The Magway
Read the full judgment text of HCAJ 14/1999 on BabelCite. This HCAJ judgment was delivered on 1 August 2002.
1. This is an appeal brought by the plaintiff against a decision of the Registrar in the course of taxation of Bills of Costs submitted by the defendant against the plaintiff. The decision, that is, the subject matter of this appeal, is that a large part of the costs of the defendant is recoverable, the costs having been incurred by work done by a Mr Aryon Paul Apostolis employed by the firm of Messrs Sinclair Roche & Temperley ("Sinclair Roche"), solicitors for the defendant.
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HCAJ000014B/1999 HCAJ 14/1999 & IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ADMIRALTY ACTION NOS. 14 AND 246 OF 1999 -------------------------- Admiralty action in rem against: the ship or vessel "Magway"
------------------------- (Consolidated) Coram: Hon Waung J in Chambers Dates of Hearing: 16 July and 1 August 2002 Date of Judgment: 1 August 2002 -------------------------- J U D G M E N T -------------------------- 1.This is an appeal brought by the plaintiff against a decision of the Registrar in the course of taxation of Bills of Costs submitted by the defendant against the plaintiff. The decision, that is, the subject matter of this appeal, is that a large part of the costs of the defendant is recoverable, the costs having been incurred by work done by a Mr Aryon Paul Apostolis employed by the firm of Messrs Sinclair Roche & Temperley ("Sinclair Roche"), solicitors for the defendant. 2.The matter arose this way. This is a collision action involving the plaintiff's vessel (on which the deceased and other crew were employed) was involved in a collision with the defendant's vessel, and a large number of people on board the plaintiff's vessel were killed and the claim was therefore brought on basis that the defendant's vessels negligence caused loss to the plaintiff's estate. 3.The matter eventually was settled so far as liability is concerned and the apportionment of liability or percentage of blame was agreed. The costs of the action on that respective apportionment therefore would have to be borne by each side in accordance with that liability percentage agreed. 4.This Action came before me on a large number of occasions and there was on one occasion a serious mishap on the part of the plaintiff, in that the trial that was scheduled to take place had to be aborted because the plaintiff was not ready to proceed and a substantial order for costs was made by me against the plaintiff. 5.The determination of all collisions actions, whether in Hong Kong or England or other parts of the world, largely depends on the proper application of the international collision regulations. I think the applicable one here is the 1972 Regulation. In Hong Kong, we of course do not have the vast admiralty judicial learning in England where the Admiralty Court of England, with the help of their practitioners, have been deciding for a long time these collision cases. 6.It is to be noted that in collision cases, what is always important is the percentage of blame and cases would often be decided where the court would hold one party to be 60%, 70%, 80% or 90% to blame. Each percentage involves very often a great deal of money. So, the correct assessment of the various manoeuvres of the ship which results in the final percentage of blame is vitally important. That assessment of the proper manoeuvre or good seamanship involves knowledge not only of the collision regulations but very often of what could be said to be good seamanship and, generally, in England, that sort of work is always handled by specialists firms with either admiralty lawyers or admiralty managers and with assistants who are experts in what is generally known as "wet work". 7.Mr Apostolis is, by any standard, an expert in that kind of wet work. His qualification is extremely impressive. In his affidavit, he referred to his having completed his legal education in South Africa in 1985. Then he worked with a number of shipping lines, including the Lloyds Surveyors in South Africa, to obtain his practical shipping experience, and he had in fact sailed on board two vessels. He had also worked with stevedores in South Africa in the loading and discharging of bulk carriers and reefer vessels. He then obtained his master's degree in maritime law in University College, London, studying under leading professors in that field. 8.He joined Sinclair Roche in London, a leading admiralty firm, on 21 September 1987. He sat the Law Society final exam in 1991 and was admitted in 1992. He became an assistant solicitor of Sinclair Roche from that time until April 1997 when he became a partner. He remained a partner of Sinclair Roche until the date of his affidavit. 9.Before he came to Hong Kong, while he was with Sinclair Roche in London, in paragraph 25 of his affidavit, he said he took two casualty matters to the Court of Appeal in England, and one of them the "Sivand" became a leading case. 10.In 1999, he came to Hong Kong as a partner of Sinclair Roche. He headed the marine casualty and insurance department. He was registered with the Hong Kong Law Society as a foreign lawyer while he sat the overseas lawyers qualification examination to qualify as a Hong Kong solicitor. This took a little bit of time and he was eventually qualified in Hong Kong, I believe, in April 2001. 