Wo Hing Engineering Ltd. v. Tyco Engineering & Construction (Hong Kong) Ltd.
Read the full judgment text of HCCT 40/1999 on BabelCite. This 高等法院原訟法庭 judgment was delivered on 8 November 2000 before Hon Burrell J.
Contract Law — Construction and Arbitration — Sub-contracting — Scope and terms of contract — Back-to-back and pay-when-paid terms — Repudiatory breach — Failure to fund project — Assessment of damages — Profit and lost opportunity — Interest and costs. The plaintiff, Wo Hing Engineering Limited, was awarded a fixed price electrical installation sub-contract for $80 million and sub-contracted the works to the defendant, Tyco Engineering & Construction (Hong Kong) Limited, for a fixed 3% fee. Tyco commenced works before formal documentation and was to finance the project. Funding difficulties within Tyco's Hong Kong management and Singapore head office led to delayed payments to suppliers and labour, causing project delays and frustration. The court found a contract existed incorporating back-to-back terms with the main contract and that Tyco repudiated the contract by failing to provide necessary funding, frustrating the contract’s commercial purpose. Wo Hing resumed control of the works, chose to complete the project itself, and claimed damages for loss of profit and fees. The court adopted a broad methodology assessing damages based on a 10% profit margin on the whole contract, including the lost 3% fee, to place Wo Hing in the position it would have been without Tyco's repudiation. The court rejected the claim for loss of future business beyond the contract. Interest was awarded on sums due and costs ordered mostly in favour of Wo Hing. The defendant appealed the quantum of damages, and the Court of Appeal remitted the matter for fresh determination. The judgment sets a significant analysis of contractual interpretation and repudiation in construction sub-contracting and the assessment of related damages.
Legal issues: Nature and terms of the contract between Wo Hing and Tyco · Whether Tyco repudiated the contract · Appropriate methodology for assessing damages · Claim for loss of business
Outcome: Judgment for Wo Hing; Tyco held in repudiatory breach and liable for damages calculated on a 10% profit basis plus lost 3% fee and agreed claims for seconded staff; interest awarded.
Cites 1 case
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HCCT000040/1999 HCCT 40/1999 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS -------------
------------- Coram: Hon Burrell J in Court Dates of Hearing: 11, 12, 14, 15, 18-21 and 25 September 2000 Date of Written closing submissions received: 6 October 2000 Date of Written replies received: 10 and 30 October 2000 Date of handing down judgment: 8 November 2000 ------------------------ J U D G M E N T ------------------------ 1. The subject matter of these proceedings is the electrical installation works in Phases 2A and 2B of the Olympic Station Development Site in Tai Kok Tsui, Kowloon. The employer, Harvest Sun Limited engaged Kumagai Gumi Hong Kong (now Hong Kong Construction Holdings) as the main contractor. The plaintiff in this action was awarded the electrical installation nominated sub-contract for a fixed lump sum price of $80 million. As often happens work started before the formal documentation. The works commenced in or around October 1998, whereas, the employer's letter of intent to Wo Hing Engineering Limited ("Wo Hing") was dated 9 November 1998. The letter of award to Wo Hing was sent on 18 January 1999. Wo Hing accepted it on 29 January 1999. The final contract documents were only received by Wo Hing in May 2000 by which time the involvement of Tyco Engineering & Construction (Hong Kong) Limited ("Tyco"), the defendant, had come to an end over a year earlier in April 1999. 2. Wo Hing sub-contracted their sub-contract to Tyco who thereby became the electrical installation sub-sub-contractor. In a nutshell, it is Wo Hing's case that Tyco stepped into their shoes. Tyco was to pay Wo Hing 3% of the contract price. Therefore, Wo Hing would get $2.4 million (3% of $80 million) and Tyco would carry out the contract. To make a profit, Tyco would have to complete the works for less than $77.6 million. 3. By way of background, the evidence shows, and I so find, that Tyco was very keen to get this contract. Tyco's parent company was a multi-national company. It was keen to get into the Hong Kong scene. Faxes and emails of congratulations were sent from the head office in Singapore to Tyco's Hong Kong management once they were on site. 4. The fundamental issue between the parties has arisen because of a lack of precision as to the actual terms and conditions of the agreement between them. In my judgment, this is a case where the court must grapple with what was said, what was written and what was done at the material time and determine thereby what the contract was. It is not realistic on the facts of this case to conclude that such was the lack of precision that there was no contract at all. In the course of pleadings, evidence and submissions, there has been a lengthy and detailed analysis of correspondence, faxes, minutes of meetings and other documents, contractual and otherwise. Tyco, in a nutshell, points to various correspondence to support their contention that, because matters of detail had not been agreed, the extent of the agreement between the parties was no more than a simple contract based on implied obligations. They concede that the court, in a case such as this, should strive to find that some sort of contract exists. They submit it can only be very limited as to its scope and effect. Wo Hing on the other hand submits that Tyco's performance under the contract points to a much more detailed agreement. As will be seen hereafter, I have come to the conclusion that the approach advanced by the plaintiff is the correct one on the issues of (i) What was the contract? and (ii) Did Tyco repudiate? Three findings on the evidence underlie these conclusions :
