Kwok Hing Yuen v. Goodpoint Engineering Ltd and Others
Read the full judgment text of DCEC 96/2002 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 30 June 2004.
1. There are two applications before me. The first one is the Applicant's application to re-re-amend the Application, and the second one is an application by the 4th Respondent for a determination on points of law under Order 14A of the Rules of the District Court. The 4 questions included in the second summons are as follows:
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DCEC000096/2002 DCEC96/2002 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION CASE NO. 96 OF 2002
Coram: H H Judge Lok in Chambers Date of Hearing: 30 June 2004 Date of Ruling: 30 June 2004 ____________________ D E C I S I O N ____________________ 1.There are two applications before me. The first one is the Applicant's application to re-re-amend the Application, and the second one is an application by the 4th Respondent for a determination on points of law under Order 14A of the Rules of the District Court. The 4 questions included in the second summons are as follows:
2.The present case arose out of an industrial accident on 21 August 2001. It is the Applicant's case, which has been confirmed by Mr Chiu for the Applicant, that the 3rd Respondent was the main contractor of the construction site at the relevant time. The 3rd Respondent sub-contracted the lift and escalator installation work to the 4th Respondent, who in turn sub-sub-contracted part of such work to the 1st Respondent, who in turn sub-sub-sub-contracted part of such work to the 5th and/or 6th Respondents, who was/were the direct employer(s) of the Applicant. 3.By the Order 14A application, the 4th Respondent seeks to argue that under section 24 of the Employees' Compensation Ordinance, Cap.282 ("the Ordinance"), only the main contractor of the construction site and the direct employer are liable to pay employees' compensation to the Applicant, and so the claim against the 4th Respondent should be dismissed. 4.Section 24(1) of the Ordinance provides as follows:
5.Both "principal contractor" and "sub-contractor" are defined in section 3 of the Ordinance. The definitions are as follows:
6.According to such express wordings, a sub-contractor like the 4th Respondent may fall within the meaning of "principal contractor" under section 24, as he was also a party who sub-contracted part of his work to a sub-sub-contractor. Hence, the learned authors of Butterworth's Hong Kong Personal Injury Service (2002, issue No. 3) said the following in paragraph 503:
7.In the premises, there can be more than one principal contractor liable to pay employees' compensation to the employee of a sub-contractor under section 24 of the Ordinance, and the answer to the first question in the Order 14A summons is "Yes". 8.In my judgment, this answer is already sufficient to dispose of the Order 14A summons, as the claim against the 4th Respondent cannot be dismissed at this stage. Further, Question (2) involves issues of facts which have to be dealt with by the trial judge, and so it is not appropriate for me to answer this question at this stage. For Question (3), the question is too generalised. Obviously, a sub-contractor responsible for the lift and escalator installation work would not be responsible for an accident to a worker who is an employee of a sub-contractor responsible for, say, the construction of walls in the site. Hence, the answer would depend on the facts of each individual case, and it is not appropriate for me to answer Question (3) at this stage. 9.Based on the aforesaid, I do not find Questions (2) and (3) to be appropriate issues to be decided in an Order 14A application. As the claim against the 4th Respondent should not be dismissed at this stage, application under paragraph 4 of the summons is also dismissed. 10.I then turn to the amendment summons. In the original Application, it was pleaded that the 4th Respondent was a sub-contractor within the meaning of the Ordinance to a principal contractor, namely the 3rd Respondent. With the proposed amendments, the Applicant now seeks to include an averment that the 4th Respondent was a principal contractor within the meaning of the Ordinance. 11.The 1st to the 4th Respondents have no serious objection to the application for amendment, and so I allow such application. However, in order to give sufficient time for the 4th Respondent to prepare the case to deal with the proposed amendments, the 4th Respondent asks for the trial dates on 12 to 14 July 2004 be vacated and the Applicant should pay for the costs occasioned by the adjournment of the trial. This request is strenuously opposed by the Applicant. According to Mr Chiu, the 4th Respondent can make use of the available time before the trial to prepare its case and there is no necessity to adjourn the trial. 12.In respect of such application, there are two points I would like to make. Firstly, the application for amendment was made at a very late stage. The case was set down for trial in the listing hearing on 27 February 2004. The case should have been ready for trial at that time, and so whoever is going to make a late application after the listing hearing runs the risk of paying the costs occasioned by the adjournment of the trial. Secondly, the amendments made by the Applicant are substantial, or at least the Applicant is estopped from arguing otherwise. The facts relied upon by the Applicant have all along been the same, but the Applicant needs the amendments in order to attach liability on the 4th Respondent under section 24 of the Ordinance. Without such amendments, it is arguable whether the 4th Respondent is liable. In view of such substantial amendments, the 4th Respondent should be given adequate time to prepare its case. 13.The 4th Respondent now complains that there is insufficient time for it to do so. However, I take the view that the 4th Respondent was at least partly responsible for its inaction in the past. The 4th Respondent has all along taken the view that, being only a sub-contractor and not the main contractor of the construction site, the 4th Respondent is not liable to pay compensation to the Applicant under section 24 of the Ordinance, and as a result it did not take any active steps to prepare the case. As I have mentioned above, the 4th Respondent's construction of section 24 is wrong, and so the 4th Respondent should be partly responsible for its previous inaction and for the adjournment of the trial. As I see it, if the 4th Respondent were to have a correct understanding of the law, it should have done some preparation work in the past, or at least such work should have been started after they knew of the Applicant's application for amendment on 21 June 2004. In my judgment, the Applicant and the 4th Respondent are equally to blame for the adjournment of the trial, and I therefore order that, as between the Applicant and the 4th Respondent, there be no order as to costs occasioned by the adjournment of the trial. For the 1st and 3rd Respondents' costs occasioned by the adjournment, such costs shall be paid by the Applicant and the 4th Respondent. 14.For the other costs, I follow the usual practice and order that:
15.I also make an order to vacate the trial dates on 12-14 July 2004 and the trial be refixed to another date.
Representation:
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