Re Madubuko Nnnaemea Paul Alias Chimangeni Delby Alias Chimangeni Delby

CACV 1189/2025, [2026] HKCA 1906

On Appeal From [2026] HKCA 438

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 1189 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1169 OF 2025)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 25 March 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 24 March 2026 (“the Judgment”) ([2026] HKCA 438).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 1 December 2025, by which the Judge refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 5606).

2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“I would like to inform Court of Final Appeal.  There are some error in my law maker authorities.  They were totally relied on same web news which officially not recognised.  There are not properly investigation in my claim by authorities.  They not give me justice.  I do not think my case determined fairly.” (sic)

5.Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged written submissions in support of his present application on 30 March 2026.  In those submissions, he complained about the lack of legal and language assistance and that the Board’s Decision was never read to him in his own language.  He also asserted that the Board had unlawfully fettered his discretion and was procedurally unfair, irrational and unreasonable for failing to properly investigate his claim.  He alleged that his problem persisted in his home country and that he would be killed upon refoulement.

6.In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit.  His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any particulars or evidence.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  More importantly, he has failed to specifically point out any error in the Judgment.  His complaints are all directed at the Board’s Decision which are not proper grounds of appeal.  His intended appeal is plainly a nonstarter.

7.Furthermore, his allegations on the lack of legal and language assistance are all new and not raised before the Judge or in the Notice of Appeal.  It is not the practice of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed in the hearing before it; nor generally is it the practice of the Court of Final Appeal to grant leave on new fact‑sensitive points not argued in the Court of Appeal: see Re Orense Marian Masangkay [2022] HKCA 33 at [7] and Re Dandiwal Sandeep Singh [2021] HKCA 870 at [7].  In any event, we noted that all of the court documents filed by the applicant in this application, his appeal as well as before the court below are in English.  Clearly, the applicant is at the least able to obtain assistance in English.  Moreover, it has been repeatedly emphasised by the Court of Appeal that as a matter of law, a non‑refoulement claimant is not entitled to free legal representation at all stages of the process and that the high standard of fairness required by law does not entail interpretation service being made available to an applicant all the time as he desires: Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [18]; Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15 at [11] and Re Tariq Farhan [2018] HKCA 17 at [11].  The applicant was also provided with interpretation services during the oral hearing before the Board[1]. We see no unfairness or prejudice suffered by the applicant and there is plainly no merit in these complaints.

8.Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

9.Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

10.For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit and we dismiss the Notice of Motion.

The applicant acting in person