Hon Mei Hing Trading As Wing Tat Iron and Steel Engineering v. The Secretary for Transport
Read the full judgment text of LDMR 19/2000 on BabelCite. This Lands Tribunal judgment was delivered on 30 November 2001 before H. H. Judge Chow, Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal; Mr. W. K. Lo, Member of the Lands Tribunal.
Lands Tribunal – compensation for land resumption – Railways Ordinance – Lands Resumption Ordinance (Cap. 124) ss.2, 10(2)(a), (b), (d), 12(d) – review of judgment – whether the open area of 371.5 sq. m. was the subject of a lease or a licence – held to be a licence as the tenancy agreement only referred to the half-house and the open area was not fenced and was accessible to the public – whether loss of profit rent falls under s.10(2)(a) with s.12(d) as the basis of assessment, or s.10(2)(d) – held to fall under s.10(2)(d) as profit rent is not the value of the land or leasehold interest but loss or damage to the business – Lee Chun v Director of Lands distinguished – whether compensation should be apportioned or awarded in full – held full compensation recoverable following Wong Hoi Nung (CACV 521/2001) where causal connection is established – whether compensation is payable for construction/site improvement work in contravention of the block government lease – held no compensation payable as no evidence of Government knowledge or acquiescence – Lucky Shoe Repairing v Best Sharp, Melhado v A.G. and Winfat, and paragraph 5 of the Schedule to the Railways Ordinance considered – whether compensation is payable for loss of stock at the agreed value – held $35,220 awarded based on the Applicant's own accounts as the stock-taking exercise was unreliable – capitalization rate for loss of goodwill – principles in Shun Fung Ironworks Ltd. v Director of Buildings and Lands applied – Schilt's risk premium table treated only as a guide – Category 4 (small businesses dependent on special skill) considered more appropriate than Category 5 – capitalization rate of 20% maintained – capitalization period of 7 years for goodwill maintained as the Applicant's husband would be nearing 70 within that period – Chan Kwok Lam v Directors of Buildings and Lands, Chum Hon Chi v Director of Lands, Chan Pui Ki v Leung On, and Callwin International Electric v Director of Engineering Development considered – final compensation of $1,050,000 awarded – costs of the review reserved.
Legal issues: Whether the open area of 371.5 sq. m. was the subject of a lease or only a licence · Whether the Tribunal erred in differentiating rent under a lease from licence fee for the same unit area · Whether compensation should be apportioned or awarded in full · Whether compensation is payable for construction and site improvement work in contravention of the block government lease · Whether the Applicant is entitled to compensation for loss of stock based on the agreed stock value · Whether loss of profit rent is compensatable under s.10(2)(a) or s.10(2)(d) of the Lands Resumption Ordinance · Whether the Tribunal erred in adopting a capitalization rate of 20% for the valuation of loss of goodwill · Whether the Tribunal erred in adopting a 7-year capitalization period for the valuation of loss of goodwill
Outcome: The Tribunal allowed both review applications in part; compensation varied from $846,000 to $1,050,000. The Tribunal set aside apportionment-based compensations following Wong Hoi Nung and awarded full compensation. Costs of the review were reserved.
Cited by 6 cases · Cites 2 cases
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LDMR000019A/2000 LDMR 19 OF 2000 IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MISCELLANEOUS REFERENCE APPLICATION NO. 19 of 2000 _______________
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Date of Decision : 30 November 2001 ____________________________________ DECISIONS ON REVIEWS _____________________________________ 1.After the Tribunal had delivered its judgment of this case on 24th July 2001, both the Applicant and the Respondent applied to review that judgment. 2.The Applicant's application was made on the following grounds: -
3.Applicant's ground of review - on exclusive possession The main issue is whether the open area of 371.5 sq. m. is the subject-matter of a tenancy between the Applicant and her landlord. The Tribunal's decision is that it was only a licensed area, and not a leased area. 3.1Mr. Lee, Counsel for the Applicant, submitted that the Tribunal failed to consider all the facts and circumstances which militate the grant of a lease. One of such facts is that the Applicant exercised the right of a landowner, in fencing off the site and in excluding others. But this is not true. Under cross-examination she was asked why she did not construct some fence to enclose her own area. Her answer was "how to enclose because the space outside the house is accessible by people." The evidence adduced reveals that to the north of the open space there is Lot No. 199 on which there are some houses. The Applicant agreed that there was no iron fence along the northern boundary of the open space so that people could just walk to the open space. This is consistent with the sketch plans shown on page 19 and page 230 of the Agreed Bundle (Exhibit No. 1), which show that there is no fence constructed along the northern boundary of the open space. The Applicant also agreed that the people of Luen Cheong Company could walk through the open space. 