What was the agreement? 5. Tyco's starting point for its argument that very little was in fact agreed, is the fact that they never signed the letter of intent dated 23 October 1998. It is apparent that as time went on, they attempted to negotiate terms which were "less onerous" than the terms of the contract between Wo Hing and its employer. Not surprisingly, all such attempts were met with a brick wall response from Wo Hing because, once it had agreed the 3%, it would not and could not take on any risks, which it had passed on to Tyco. 6. Not surprisingly passages from the evidence and extracts from the exhibits go both ways. Taken in isolation, a meritorious case can be compiled for both sides. The court has had a difficult task in deciding where to place the greater weight on the conflicting evidence and documentation. What follows in a brief summary of those matters upon which the court has placed greater reliance. It is simply unhelpful to refer to every competing letter, fax, email, etc. All have been considered. The result is that the court finds that as at the time when Tyco commenced the works in late October or early November 1998, Tyco was bound to carry them out on, inter alia, the following terms :
7. It is undoubtedly fair to say that some matters, at the material time, needed further discussion. To that end, there was a meeting on 3 November 1998. This was necessary even though Mr Edwin Lee ("Mr Lee"), a director of the plaintiff, gave evidence that he regarded the situation prior to this meeting as "a done deal". Mr Lee impressed the court as an honourable and successful businessman. He honestly believed and understood it was "a done deal". He acknowledged, however, that further discussions were necessary but that they did not affect the understanding as to the fundamental principles which governed the agreement between the parties, namely those listed above. 8. The minutes of the 3 November meeting made express reference to $80 million being the "final price" and that the plaintiff's fee was 3%. It also minuted Tyco's agreement to authorize all expenditure and to being paid seven days after Wo Hing's receipt of payments. The date in each month upon which Wo Hing agreed to submit its invoices was not finalized. 9. As further evidence that the unsigned letter of intent formed the basis of the agreement, Wo Hing placed considerable reliance on Tyco's conduct thereafter. The letter of intent stated :
10. The more important points in the 22 October fax were :
11. Evidence of the parties' conduct upon which the plaintiff relies can be summarized as follows : (a) The testimony of Tyco's project manager, Mr Paul Maddocks when being cross-examined.
(b) A letter of 6 November from Tyco which said :
Both "amendments" contain "ifs". The contingencies did not arise. In any event, if Tyco wanted to propose serious and substantial "amendments" to the letter of intent, this is when it would have done so, but did not. (c) Tyco's Hong Kong director, Mr Chris Melhuish, communicated to his own head office on 15 November 1998 in the following terms :
and on 1 April 1999 :
("Rob" was Mr R. Salek, from the Singapore head office) and on 10 April 1999 :
The only part of this Tyco letter with which Wo Hing does not agree is the reference to being paid the "same day". In fact, the agreement was seven days later. Same day payments would, for practical reasons, be impossible. (d) Tyco's lawyer in Singapore, Mr Thomas Ho, had written a lengthy letter, prior to 3 November 1998, which recorded Tyco's concerns about some of the more onerous terms (nonetheless "standard" in Hong Kong) in the contract. He, understandably would have preferred some to have been deleted or amended. The reality however was, and Tyco either did or should have appreciated this, that Wo Hing would only be able to change the terms of its contract with Tyco if it was able to change the same terms in its contract with Harvest Sun. The latter scenario would never have been entertained by Harvest Sun or even embarked on by Wo Hing. 12. In short, it is, in my judgment, acceptable logic to submit that if Tyco was anxious to make amendments, there must have been something to amend. Its anxiety stems from the tacit acknowledgement that without amendment it was bound by the terms which were back-to-back with the Wo Hing/Harvest Sun contract. 