid explanation for the delay will strengthen, and the absence of an acceptable explanation will weaken, the Applicant’s request for what is an indulgence to be granted in the court’s discretion. [3] Although where an applicant is many months out of time, leave may be refused however strong the complaint might otherwise be, and an applicant who sleeps upon his rights may be barred from pursuing them in a judicial review even though he may have a meritorious case (AW v Director of Immigration & anor. [2016] 2 HKC 393 (CA) at §27(iii) as approved in the other cases cited below, in particular H v Director of Immigration (2020) 23 HKCFAR 248 at supra at §37(2)). |
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