HKSAR v. Wong Yin Chak

HCMA000296/2000

HCMA296/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

(Appellate Jurisdiction)

MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO.296 OF 2000

(ON APPEAL FROM SKCC 3318 OF 1999)

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Coram: Deputy High Court Judge Tong in Court

Date of Hearing: 1 August 2000

Date of Delivery of Judgment: 25 August 2000

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J U D G M E N T

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1. The appellant was charged with three offences : careless driving, failing to stop in case of accident, and failing to report as soon as reasonably practicable after an accident causing damage. He pleaded not guilty to the charges and was convicted by the learned magistrate after trial.

2. The prosecution case was, to put simply, that on the material date, PW1, the driver of GC9853, was driving along Chatham Road North. He was in the fourth lane. In the course of his driving, another vehicle, HE735, cut into his lane without prior indication. As a result of this, there was a slight collision. The rear offside of HE735 hit the front nearside of PW1's vehicle. PW1 blew his horn. The offending vehicle eventually stopped at a distance of 60 to 70 meters from the position of impact. PW1 then talked to the driver of HE735. They agreed to meet at Harbour Crystal Plaza to talk about the payment by the driver of HE735. However, PW1 did not note down the personal particulars of the driver of HE735 at the time and the latter failed to turn up at the hotel. Hence, he made a report to the police.

3. This incident was also witnessed by PW2, a passenger in PW1's car. However, both PW1 and PW2 were not in a position to clearly identify the driver of HE735 in court.

4. The appellant had elected to give evidence at the trial. Basically, he admitted to be the driver of HE735 at the relevant time but he denied that there was any collision in Chatham Road. He said he did change lane but there was no vehicle in the fourth lane before he drove into that side of the road. He disagreed he had ever stopped his car and talked to PW1 and PW2.

5. Having seen and heard the witnesses, the learned magistrate concluded that he found the prosecution witnesses to be honest witnesses. He commented that PW1 and PW2 were frank and he accepted their evidence. He did not believe the evidence given by the appellant, perhaps except that he was the driver at the time. He found the appellant guilty of the charges.

6. In conducting his own appeal, the appellant argued, inter alia, that :-

- he had never seen the other vehicle at the time;

- there was no damage on his vehicle;

- the route referred to by PW1 was an impossibility; and

- if he did get off the vehicle and talked to PW1, they should have exchanged personal particulars.

7. The respondent stated that it was a finding of fact by the learned magistrate that the appellant's vehicle had collided with PW1's vehicle when the former changed lane in a careless manner. There was evidence to support such a finding, therefore it should not be disturbed. As to the charge of failing to stop, the fact that the appellant did not turn up at the hotel showed that he had no intention to supply the personal particulars in the first place. The obligation of stopping would include the duty to supply the information.

8. In this regard, sections 56(1)(b)(i), (2) and (5) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap.374 read :

"56. Duty to stop in case of accidents

(1) Where, owing to the presence of a vehicle on a road, an accident occurs whereby -

(a) ...

(b) damage is caused to -

(i) a vehicle other than that vehicle or a trailer drawn thereby;

...

the driver of that vehicle shall stop.

(2) In the case of any such accident, the driver of the vehicle shall, if required, give to any police officer or to any person having reasonable grounds for so requiring the following particulars-

(a) his name and address;

(b) the name and address of the owner of the vehicle; and

(c) the registration or identification mark or number of the vehicle.

...

(5) A person who contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable to a fine of $10,000 and to imprisonment for 12 months."

9. Regarding the second charge, the learned magistrate stated the following in his Statement of Findings :

" Although the appellant had stopped at the time of the accident, and I am satisfied [he had] engaged in conversation with PW1 about the accident, he did not stop for such time as necessary in the prevailing circumstances, having regard to the character of the road or place in which accident happened, would provide a sufficient period to enable PW1 to require information about personal particulars of the appellant. PW1 says, and I accept, that he did not do this as arrangements were made between the parties to meet at the Harbour Crystal Plaza for such purpose. Further in this regard the appellant had driven 60 to 70 metres from the scene before he stopped, and came back.

Clearly also on all the evidence here the appellant failed to report as soon as reasonably practicable after an accident causing damage in person at the nearest police station or to a police officer. In this regard he had not given his particulars at the scene to a person entitled to require them (PW1)."

10. The learned magistrate was fully entitled to reject the evidence of the appellant (again, except for him being the driver), and accept the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. In the circumstances, it would be a logical conclusion that the appellant had committed the first offence of careless driving and the third offence of failing to report.

11. Regarding the second offence of failing to stop, the learned magistrate had noted that the appellant did stop after the accident, albeit at a distance from the spot of collision. Then the parties had a discussion. PW1 had pointed out the damage to the appellant and talked about looking for a garage or reporting to the police. Then the appellant said he would fix it and they agreed to meet at the nearby hotel to discuss payment. PW1 said he did not ask for the personal particulars of the appellant because he believed that they would meet as arranged.

12. Regarding authorities on this matter, in Jarman v. Walsh [1936] SASR 25, the driver had gone on for 300 yards from the scene of the accident and then returned. The court held that the driver had not complied with the obligation to stop (cited in Saunders, Road Traffic Offences in Hong Kong, 1995). In another case, McDermott v. DPP [1997] RTR 474, the driver drove on for about 80 yards, then he stopped and returned to the other vehicle. It was also held to be insufficient to satisfy the stopping requirement (cited in Wilkinson, Road Traffic Offences, 19th ed.). Here in the present case, the appellant stopped after 60 to 70 meters. I do not think a line could be drawn as to beyond what distance it would amount to failing to stop, but I would say to stop after such a long distance did not satisfy the obligation. Apart from this issue, I agree with the prosecution that the requirement to stop included the requirement to provide the personal particulars. Here, PW1 did not immediate get the personal particulars of the appellant because they had agreed to meet at the hotel. The appellant did not turn up as agreed, hence he failed to provide the necessary information of personal particulars. I would also uphold the learned magistrate's decision to convict the appellant on this charge.

13. In the circumstances, I would dismiss the appeal.

Representation:

Miss Winsome Chan, SGC of Department of Justice, for the Respondent

Appellant in person, present