13. Tyco complained that the first written reference to the "back-to-back" nature of the agreement came several months after work began. The reason for this was not because it was an afterthought by Wo Hing but because it was the first time it had become necessary to state the existing arrangement. (e) Labour sub-contracts. The labour-only sub-contracts were with two companies called (in short) "Professional" and "On Fat". They had started work slightly before Tyco came on site. They had been originally engaged by Wo Hing. As an example of Tyco simply stepping into the shoes of Wo Hing, it took over the labour-only contracts with Professional and On Fat and requested all their invoices be sent directly to Tyco for payment. (f) Payments made. The defendant's case is that the nature of the agreement between the parties goes little further than a simple contract to carry out certain works based on implied terms including an implied term for reimbursement of cost plus a reasonable profit. Up until the time when things started to go seriously wrong (March/April 1999), the payments that were actually applied for and made were in accordance with Wo Hing's case, namely, back-to-back and pay-when-paid terms, and not on the basis of Tyco's "implied term" as to payment. 14. On 31 December 1998 and 1 February 1999, payment applications were made by Tyco to Wo Hing. The documents show that Tyco was paid Wo Hing's "certified amount" less "3% fee reduction". The application in March 1999 was commenced in the same way. 15. In conclusion on the "contract issue", it is fundamental to my findings as set out on page 6 (supra) as to the basic terms which formed the basis of this contract, that by agreeing to take 3% of the known contract price, Wo Hing would be exposing itself to no further financial risk. The day-to-day funding of the project was passed to Tyco. It simply makes no sense to think that for a 3% fee there would be any obligation on Wo Hing to pay Tyco's bills for labour and materials in advance. Neither could it have been seriously considered that Wo Hing would agree to re-write its contract with Tyco in terms "less onerous" than its own contract with the employer whilst leaving itself exposed to those unaltered and onerous terms. I am persuaded without difficulty, on the evidence, that the "back-to-back" and "pay-when-paid" nature of this contract inevitably flowed from the initial agreement between the parties in their Hong Kong context. The financial difficulties which emerged in early 1999 stem from the fact that Tyco's Hong Kong management was unable to persuade its Singapore bosses to release funds contrary to their own understanding and belief that it was necessary for them to do so to ensure smooth progress of the works. All the testimony in court on this issue goes one way. On at least one occasion, and motivated solely by a desire to keep the contract going, Wo Hing lent a substantial sum of money to Tyco in order to pay for labour. It was plainly a loan. Tyco quibbled about having to pay interest on it but cannot seriously contend that it evidences any obligation on Wo Hing to finance the project generally. Repudiation 16. It is, first of all, necessary under this heading to consider the events of February to April 1999. Although the Hong Kong management of Tyco was doing its very best, the works were falling behind schedule because of the financing difficulties already referred to. The loan for labour (referred to above) was for $1.9 million and was made on 26 January 1999. Such a sum is well within the amount which both sides recognized should be available as working capital on a project such as this. Mr Edwin Lee for the plaintiff said that a contractor would have to satisfy the Government on Government projects that it had 15% of the contract price available. Similarly, figures of 10%-20% were quoted by Mr Paul Maddocks and Mr Chris Melhuish for the defendant. Tyco's reluctance to authorize payment of $1.9 million for labour payments and seeking a loan from Wo Hing instead marked the start of a situation which went from bad to worse. There is an abundance of correspondence, emails, faxes, etc. evidencing this. Most of it is between Tyco's Hong Kong staff and its head office. It is unnecessary to recite it herein. Sadly, the difficulty was not solved and the ultimate consequence was, due in my judgment to Tyco's intransigence, that Tyco's involvement in the project came to an end and Wo Hing stepped back into its own shoes. 17. Some of the more important communications which the court considers to be a fair reflection of the situation which actually existed at the time are as follows : i) On 9 March 1999, Tyco's Mr Chris Melhuish emailed Singapore :
ii) On 15 March 1999, Wo Hing wrote to Tyco :
iii) The above letter prompted this "holding" reply :
iv) On 17 March 1999 (to Tyco) :