11.During the large part of the period when he had not yet qualified as a solicitor in Hong Kong, he was handling, as part of Sinclair Roche, the solicitors firm for the defendant, this collision matter. The Bill of Costs that had been submitted and the analysis done by the Registrar in his judgment showed clearly that he did the bulk of the work. I think the percentage expressed was some 90%. Was he qualified to do the work? Undoubtedly, he was, and there can be no better person in Hong Kong to do that work. Should that work therefore be paid? Certainly. Lay clients have no complaint about paying for that work. 12.It is an objection from the plaintiff which has brought this case to this court. The plaintiff has taken what I regard as a wholly unmeritorious step, to contend that no part of the work done by Mr Apostolis should be recoverable. They have an alternative case -- but it is a backup case -- to say if it is recoverable it should be paid at the lowest possible rate of a clerk, at about $1,200. The Registrar had assessed his work as being worthy of the rate of $3,000, having cut it down from $3,500. 13.Two points are relied upon by the plaintiff's counsel, in the course of the argument before me, to say that no costs should be recoverable at all. The first is based on sections 45 and 50 of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance. The second point is based on what is said to be a breach of Regulation 12 of the Foreign Lawyers Registration Rules. I will deal with them in turn. 14.Section 45 of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance provides as follows :
15.Section 7 referred to in section 45 provides as follows :
16.Section 50 provides as follows :
17.At the outset, one can say that section 45 is the key provision and that section 47, which deals with conveyancing documents, does not in fact provide an appropriate escape from the applicability of section 45. I think in so far as the Registrar relied on section 47 as having any impact on the application of section 45, he was mistaken. 18.Section 45 on the face of it may be in wide terms, but it has to be read very carefully. The key words in section 45(1), are : "A person .... who is not qualified to act as a solicitor shall not act as a solicitor....". What does it mean -- acting as a solicitor -- in this context? A large number of cases had been cited to me but I agree with Mr Toms for the defendant, that none of them provide the court with much assistance, because they all turned on their particular facts and there is no case cited which is similar or akin to our situation. 19.In the general litigation process, a firm of solicitors would have a team of people working for that particular case, and they range from not just messengers boys, but clerks, assistant solicitors, partners and, in admiralty matters, sometimes admiralty managers. In England, admiralty manager is a commonplace phenomenon in all collision cases and the admiralty manager would often be the first point of contact between the client and also between barristers with the solicitors firm. Their expert knowledge is invaluable. No one has ever suggested that when someone who is not a qualified solicitor and has performed work as part of a team for a firm of solicitors in the course of general litigation or collision litigation, that such costs would not be recoverable. In fact, the costs for work done by admiralty manager is readily recoverable and sanctioned. 20.The question therefore is : were they acting as solicitors so that these people could be said to be in breach of section 45. Section 45 is a penal provision because subsection (1) provides for the prohibition, and subsection (2) provides three kinds of penalties for the consequences of contravention. Under subsection (2)(a) - he would be guilty of contempt of the court and could be punished accordingly; under (2)(b) - he would be incapable of maintaining action for costs for anything done by him in the course of so acting; and (2)(c) - he would be guilty of an offence and be sentenced to imprisonment of two years and to a fine of $500,000. So, these are serious offences, and one therefore must look at it in that light to consider whether a person could be said to be in breach of section 45. 21.I have no doubt that in the course of the work done by people in general litigation, whether it is in the course of writing letters (whether to lay client or to the other side), or for taking instructions, or for liaising with or instructing counsel, these are not people who are acting as solicitors. Obviously, one particular act would be acting as a solicitor and that is appearing in court as opposed to attending court. If someone appears in court who is not a solicitor, then he is undoubtedly acting as a solicitor. But apart from that, it is difficult to say, in relation to any particular piece of work, whether that piece of work done by a person who is not a qualified solicitor, would be considered as acting as a solicitor and therefore in breach of section 45 with a criminal offence consequence. 