Aust-key Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue
Read the full judgment text of HCIA 1/2000 on BabelCite. This HCIA judgment was delivered on 21 March 2001.
1. This is the decision on the case stated by the Board of Review (said to be) pursuant to section 69 of the Inland Revenue Ordinance Cap. 112 which reads :
Cited by 3 cases
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HCIA000001/2000 HCIA 1/2000 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE HIGH COURT INLAND REVENUE APPEAL NO. 1 OF 2000 ____________
____________ Coram: Hon Chung J in Court Dates of Hearing: 21 July 2000 and 2 March 2001 Date of Handing Down Opinion: 21 March 2001 ___________ O P I N I O N ___________ Introduction 1. This is the decision on the case stated by the Board of Review (said to be) pursuant to section 69 of the Inland Revenue Ordinance Cap. 112 which reads :
2. The 2 questions posed for the opinion of the Court by the Board are :
3. I shall discuss whether these questions can properly be called "questions of law" below. For the moment, I shall proceed to consider them assuming that they are. The Background Facts 4. The background facts leading to the hearing before the Board have been set out in the case stated and arose in the following manner. 5. The taxpayer used to own shop premises in Tai Po ("the Property"). It is common ground that when the Property was acquired, it was intended to be the taxpayer's capital asset. The taxpayer applied to the authorities sub-divide the Property into 87 shop units in August 1988. By July 1989, sub-division work was completed. From April 1989 to March 1993, the taxpayer sold 73 of the sub-divided units (5 of which were sold with existing tenancies). The 14 units still owned by the taxpayer were rented out. 6. The Revenue considered that when the Property was converted into 87 units, the taxpayer changed its intention from treating the Property as a capital asset to trading stock. The Board in essence agreed with the Revenue regarding this matter despite the taxpayer's arguments to the contrary. This point is no longer in issue before the Court in the case stated. 7. As a result of the taxpayer's change of intention regarding the shop units, the sale proceeds therefrom became taxable. The Revenue considered the value of the Property (before sub-division) should be $16 million, based on a valuation by the Rating and Valuation Department ("the R & V"). On the other hand, the taxpayer assessed (through valuers engaged by it) that the value should be $30 million. 8. The taxpayer's value was at one stage accepted by the Revenue but this was no longer the case when the matter was heard by the Board. At the time of the Board hearing, the taxpayer argued inter alia that the Revenue, having accepted its valuation, is estopped from departing from it after a reasonable period of time. Again, this argument is not relevant to this case stated. 9. At the end of the hearing, the Board assessed the Property's value to be $25.5 million (not $16 million or $30 million). The practical consequence (to the taxpayer) of the difference in the Property's value is this. If the Property's value is higher, the difference between it and the amount of sale proceeds (that is, the profit) would be smaller and hence the amount taxable would be less. The Relevant Findings of the Board 10. From the 2 questions posed, it is apparent that the Board's findings relevant to the case stated are related to the valuation of the Property. In view of its importance herein, the relevant passages will be set out below :
The First Question in the Case Stated 11. As state above, the first of the 2 questions posed by the Board is :
12. The inappropriateness of this question for an opinion of the Court is obvious. As it is now phrased, the answer must invariably be in the affirmative. The Board :
13. As a statutorily established appeal tribunal, it is obvious that the Board has the power inter alia to decide on the facts relevant to the appeal. In order for it to properly do so, as s. 68(7) above clearly shows, the Board has been empowered to admit or reject any evidence adduced as appropriate. 14. With the above in mind, not only is the Board entitled to make its own findings of fact after having considered the evidence (including valuation evidence if relevant), it is under a duty to do so. 15. It became apparent during the hearing before the Court that the taxpayer's real complaint against the Board is this. Having rejected the value assigned to the Property by both parties, the Board is not entitled to, and should not, make a finding on the Property's value (which is different from that assigned by either party). 16. At the beginning of the hearing on 21 July 2000, I informed counsel of my concern over the difference between the first question (as worded) and the real complaint of the taxpayer. As a result, the hearing was adjourned to enable the taxpayer to consider whether to amend the case stated. When the hearing resumed on 2 March 2001, a draft amended case stated was placed before the Court. Counsel for the Revenue opposed the draft amended case stated by reason that it has not been amended according to s. 69(4) of Cap. 112. However, counsel for the Revenue indicated he would not object to arguments relating to the real complaint being put forth in the absence of an amendment. 17. The taxpayer's real complaint only has substance if the Board had rejected all valuation evidence adduced by both parties. In such a case, there will be no evidence left for the Board to base a finding on the Property's value. 18. As a fact, however, the Board has not rejected all valuation evidence. What it has done can be summarized as follows :
19. Although my view is strictly irrelevant to the case stated, I do not consider there is anything wrong in the Board's approach set out above. There is no complaint that the Board's finding is irrational or perverse and I do not consider any such complaint can be validly made. 20. As a tribunal of fact,
are all matters falling within the Board's jurisdiction and are matters for it to decide. The Second Question in the Case Stated 21. The second question posed by the Board is :
22. I do not see how this question (as presently worded) can be answered as a matter of law. The inappropriateness of this question is shown by the argument of counsel for the Revenue to the effect that the Board has not completely rejected the parties' evidence relating to the market value of the Property. Strictly speaking it is not open to him to do so because the question can be read as meaning that the evidence has been totally rejected. The taxpayer, however, did not object to this line of argument at the hearing. 23. If the question had been :
the answer to this question would have been in the negative. There may be (subject to further arguments on this point) inherent jurisdiction on the part of the Board to decide (as a matter of discretion) whether further expert evidence is needed if the expert evidence adduced has been totally rejected. However, the Board may decide further expert evidence is not needed and the appeal can be determined based on the burden of proof (in other words, the party which bears the burden of proof will fail on the point where expert evidence is needed). Where there has only been a partial rejection of the evidence, the proper answer will have to depend on (a) the extent to which and/or (b) the reason(s) why, the Board did not accept the valuation evidence. 24. In the factual context of the case stated, I do not find that there is any error in the Board's approach (but this is strictly irrelevant to the case stated). Likewise, there is (correctly) no complaint that the Board's finding is irrational or perverse. Conclusion and Other Matters 25. It follows from my earlier observations (see above) that the case stated has not raised any question of law properly within the meaning of s. 69 of Cap. 112. However, assuming that they are properly questions of law raised thereunder, the Court's opinion is that :
Further, having considered the circumstances of this case, I would if necessary confirm the Board's finding on the market value of the Property. 26. The proper course for the Board to take when it is asked to state a case but which involves no proper question of law is to decline the request. If the applicant (whether the taxpayer or the Revenue) is dissatisfied with the Board's refusal to state a case, it is up to the applicant to decide whether to take further action (and if so, what action to take). Costs 27. The parties agreed that a costs order nisi pursuant to RHC Ord 42 r 5B(6) can be included. No useful purpose has been achieved by the case stated. The Revenue has in essence been successful herein. The costs should be paid by the taxpayer to the Revenue adopting the usual rule that costs should follow the event.
Representation: Ms Lily Yew, instructed by Messrs. W. L. Yuen & Co., for the Appellant Mr. Ho Chi Sum, SGC of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent |
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