v) By 1 April 1999, it became apparent that Tyco's position would not change. They informed the labour sub-contractor ("Professional") that they would only be paid after Wo Hing had paid them. Funds to place letters of credit for advance purchase of materials was not forthcoming. Some suppliers had stopped making deliveries because they had not been paid for over three months. vi) The supply of materials got worse during the next week. The frustration being experienced by Tyco's Hong Kong team because of the lack of funding from Singapore is plain from the documentary exhibits. vii) A somewhat desperate "final shot" attempt to salvage the situation came from Mr Chris Melhuish on 8 April when he wrote to Wo Hing suggesting they, together, approach the main contractor to request a "large up front payment" to keep the project going. The note ends "it's only an idea". Mr Melhuish's motives were admirable but as Mr Lee for Wo Hing pointed out, for a contractor to go cap-in-hand to the main contractor would be commercial suicide for his firm. The "idea" nonetheless demonstrates that Tyco (Hong Kong) had come to the end of the line and could not continue in the existing situation. 18. This was the situation immediately prior to the determination of the contract on or about 13 April 1999. One of Tyco's main complaints is that at the time of termination the next monthly payment, in the sum of $3,221,370, was imminent. It submitted that had it been paid the immediate financial crisis would have been solved and the projected would have gathered steam. It said that Wo Hing deliberately withheld it and effectively contrived the situation which brought the contract to its end. I reject this contention. There is greater force in the plaintiff's submission that even if the latest interim payment had been paid to Tyco on or before 13 April (albeit, it was not actually due until 19 April) at best, the crisis would have abated for a short period. Assuming Tyco maintained its stance as to the responsibility of the financing of the project, the problem would not have been solved by the early payment of one monthly payment (which, in any event, Wo Hing did not receive until 12 April). Mr Graham, for the plaintiff, makes a number of points on this question, including the following, which I find to be a fair and accurate assessment of the situation. In answer to the question, what would have happened if the progress payment had been handed over early, he submitted :
19. At trial there was a considerable volume of evidence and cross-examination thereon concerning the financial liabilities for labour and materials as at April 1999 and Tyco's cash flow forecasts. The purpose of this evidence being to see what might have happened if Wo Hing had made the progress payment to Tyco earlier. As already indicated, I have concluded that in the long term it would have made little, or no significant, difference. The real question is not, was Wo Hing being unreasonable in asking Tyco to leave the site on or about 13 April when a payment was due to Tyco on 19 April, but could Tyco have completed its sub-contract given the circumstances pertaining at the time? The answer to this question is "No". To recite further extracts from the evidence would be to labour the point. At the risk of oversimplifying an issue that generated many arch files of evidence and exhibits and several days in court, Tyco was in repudiatory breach by failing to finance the project on a day to day basis. Its continuing failure so to do was crippling progress. Wo Hing justifiably felt that if it were to provide funds for the project it was entitled to run it as well and then work towards a profit for itself over and above the 3% fee which had been agreed. It accepted Tyco's repudiation and requested it to leave the site on 13 April. It formally accepted the repudiation by letter on 19 April 1999. 20. The legal test of what conduct amounts to a repudiatory breach can be stated simply. Moreover, in this case, I find it can be applied simply as well. We need not look beyond the words of Devlin J in Universal Cargo Carriers v. Citori [1957] 2 QB 426 at 431, a breach "which goes to the root of the contract" or "frustrates the commercial purpose of the contract". Also, the observation of Lord Wright in Ross T. Smith & Co. Ltd v. T.D. Barley & Son [1940] 3 All ER 72, are precisely appropriate to Tyco's manifested intentions in our case :
21. The "commercial basis" and "root" of the contract was that Wo Hing would be relieved of financial risk by accepting only a 3% fee. Both sides were aware of this. This could not be achieved without Tyco providing the necessary funding. Logic demands that if the contract was not on a back-to-back and pay-when-paid basis, Wo Hing would be burdened with the very financial and other legal obligations it had intended to pass to Tyco for an agreed fee. Tyco in return got the advantage of making a commercial profit out of the electrical installations. 22. It is finally interesting to note that as part of Mr Pennicott's submissions in relation to quantum he makes the point that from April 1999 "Wo Hing made a conscious decision to alter the contractual matrix and assume the risk". There are two corollaries. Firstly, the state of affairs they elected to inherit was that created by Tyco. [In reality it was an obvious decision to make by Wo Hing. To attempt to find a new sub-contractor to come in afresh and carry on the works on the same "3% fee" terms would have been difficult, time consuming and very likely would have created more problems than it solved.] Secondly, Mr Pennicott's submission implies that there was a risk to be assumed and that prior to April 1999 Wo Hing did not have that risk. There is only one other party who could have been burdened with the risk beforehand, Tyco. The risk being referred to is the risk of not making a profit because, inter alia, the financing and funding of the project might not go as planned. Quantum 23. The court's conclusions and findings in relation to the contractual terms and the question of repudiation mark the high water mark in the case as far as Wo Hing is concerned. The court's decisions on matters of quantum are by no means as favourable. 