3.2The intention of the parties is also relevant in considering whether the open space is a leased area. The tenancy agreement (page 91 of Agreed Bundle) only referred to the leasing of the half-house. When asked by the Respondent's Counsel why she did not make sure that the open space was also covered by the tenancy agreement, her answer was that she had not known about the land resumption then, and had she known about the land resumption she would have stated it clearly. If the parties had intended that the tenancy agreement also covered the open space, it should have been stated there. It would not have been difficult for a few more Chinese characters to be added to the tenancy agreement so that the open space adjacent to the half-house was included in the written tenancy agreement as well. 3.3That being the situation, the Tribunal could not have erred to find that the open space was not the subject matter of a tenancy. 4.Applicant's ground of review - on calculation of loss of profit rent In ascertaining the value of the leased area and the attached licensed area, the Tribunal said that: -
4.1Mr. Lee submitted that the Tribunal was wrong to differentiate the rental payable under a lease and the rental payable under a license as there was no evidence that such a disparity exist. But the Tribunal is of the view that there must have been such a disparity. The leased area was a half-house whereas the open space was a mere open space, without any cover erected on it. The landlord must have spent money either in putting up or acquiring the structures. On the other hand, the structures kept away rain, wind and sunlight, thereby providing a better working environment and a good storing place for properties against rain. They also provided security to the properties kept inside the structures against theft. Due to these reasons, it would be very natural and reasonable for a landlord to demand more money (in terms of rent) from the tenant than the licence fee, for the same unit area. The Tribunal is unable to say how much more money would be demanded. In the absence of evidence, the Tribunal holds the view that it would not be unreasonable to say that the unit value of the leased area should be at least twice the unit value of the licensed area. 4.2For reasons set out in our original judgment, we repeat our estimate of the market rent and licence fee for the whole Site, as follows: -
4.3Based on the Court of Appeal decision in Wong Hoi Nung, the loss of profit rent and licence fee to the Applicant should be calculated on the basis of the total occupational area of the Applicant. Hence, the loss of profit rent and licence fee is calculated as follows: -
5.Applicant's ground of review - on apportionment The Tribunal follows the Court of Appeal decision in Wong Hoi Nung formerly trading as Bailey Trading Company v The Secretary For Transport (CACV 521/2001) ("Wong Hoi Nung"), which is binding on the Tribunal. At page 10 of that judgment, the Court of Appeal said: -
Based on this decision, the Tribunal will set aside all the compensations made on apportionment basis, and award full compensations instead. 6.Applicant's ground of review - on loss of construction and site improvement work Mr. Lee submitted that in failing to take enforcement action, the Government tolerated and acquiesced the existence of the structures, as such structures were openly used over a long period of time. Alternatively the Government by its conduct impliedly waived its right to enforce the Government lease provisions which prohibited the erection of structures by accepting annual rates and taxes from the Applicant throughout its occupation of the site. The Tribunal took the view of the fact that the structures in question had been in use openly for a long time does not necessarily give rise to an inference that the Government had knowledge of such a fact. There is no evidence adduced by the Applicant to show that the Government had such knowledge at the material time, and therefore the issue of acquiescence or waiver of the Applicant's conduct in erecting the structures does not arise. 6.1Mr. Lee further submitted that the Tribunal erred in failing to follow the decision in Melhado v A. G. and Winfat and in holding that such work was in contravention of the Block Government Lease. The Court of Appeal in Wong Hoi Nung fully considered this issue. The Tribunal's decision in this respect is in line with that decision; therefore the Tribunal's decision cannot be faulted. 6.2Mr. Lee opined that the Tribunal erred in failing to give due regard to paragraph 5 of the Schedule to the Railways Ordinance which reads as follows: -
