HKSAR v. Leighton Contractors (Asia) Ltd.
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 1029/2000 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 9 January 2001.
1. On 22 August 2000 the appellant was convicted after trial in San Po Kong Magistracy of two offences one of which was contrary to Regulations 31(1)(c), 68(1)(a) and 68(2)(a) of the Construction Sites (Safety) Regulations made under the Factories and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance CAP 59, and the other contrary to Sections 6A(2)(c) and 6A(3) of the Ordinance itself.
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HCMA001029/2000 HCMA 1029/2000 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE APPELLATE JURISDICTION MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 1029 OF 2000 (ON APPEAL FROM SAN PO KONG MAGISTRACY _______________
________________ Coram: Hon Jackson J in Court Date of Hearing: 19 December 2000 Date of Delivery of Judgment: 9 January 2001 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ 1. On 22 August 2000 the appellant was convicted after trial in San Po Kong Magistracy of two offences one of which was contrary to Regulations 31(1)(c), 68(1)(a) and 68(2)(a) of the Construction Sites (Safety) Regulations made under the Factories and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance CAP 59, and the other contrary to Sections 6A(2)(c) and 6A(3) of the Ordinance itself. 2. The information in relation to the first offence alleged that the appellant, being the contractor responsible for a hoist at a construction site, failed to ensure that it was not used unless the hoistway enclosure and the gates, where practicable, extended to a height of a least 2 metres unless a lower height (being not less than 900 millimetres) was sufficient to prevent a person from falling down the hoistway and there was no risk of any person coming into contact with any moving part of the hoist. 3. The information in relation to the second offence alleged that the appellant, being the proprietor of an industrial undertaking, failed to provide information, instruction, training and supervision as was necessary to ensure, so far as was reasonably practicable, the health and safety at work of all persons employed by the appellant at the industrial undertaking. The facts of this case 4. The facts which led to the prosecution and conviction of the appellant can be shortly stated. The appellant was both the contractor responsible for a construction site and the proprietor of the industrial undertaking going on at that site. 5. On 30 September 1999 an employee of the appellant fell to his death from the 40th floor of a building being constructed on the site. He fell down the hoistway. 6. Precisely how the accident came about is not known. 7. On the 40th floor of the hoistway there was a double flap metal gate 160 centimetres high, the top of which was 40 centimetres below a concrete tie beam of the building. An electrical interlocking device was installed at the top of the right flap metal gate. 8. There was evidence before the learned magistrate, which he apparently accepted, that the deceased worker was one of 3 employees of the appellant who had gone to the 40th floor to unload materials which were to be hoisted up from the ground. 9. Whilst two of these employees were cleaning up miscellaneous items the deceased man went to the loading platform and communicated with the hoist operator on the ground by intercom. He apparently asked her why the hoist had not yet arrived at the 40th floor. 10. The next thing that happened was that the deceased man cried out for help, which cry was heard over the intercom by the hoist operator on the ground (who immediately stopped the hoist) and by at least one of the employees on the 40th floor who turned round and saw that the deceased had disappeared; that the metal gates were open, and that the hoist platform was stationary at a position higher than the 40th floor. 11. Whilst it can be no more than pure conjecture or speculation after the event it may have been the case that the deceased, who was anxious for the hoist to arrive at the 40th floor and who enquired of the hoist operator as to its whereabouts, opened the gates; went out on to the temporary hoist platform to look down for it and fell to his death, being completely unaware that at that time the hoist was, in fact, higher than the 40th floor. It goes without saying that, whatever in fact happened, this was a dreadful tragedy. The trial 12. It is plain from a reading of the learned magistrate's most careful and comprehensive statement of findings that the prosecution called a number of witnesses who were employees of the appellant and who gave detailed evidence, inter alia, about the provision of information, instruction, training and supervision concerning matters of safety by the appellant. 13. I will return to that evidence later in this judgment but suffice it say for the moment that the learned magistrate concluded in relation to training and supervision as follows:-
14. If that then was the learned magistrate's conclusion concerning training and supervision, what of information and instruction? 15. The prosecution called a Divisional Occupational Safety Officer of the Labour Department (the prosecuting authority) who the learned magistrate (after argument) accepted as an expert. That witness, who had a number of qualifications as an expert, told the court that he had not previously given evidence concerning the use and operation of a hoist; that whilst he had monitored hoists in high rise buildings he had never used one; that he had not drafted working manuals on the safe operation of a hoist but that he had lectured on the subject. 