22.I think, in the context of admiralty work, it is even more difficult, having regard to the various expertise required (and there is a lot of nautical expertise), to say that someone was acting unlawfully because he was acting as a solicitor. 23.The case that was put before me relies on the totality of the bill and of the large percentage of work done by Mr Apostolis, and it is therefore said that in relation to all the work that had been relied upon for recovery of costs and in relation to each and every piece of work therefore, he was acting as a solicitor. I do not agree. I think, having regard to the criminal provisions and the appropriate high standard required to show that there was a breach (and I do not mean therefore necessarily I have to apply the high criminal standard but it is nevertheless an appropriately high standard even in civil cases), that I can be satisfied that there was a breach of section 45(1) of the Ordinance. 24.So far as section 50 is concerned, the matter cannot be advanced any further because there are similar words, they are : "No costs in respect of anything done by an unqualified person acting as a solicitor shall be recoverable ....". So, again, I think the same consequence must apply. That disposes of the first point of objection. 25.In relation to the second point of objection, I think the case of the plaintiff is even weaker. I say it for this reason. Whereas sections 45 and 50 make express provisions about non-recovery of costs, Regulation 12 of the Foreign Lawyers Registration Rules does not even say that. What these rules provide is a scheme whereby the foreign lawyers are put under certain control as a price of their being admitted as a foreign lawyer. 26.The first question that was raised in relation to Regulation 12 by Mr Toms is the proper interpretation of "provide any legal service." I agree with Mr Toms that the provider of the legal services here is the firm. The reason is the client goes to the firm, the solicitors on record is the firm. The firm may engage a number of people to work for the firm, including Mr Apostolis, but the provider of the legal services is not Mr Apostolis but is Sinclair Roche, this is to be contracted with, for example, a registered foreign lawyer on his own account starts practicing as sole practitioner and offering legal or providing legal services. That would be a very different situation. But this is someone who works for Sinclair Roche, who was a qualified English lawyer working in Hong Kong as a foreign lawyer under the scheme. I do not believe, therefore, that he was providing any legal services. The firm did. 27.The second point is that the proviso under Regulation 12(2) makes it clear that a foreign lawyer may handle any matter which involves private international law or conflict of laws. It was argued before me that there was no element of private international law or conflict of laws in this collision case and, therefore, Regulation 12(2) does not bite. I do not agree. The international collision regulation is derived from the international convention, and the proper application of that collision regulation is a substantial part, not only of English law of which Mr Apostolis is a qualified person, but also of other foreign law which has interpreted the regulations. I cannot over-emphasise the importance of these regulations for a collision case such as this. It is every manoeuvre, every nautical step taken, that has deep implication for the proper application of these regulations, and I think Regulation 12(2) does bite on this case. 28.Thirdly, it seems to me that the lack of any criminal sanction or of any non-recovery of costs sanction in Regulation 12 is to be contrasted with sections 45 and 50 of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance. By no stretch of imagination, even if there is a breach of Regulation 12, can one come to a view that the statute or the Regulation (the subsidiary legislation) has in mind an implication of non-recovery of costs, and this is even more so when the recovery of costs is by the employer client (not the firm) from the other side. In my view, Regulation 12 is really not a proper defence to the claim for costs for work done by Mr Apostolis. 29.So far as the third point is concerned, that is to say, the hourly rate, having regard to the fact that I have decided against the plaintiff on the first and second points, it would not be necessary for me to deal with that and I do not propose to do so. I certainly do not think the Registrar was wrong in assessing the costs at $3,000 an hour and I do not propose to vary it in any way. 30.The appeal therefore is dismissed with order of costs nisi against the plaintiff. The plaintiff's own costs will be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.
Representation: Mr Maurice Peter Tracy, instructed by Messrs Crump & Co., for the Plaintiff Mr Jason Toms of Messrs Stephenson Harwood & Lo, for the Defendant |
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