The Tribunal cannot see how this paragraph can be of any assistance to the Applicant. 7.Applicant's ground of review - Loss of stock The Applicant submitted that " the Tribunal erred in failing to award compensation for the loss of stock as based on the amount as agreed by the parties at $163,280 and based on a joint stock taking exercise. The Tribunal failed to distinguish the legal requirement of establishing ownership and the administrative requirement of proof of ownership." 7.1In our original judgment, we have already set out the grounds of adopting different stock value figures by both parties. Whilst the Respondent agreed with the Applicant the value of stock at the stock taking exercise, the Respondent did not agreed on the actual quantity of stock. We accept that the Respondent has the right to question the Applicant on the proof of ownership of the stock. We further accept the Respondent's submission that the stock taking exercise was unreliable for the reasons as stated in paragraph 19 of the Tribunal's original judgment. In the absence of any satisfactory proof produced by the Applicant, we decide that the stock figure of $35,220, based on the Applicant's accounts as at 31.3.1999 was an appropriate figure to be used. 8.The Respondent's review application - on the calculation of loss of profit rent Mr. Lam, Counsel for the Respondent, submitted that 'the Tribunal erred in treating the Applicant's claim for loss of profit rent as part of her claim for loss or damage to her business, under section 10(2)(d) of the Lands Resumption Ordinance Cap. 124 ("the Ordinance"). Loss of profit rent ought instead be the value of Applicant's leasehold interest in the land resumed, compensatable under section 10(2)(a) of the Ordinance.' Secondly, the Respondent submitted that "the Tribunal erred in holding that section 12(d) of the Ordinance had no application in the assessment of profit rent. Section 12(d) ought instead to have formed the basis of assessment of loss of profit rent, viz. loss of profit rent ought to have been assessed on the basis of the amount which the Applicant's leasehold interest in the land resumed might be expected to realize if sold by a willing seller in the open market." 8.1"Profit rent" is the profit enjoyed by a tenant because the monthly rental paid by him is below that of the market rent. This is the difference between the market rental and the rental actually paid by him. For instance, if the rental paid by him before the resumption of the land was $2,000 per month, whereas the market rent was $2,500, then he obtained a "profit rent" of "$500" ($2,500 - $2,000) per month. Based on this analysis, it is immediately apparent that section 10(2)(a) is not applicable to the realm of "profit rent". Section 10(2)(a) reads: -
8.2The issue is: what is meant by "the value of the land resumed". "Land" is defined under section 2 of the Ordinance to mean: -
According to section 12(d) of the Ordinance, the value of the land resumed shall be taken to be the amount which the land if sold by a willing seller in the open market might be expected to realize. 8.3Mr. Lam quoted the case of Lee Chun v Director of Lands [1983-85] CPR 426, to support his submission that profit rent is compensatable under section 10(2)(a) of the Ordinance, i.e. it is the value of the Applicant's leasehold interest on the land resumed at the date of resumption. The relevant part of the judgment in Lee Chun dealing with the Applicant's "leasehold interest" can be found on page 437 to page 440 of that judgment. For the present purpose, the Tribunal reproduces the extracts of that part of the judgment as follows: -
8.4The Tribunal in Lee Chun simply applied section 12(d) of the Ordinance without explaining why. It was not dealing with the value of the leasehold interest per se under section 12(d). It was in fact dealing with "the value of the business" on the applicant's leasehold interest. If it was merely to ascertain the value of the leasehold interest, it should not have resorted to ascertaining the net income of the fist pond business. This case is not the authority for applying section 10(2)(a) in the realm of "profit rent". 8.5Under the terms of a tenancy/lease, both the landlord and the tenant have their respective rights and obligations. One of the obligations of the tenant is to pay to his landlord the monthly rentals. The obligation to pay the monthly rental stems from the tenancy/lease, but it is not the tenancy/lease itself. The profit rent he enjoys by paying a rental lower than the market rental is not the tenancy/lease itself. Therefore "profit rent" does not come within the meaning of "land" under section 2 of the Ordinance. 8.6There may be various interests or rights enjoyed by various people at the date of resumption, and a tenancy/a leasehold interest is one of them. Such interests or rights only attach to the land, but they are not the land itself. Thus under section 10(2)(a) of the Ordinance, the Legislature legislated for compensation payable for "the value of the land" resumed whereas under section 10(2)(b) it legislated for compensation payable for "the value of any easement or other right" in the land resumed. Sections 6 and 8 refer to "estate or interest in the land". This shows that "land" and "estate or interest in the land" are two different things. In the present case, the Applicant only had a leasehold interest in the land. Therefore sections 10(2)(a) and 12(d) do not apply. 8.7If section 12(d) is applicable, and the leasehold interest is sold in the open market, a sum representing the open market value will be obtained. But how could that figure reflect the fact that the tenant was enjoying a cheaper rent? Section 12(d) simply does not deal with this situation. 8.8On the other hand section 10(2)(d) applies to this situation. The Applicant acquired the tenancy for the purpose of running the iron and steel business. It is an integral part of the business because without the tenancy the business simply cannot survive. On the reverse, if there had not been such business, the tenancy would not have been created. 