16. In the course of his evidence this witness said that whilst he accepted that the appellant had given to its employees sufficient oral information and instructions concerning the safe usage of the hoist, that information and those instructions should also have been given in written form. 17. As part of its case during the trial, the appellant also called an expert witness. His expertise was not challenged and, among other things, he said that the intercom system of communication between the hoist operator and the unloading workers was one of the best, and that the information, instruction, training and supervision given by the appellant was sufficient. He said that information and instructions should be given to the workers orally and not in writing, and that in his opinion, those of them who had given evidence in the trial appeared to be fully aware of the operational features of the hoist. 18. As to the summons issued under the Regulations regarding the height of the gates between the hoist and the building, the expert for the prosecution was of the view that the gap of 40 centimetres between the top of the metal gates and the concrete tie beam should have been covered, and that albeit the gates were of sufficient height to prevent a person from falling into the hoist shaft, they were insufficient to prevent a person coming into contact with the hoist. 19. The expert for the appellant, on the other hand, was of the opinion that as the metal gates were 1.6 metres high there was no risk of any person coming into contact with any part of the hoist. 20. In his statement of findings the learned magistrate concluded in relation to the section 6 summons as follows:-
21. In relation to the summons concerning the regulations governing the use of the hoist the learned magistrate concluded as follows:-
The grounds of appeal 22. The appellant's grounds of appeal settled by Mr Wu of counsel speak for themselves. I set them out hereunder:-
23. In relation to the conviction under S6 of CAP 59 and in the course of his detailed submissions before me Mr Wu, for the appellant, has argued that by reason of the 11 matters set out hereunder it was not necessary for the appellant to provide written information and instruction to its employees but that, in any event, there was evidence before the court that employees of the appellant were provided with written information and instructions which fact was not taken into consideration by the learned Magistrate.
24. In relation to the conviction for the regulatory offences Mr Wu has argued that by reason of the 8 matters set out hereunder, it was not reasonably foreseeable that there was any risk of an employee coming into contact with any moving part of the hoist and, further, that any risk of the kind envisaged by the learned Magistrate in his statement of findings was entirely speculative and such risk would apply irrespective of the height of the gates.
Conclusion 25. I respectfully agree with each and every one of the submissions of Mr Wu in relation to both summonses and I also respectfully agree with everything, save two matters, stated by the learned magistrate. I find myself unable to agree with him that, on the evidence, he could properly conclude that there was anything beyond a fanciful risk that a worker might place a part of his body above the closed gates and into the hoist shaft, or that it was necessary ( and I stress that word) for safety instructions (in the circumstances of this particular case) to be given in written or diagram form. 26. It seems to me that the evidence of the expert witness for the prosecution upon which the learned magistrate appears to have placed great reliance was little more than an expression of ideals and a counsel of perfection arrived at in hindsight in an attempt to explain what, on the face of it, was inexplicable. 27. Indeed, as I have said, I am quite unable to see how it could fairly be said that, on the evidence before the learned magistrate, instructions and information in writing were 'necessary to ensure the safety at work of the employees of the appellant'. For what it is worth, it seems to me that there can be no wholly safe system of work devised for employees in the construction industry who are required to work 40 storeys above ground. Such work is inherently dangerous or unsafe. To suggest, as the prosecution expert appears to have been suggesting that this dreadful accident would not have happened if the deceased worker had received instructions in writing is speculative in the extreme. Given that, in my view in this case, the issuing of instructions and information in writing was not necessary the appellants appeal against the section 6 conviction must succeed - and I set it aside and quash the sentence imposed. 28. As regards the appeal against the conviction in respect of the regulatory summons, that too I allow and quash the sentence. The mere fact that the gates were less than 2 metres in height is, so it seems to me, neither here nor there, given their actual height of 1.6 metres and the fact that the height of the overhead concrete beam meant that gates of 2 metres in height could not be installed. What was important was whether this 'shortfall in height' might of itself present a risk of a person falling down the hoist way (and the learned magistrate found that it would not) or whether it would present a risk of a person coming into contact with a moving part of the hoist (which the learned magistrate found that it would). As I have said I am unable to see how it could be said that just because there was a small gap between the top of the gates and the overhead concrete beam, that presented a real (as opposed to a wholly fanciful) risk that that might happen. 29. As indicated to counsel at the hearing of this appeal I make a costs order nisi in favour of the appellant.
Representation: Mr Paul K N Wu, instructed by Messrs Mallesons Stephen Jaques, for the appellant Mr Paul Madigan, SGC, for the Respondent |
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