HKSAR v. Ye Ying
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 184/2003 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 28 May 2003.
1. On 13 February 2003 the appellant and a co-defendant, Chen Guang Deng, pleaded guilty at Tsuen Wan Magistrates' Court to an offence of attempting to obtain services by deception, contrary to section 159G of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap.200 and section 18A(1) of the Theft Ordinance, Cap.210.
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HCMA000184/2003 HCMA184/2003 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Appellate Jurisdiction) MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO.184 OF 2003 (ON APPEAL FROM TWCC 349 OF 2003) ----------------------
-------------------- Coram: Hon Jackson J in Court Date of Hearing: 28 May 2003 Date of Judgment: 28 May 2003 Date of Handing Down Judgment : 5 June 2003 ------------------------ J U D G M E N T ------------------------ 1.On 13 February 2003 the appellant and a co-defendant, Chen Guang Deng, pleaded guilty at Tsuen Wan Magistrates' Court to an offence of attempting to obtain services by deception, contrary to section 159G of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap.200 and section 18A(1) of the Theft Ordinance, Cap.210. 2.They were each sentenced to a term of 12 months' imprisonment against which sentence the appellant appealed. On 28 May I allowed the appeal to the extent that I substituted a term of eight months' imprisonment for that imposed by the magistrate and these are my reasons for so doing. 3.The facts of the offence read over to, and admitted by, the appellant in the magistrates court were as follows :
4.In his Reasons for Sentence the magistrate (inter alia) said this in relation to the appellant and his co-defendant :
5.The approach of Mr Cheung (who appeared before me on behalf of the appellant) to that sentence was as follows :
6.Seeking to respond to each of those matters in turn, Mr Kwok for the respondent has argued as follows :
7.Mr Kwok produced before me some statistics prepared helpfully by a senior police officer relating to the prevalence of offences of the type to which the appellant pleaded guilty (i.e. offences charged under the Theft Ordinance) and to which prevalence the magistrate very properly made reference. 8.Those statistics demonstrate that between 31 January 2002 and 6 April 2003 no fewer than 34 persons (including the appellant and his co-defendant) have been convicted of offences of fraud, obtaining services by deception or attempting to obtain services by deception involving the misuse of boarding passes issued in the names of other persons. Of those 34 persons 27 (including the appellant and his co-defendant) were from Fujian province on the Mainland. Sentences for such offences (and I shall refer to them as Theft Ordinance offences) have ranged between suspended sentences of two months' imprisonment to immediate sentences of 12 months' imprisonment. Indeed of the 34 persons to whom I have referred only eight (including this appellant and his co-defendant) received a 12-month sentence and each received that sentence within the last six months. 9.Mr Kwok tells me that prior to January 2002 nobody who produced somebody else's boarding pass to airline staff was charged with the Theft Ordinance offences. Now that offences under section 159G are being charged the particulars generally allege that the defendant obtained, or attempted to obtain services from an airline, namely a flight service from Hong Kong to Japan (or wherever), by the deception made to airline staff that he was the person named on the boarding pass. 10.A number of questions arose at the hearing of this appeal as follows :
11.For the appellant Mr Cheung made a number of forceful points in addition to those set out in paragraph 5 above. He says that the 'misuse' of a boarding pass (unlike the possession or presentation of a false/forged travel document such as a passport) is, in truth, a 'one off' or wholly singular offence in that once the boarding pass has been used it (unlike a false passport) cannot be used again. 12.He goes on from there to suggest that whilst the statistics of recent offences put forward by Mr Kwok may well be correct, those statistics plainly (with one or two exception) demonstrate sentences which would likely engender in this appellant (by reason of the sentence which was imposed upon him) a real sense of grievance and that, in terms of criminality, it is much less serious to produce to the staff of an airline somebody else's boarding pass than it is to produce to Immigration authorities a false or forged passport or other travel document. Conclusion 13.As I said in an appeal before me only last week [HKSAR v. Li Xiao Feng, HCMA 286/2003] where that appellant was charged with an offence not of producing a false/forged passport to the Immigration authorities but an offence of making a false representation to such authorities by producing a false/forged Chinese permit which production specifically implied that such referred to the holder of a genuine passport I fail to see any difference in the criminality involved in those offences (which I will call Immigration Ordinance offences) because, in truth, the object of the exercise is precisely the same and either way the representation is made to a Government official that a document is genuine when in fact it is false/forged. 14.Whilst the consequences, in terms of comity and mischief may be the same, there is (or so it seems to me) a quite apparent difference in terms of criminality between that course of conduct and the presentation of somebody else's boarding pass to airline staff. 15.For my part I am in no doubt, despite the arguments of Mr Cheung, that this appellant was not in transit in the sense that that term implies and even if he was I fail to see what difference that would make. 16.I do not accept Mr Kwok's argument based, if I may say so, upon no more than a possibility as to what the appellant might have done upon his arrival in Tokyo. If a magistrate did that he would be sentencing a defendant for an entirely different offence to that with which he had been charged (i.e. the attempted deception in Hong Kong) and he would be sentencing for an anticipated offence in another jurisdiction. Of course the situation may be very different if the deception succeeds beyond being merely an attempt. 17.There undoubtedly have been inconsistencies in sentencing for the 'Immigration Ordinance offences' and plainly from everybody's point of view - not least that of a defendant that is undesirable. I sought to address that difficulty in my judgment in HKSAR v. Li Xiao Feng. No less undesirable is the apparent wide variation or range of sentences imposed for the Theft Ordinance offences involving boarding passes. Hopefully this judgment may provide an indication which will lead to greater consistency in the sentences imposed for these offences. 18.As I have said I now accept - albeit initially I had reservations - that the offence of which the appellant was convicted (particularly given that it was 'an attempt') should be regarded as being somewhat less serious than the 'Immigration Ordinance offences' and, that being so, they should attract a somewhat lower starting point in sentence. 19.In my judgment an appropriate starting point for such an attempted deception offence (and again I stress the word 'attempted') is of the order of 12 months' imprisonment which sentence should be reduced in the light of a plea of guilty to a sentence of eight months. 20.It was for these reasons that I allowed this appeal to the extent which I did and I invite the Director of Legal Aid to bring the matter to the attention of the appellant's co-defendant who has not - so far as I am aware - seen fit to appeal against his sentence.
Representation: Mr Kwok Wing Lung, SGC of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr Cheung Yiu Leung, instructed by DLA, for the Appellant |
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