8.9The profit of the business is what will be left behind after deducting the total income from the total expenditure. No doubt the monthly rental forms part of the total expenditure. This is reflected in the Applicant's tax returns to the Inland Revenue Department for the year 1996/1997, 1997/1998, 1998/1999 where the business expenses include the rentals of the shop and the rental deposit (pages 35, 39, 45 of the Agreed Bundle). 8.10In conclusion, we hold that section 10(2)(d) and not section 12(d) applies to the realm of profit rent, and therefore the Tribunal's judgment in this respect should not be disturbed. 8.11Mr. Lam submitted that it would not be right to treat the "rent" of $2,880 paid by the Applicant as covering also the government land G1 and G2. It must be against public policy to "recognize" the purported grant of a licence over government land. However, in view of the decision of Wong Hoi Nung, a case involving compensation to a business covering private and government land, this argument simply cannot stand. On the cross appeal on the issue of profit rent, the Court of Appeal had this to say:-
8.12In the present case the Applicant had no knowledge at any material time that parts of the licensed area, namely G1 and G2, were government land. Therefore the Tribunal was entitled to find that the licence fee was for the whole of the area (which included the government land G1 and G2) licensed to him by her landlord. 8.13Mr. Lam also submitted that "in any event, the adoption of a multiplier of 7 years (before discount) was too high in the circumstances of the case." because for a periodic tenancy, the adoption of a term of years of 7 is unprecedented. 8.14We decide that the period for the capitalization of profit rent and licence fee obviously depend on the likelihood of duration of the business on the premises, in the absence of the resumption. We have in our judgment determined this to be 7 years. This issue will be covered in paragraph 10 of this review judgment below. 8.15As set out in paragraph 4.3, the estimated loss of profit rent and licence fee is revised to be $214,938. 9.Respondent's review application - on loss of goodwill Regarding our judgment on the loss of goodwill, Mr. Lam submitted that "the Tribunal's adoption of a multiplier of 7 years (before capitalization) was too high and of a discount rate of 20% was too low in view of all the circumstances of the cases particularly matters mentioned in paragraphs 15.7 and 15.8 of the Judgment." 9.1In Callwin International Electric Co. Ltd. & Anor v. Director of Engineering Development [1984] HKC 556, the Tribunal stated that: -
9.2The Tribunal also observed in the same page of the judgment of Callwin that: -
9.3In the present case, it has been accepted by both parties that the method of assessing the goodwill of the Applicant's business affected by the resumption is to multiply the agreed annual profit of the business by an appropriate years' purchase. The Applicant's expert suggested a multiplier of 11.11 arrived at by applying a discount rate of 9% in perpetuity. On the other hand, the Respondent's expert adopted a multiplier of 2, based on the years' purchase for 5 years at a capitalization rate of 43%, or 1.94. In our judgment given on 24th July, 2001, we decided that the capitalization period should be 7 years whilst for the discount rate, in the absence of better evidence, a rate of 20% be adopted. The Respondent in the review application submitted that the capitalization rate of 20% is too low for reason set out below: -
9.4The principles to be applied in arriving at a discount rate in the assessment of goodwill are to be found in the Privy Council's decision in Shun Fung. It was held (at 132B-E) that: -
9.5In Shun Fung, the parties agreed on the formula for converting the nominal rate of return to a real rate based on an agreed inflation rate. The Claimant used a real discount rate of 12-13% when calculating the value of future profits on an extinguishments basis whilst the Government on the other hand adopted a real discount rate of 28%. The Tribunal in its judgment dated 29 June 1992 fixed the real discount rate at 25%. There was nothing before the Judicial Committee to cause it to disturb the Tribunal's conclusions on this issue of discount rate. 9.6Despite the principles set out by Shun Fung, the problem of assessment of goodwill for compensation cases in Hong Kong such as the present case has remained more or less unchanged because the difficulties of finding the appropriate discount rate (especially the third component, the so-called risk factor) persists. 9.7In the review application, Mr. Lam for the Respondent submitted that the rate to discount the risk factor ought to be "in the region of at least 26 to 30%". This was based on the Schilt's categorization of risk premium table adduced in the Land Tribunal's hearing of Shun Fung. It was Mr. Lam's submission that in the present case, the business should fall within Category 5 of Schilt's table where the risk premium was stated as 26-30%. Therefore, after adding an estimated risk free rate of 6% to this suggested risk premium range, the minimum capitalization rate for the loss of profit for the Applicant should at least be 32%. 