24. Before addressing the quantum issues, it should be said that apart from the considerable assistance, the court has received throughout from Mr P. Graham, for the plaintiff and Mr I. Pennicott, for the defendant and their respective instructing solicitors, the court has also, on quantum matters, had the benefit of evidence from two experts, Mr S. Tennant for Tyco and Mr C. Pritchard for Wo Hing. Apart from their individual written reports and oral testimony which were both helpful and very professional, they have both taken considerable time to try and agree facts and figures thereby narrowing and crystallizing the issues the court has to resolve. Methodology 25. The parties' have fundamentally different views as to the correct method of assessing damages. Both legal submissions suggest the opposing parties approach is flawed or misconceived or both. 26. I make the following observations and findings :
27. The question therefore now is - have Wo Hing made a profit? 28. The figures quoted supra at (g) are the most recent figures provided by both experts which are either agreed or determined by the court, except the one substantial area of disagreement. That item is the projected external costs. The competing submissions as to whether the figures should be $10.6 million or $0 are briefly as follows : 29. Mr Pennicott, for Tyco, describes it as "the crucial area of dispute between the parties". He points out that without this item it is clear that Wo Hing has made no loss. The question then becomes, how much profit has it made? Wo Hing in estimating its projected external costs has simply equated them with its outstanding purchase orders. Mr Tennant's evidence pointed out that as an indicator of expenditure, purchase orders would provide a useful guide in the early stages of a contract but as it nears its completion, as in our case, it ceases to be reliable. Mr Pritchard, for Wo Hing, considered that the purchase orders "were a sound basis to estimate the balance of costs that have yet to be incurred". 30. Mr Pennicott points to an additional factor which, he submits, further dilutes Wo Hing's argument. Included in the estimate of $10.6 million is a figure of $4 million, on paper due to Professional for labour. The evidence shows, and I accept, that this figure will not be paid. The starting point, even on Wo Hing's approach is therefore $6.6 million (approximately). Mr Pennicott submits that, whatever the court's findings as between themselves and Wo Hing, Tyco should be granted declaratory relief in the form of an indemnity against any future claims that may be made by On Fat or Professional against Tyco. I do not think that a specific order in those terms is appropriate as part of the judgment in these proceedings. However it is appropriate to state that the sum which the court has calculated that Tyco should pay to Wo Hing is intended to extinguish all Tyco's liabilities in respect of this contract. 31. Reliance, by Mr Pennicott, is finally placed on the most recent available documents. Towards the end of the trial a "Cost control monitors report" was disclosed which contained a summary of the position as at 31 August 2000. These figures are :
To this, Mr Pennicott suggests of a figure of $2 million is added (reasonably) for head office costs :
The value of work done certified to date is $83,100,000.00. 32. The most accurate figure available therefore for the profit made at this, near completion point in time, subject to the "projected costs" issue, is (approximately) $6.8 million. The equivalent figure from paragraph (g) supra was $75.35 million (a profit of $7.65 million). The difference between the figure (admittedly contrived in part by the court's findings) at (g) and the figure in (j) shows a slightly decreasing profit. 33. The result of Mr Pennicott's submission is that the court is persuaded that the final figures will be favourable to Wo Hing. As the court is minded to guarantee them a fair profit, it must make a value judgment. The present projected profit (following Mr Pennicott's analysis) is as described above. It seems also that that present projected profit is likely to be further eroded because of some future projected costs. The figures quoted above point to the fact that the further erosion will be relatively small but not $nil, as proposed by Mr Tennant. In order to achieve a final and fair determination which will put Wo Hing in the position it would have been had they been in charge from the outset (the position they elected to try and achieve in April 1999). I consider a figure of $1.5 million should be included in the equation for "future projected costs". The final figure is therefore $76,855,354. Taking the latest certified work done figure of $83,100,000, the profit is $6,244,646. This profit has been achieved utilizing the monies due to Tyco in April 1999. Even so, it is short of a 10% profit to which Wo Hing is entitled having chosen to resume the financial burden which should have been Tyco's had it not repudiated. A 10% profit would be $8,310,000. There is a difference of $2,065,354 - which I consider (subject to the following section of this judgment) is a fair reflection of Wo Hing's claim against Tyco. Applying the submissions adopted by the court to the evidence and most recent figures, as I have found them to be, it is intended to put Wo Hing in the position it would reasonably have expected to be had it carried out the entire works. It is a deliberately "broad brush" approach. It directly accords with neither methodology advanced by the parties. This is not entirely surprising given the oceanic gulf between the parties on their final assessments. In approximate figures, Mr Graham claims (including "loss of business" with which I deal in the next section) the sum of $25 million in the event of succeeding on liability. Mr Pennicott, even if he loses on liability, contends Tyco should nonetheless be paid about $6 million as it is the "net winner". The court's approach, in a nutshell, is that Wo Hing, having stepped back into its own shoes (which it was right to do and Tyco cannot be heard to complain about that decision) has made a profit which is nearly as much as it would have done had it been the contractor ab initio. 34. The question which initiates the final section of this judgment is - has it lost anything else for which it should be compensated? Loss of business 35. Again the parties are poles apart on both principle and quantum under this heading. Wo Hing simply says it is entitled to $12 million because if it hadn't been engaged in this contract it could have been engaged in another $80 million contract and would have expected to make 15% profit. Mr Pennicott submits the claim has a nil value and suggests it should never have been pursued. He relies on the fact that Wo Hing's own expert report does not deal with the issue. Tyco's expert, Mr Tennant, did deal with it but was not cross-examined on it and one view of the plaintiff's own evidence from Mr Lee and Mr Lam did not support it. 36. In view of the court's approach hitherto, this issue can be speedily disposed of. As part of the exercise in evaluating Wo Hing's claim, the court has already stated that its "profit" on this project should be 10%. The reasons for selecting 10% have already been given. By engaging its resources on this project, what has it lost? It has lost the opportunity of receiving its risk free 3% fee from Tyco, had Tyco not repudiated. Put simply, Wo Hing was expecting $2.4 million for passing on the project to Tyco. It has not received this fee as a result of the repudiation. It should be added to the figure already calculated. The combined sum reflects the plaintiff's total loss. The $2.4 million should be reduced by the fees deducted up to the last payment to Tyco (certificate number 5). That sum is $113,940. 37. The total sum to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff in respect of these proceedings is $5,069,102. 38. That sum is made up as follows :
Interest and costs 39. The question of interest in the light of this judgment is not easy. The repudiation was in April 1999. However, the "cost" of the repudiation has not emerged until very recently. It has been a gradual process. As the court has endeavoured to calculate what Wo Hing should have made out of the completed project and has compensated it for the shortfall in profit and loss of 3% fee, I think the appropriate time from which interest should run, in respect of (i) and (ii) above, is soon after the original completion date. 40. I give judgment for the plaintiff :
41. The question of costs may require further argument. Wo Hing has won on liability but its case and submissions on quantum have met with limited success. My costs order nisi is that the defendant shall pay 75% of the plaintiff's costs.
Representation: Mr Peter Graham, instructed by Messrs Deacons, for the Plaintiff Mr Ian Pennicott, instructed by Messrs Denton Wilde Spate, for the Defendant Appeal by the Defendant to Court of Appeal on the amount of damages awarded to Plaintiff. Court of Appeal would set aside the awarded judgment, dismissed the cross-appeal by the Plaintiff and on the question of quantum remit back to Court below for determination afresh. Please refer to CACV1120/2000 dated 17 April 2002 Appeal by the Defendant to Court of Appeal on the amount of damages awarded to Plaintiff. Court of Appeal would set aside the awarded judgment, dismissed the cross-appeal by the Plaintiff and on the question of quantum remit back to Court below for determination afresh. Please refer to CACV1120/2000 dated 17 April 2002 Appeal by the Defendant to Court of Appeal on the amount of damages awarded to Plaintiff. Court of Appeal would set aside the awarded judgment, dismissed the cross-appeal by the Plaintiff and on the question of quantum remit back to Court below for determination afresh. Please refer to CACV1120/2000 dated 17 April 2002 |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCCT 40/1999