9.8However, we have much reservations on the above computation suggested by the Respondent. First, we note that even when the Lands Tribunal in finding that the Schilt's table to be helpful in the determination of the appropriate capitalization rate for Shun Fung regarded the method as a somewhat crude method. Also, we understood from the Lands Tribunal judgment of Shun Fung that the hearing of that case in the Tribunal spanned between 1988 to 1992. Whilst we do not know the date of publication of the Schilt's table adduced by the expert in Shun Fung, we believe that it was most probably published not earlier than the mid 1980's and the business data that it was based was in the early 1980's, at the earliest. Of course, the business that the table attempted to categorize are based on locations very different from those in Hong Kong. Also, the categorization of business may not be applicable to Hong Kong situation as well. Under the circumstances, whilst we also agree that in the absence of any evidence, the Schilt's table may provide a guide but we do not think that it would be right for the Respondent in the present case to ask the Tribunal to follow strictly the categorization of the business and the corresponding risk premium rate as shown in the table extracted in the Land's Tribunal's judgement of Shun Fung. 9.9Furthermore, even based on the Schilt's table as referred to by the Respondent, we do not agree with the Respondent that the Applicant's business be considered as Category 5. We rather consider that Category 4, being for "small businesses that depend upon the special skill of one or two people" is a more appropriate category for the Applicant's business. This category suggests a risk premium rate of 21-25% 9.10The parties, in advancing their cases have cited the Y.P. adopted by the Courts over the years. They are summed up below: -
As regards the estimation of the real return (i.e. after allowing for inflation) and the discount rate, the Court further said: -
(3) Chan Kwok Lam v. Director of Buldings and Lands [1986-88] CPR 447 in which the Lands Tribunal decided to adopt a YP of 2 based on a yield or capitalization rate of 33 1/3 after taking into account the somewhat erratic nature of the business. Otherwise, the Tribunal opined that a lower rate of 20% advocated by the Applicant's expert might be appropriate: -
9.11In the present case, we find that insufficient evidence pertinent to the three ingredients that make up the capitalization rate has been adduced to assist the Tribunal in the finding of an appropriate discount or capitalization rate to be used for the valuation of the loss of profit. However, we are aware that the inflation rate in January 1999, the date of reversion of the Applicant's premises, should be much lower than that in the 1980's. 9.12Therefore, having regard to the rates adopted in Shun Fung and Chan Kwok Lam, the judgment of Chum Hon-Chi and in the absence of more and better evidence, we decide to maintain our original decision of using a capitalization rate of 20%, even it may be slightly to the benefit of the Applicant. 10.Respondent's review application - discounting period in the valuation of loss of profit (goodwill) The Respondent submitted that the adoption by the Tribunal of a term of years 7 for loss of goodwill was too high. 10.1We have set out in our original judgment the reasons for adopting 7 years in our valuation. We have reviewed those reasons and the justification put forward by the Respondent for the shorter 5 years period. 10.2We find that there is no evidence before us that either the Applicant's husband and the Applicant herself were in bad health. Having regard to the dependence of the Applicant on her husband in the running of the business, the steady though modest profitability of the business, the average life expectancies of men and women in Hong Kong, and the fact that the Applicant's husband has been working in this type of 'blue collar' work for a long period of time, we still consider it reasonable to adopt a period of 7 years in the valuation of the goodwill for the business. 10.3The Applicant and the Applicant's husband were 58 and 64 respectively in 2001. So, at the year of resumption (1999), they were about 56 and 62 respectively. Therefore, it is our view that without the resumption, it is most probable that they will continue the periodic tenancies and the running of the business on the premises for about 7 years, by which time they will be about 63 and 69 respectively. They would most likely cease business by that time, mainly because the husband will be nearing 70. Besides, it is our view that working further appears to be very demanding, especially for the Applicant's husband. 10.4All in all, we stick to our original decision that it would be reasonable in the circumstances to adopt a 7-years period in the valuation of goodwill on the basis of total extinguishment of the business. 10.5Therefore, after revising the assessed profit rent and licence fee, the loss of goodwill is re-assessed as follows: -
11.Summary of compensation payable to the Applicant upon review Following the Court of Appeal decision in Wong Hoi Nang, the following compensation amounts are therefore payable to the Applicant: -
12.Order
Representation: The Applicant : represented by M/S Peter W. K. Lo & Co., Solicitors. The Respondent : represented by Secretary for Justice. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
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Further hearings and rulings under LDMR 19/2000