HKSAR v. Wong Chi Hung
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 171/2005 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 14 October 2005.
1. The appellant appears in person before me seeking to overturn his conviction for resisting a police officer in the due execution of his duty contrary to section 36 (b) of the Offenses against the Personal Ordinance.
Cited by 3 cases
|
HCMA 171/2005 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. HCMA 171 OF 2005 (ON APPEAL FROM KCCC 13635 of 2004) ____________ BETWEEN
____________ Before: Deputy High Court Judge Line in Court Date of Hearing: 14 October 2005 Date of Judgment: 14 October 2005 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ 1.The appellant appears in person before me seeking to overturn his conviction for resisting a police officer in the due execution of his duty contrary to section 36 (b) of the Offenses against the Personal Ordinance. 2.The magistrate's statement of findings read thus:
Findings of Fact
3.It was thus not apparent what the differences were between the civilian witness and the police officers; why the magistrate judged the defendant to be an unreliable witness; what were the ample grounds to arrest the defendant; whether any disorderly conduct was intended or likely to cause a breach of the peace; what supported the finding that the police officer was acting in the execution of his duty; what test the magistrate had applied to judge if a breach of the peace was likely (if that is what he in fact did) and what events were captured on the CCTV tape. 4.The case had to be adjourned for a full transcript. The full transcript revealed that the duty lawyer, acting on behalf of the appellant below, took two main points. The first was that the police officer was not acting in the execution of his duty because no breach of the peace was intended or likely. The second point was that the prosecution evidence taken as a whole was not to be trusted, which was supported by some strong jury points, not least the facts that the part of the incident recorded on the CCTV tape, admittedly without sound, arguably showed the police officer to be the aggressor, thrusting his face into that of the appellant who was backed up to a wall before the arrest; that at the time of the arrest the defendant was in fact filling in forms; that the appellant obediently came to the officer at the officer’s beckoning for the arrest to be affected, the resistance to which (said by the officer to have commenced unintentionally) occurred conveniently with every other police officer looking the other way and out of sight of the CCTV cameras. 5.Were there grounds to arrest the appellant? The officer purported to make the arrest on the basis of disorderly conduct. Section 17B(2) of the Public Order Ordinance provides that any person who in any public place behaves in a noisy or disorderly manner or uses….threatening, abusive or insulting words, with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be caused, shall be guilty of an offence. The police officer would also have power to arrest for a breach of the peace at common law. 6.There was ample evidence of the appellant swearing offensively and loudly. The question was whether a breach of the peace was thereby likely to be caused. 7.In R.v. Howell [1982] QB 421, the leading case as to what is meant by the phrase “breach of the peace”, it was said :
8.And elsewhere in that case, the court said so far as the likelihood of the threat of violence causing a breach of the peace is concerned :
9.Harm to property was never suggested or remotely relevant. So, could the police officer reasonably apprehend that any harm was actually done to anyone then present at the police station, or that it was likely to be done or that anyone there was in fear of such harm being done? 10.The answer to that question, having been through the transcript, is undoubtedly no. The civilian witness who was called never spoke of such or laid the ground for it to be inferred. No police officer spoke of or feared the appellant harming them. The evidence was that there were two or three members of the public waiting in the lobby area of the police station. The arresting officer surmised that one of them felt impatient at what had been going on and walked out and the most he could say about any general reaction was that the speaking of the foul language “affected the mood of the public”. It was clear from his evidence that he paid them no particular attention. When asked if they were disturbed he said that he supposed so. It was clear from the evidence that whilst those members of the public may not have liked what they heard and saw there was no question of them being the subject of either harm or threatened harm sufficient to constitute a breach of the peace. 11.The test that the police officer used to justify his arrest was apparent from what he said to the appellant, namely “if you are so noisy here affecting others…..you would have committed an offence being disorderly behaving in a public place”. “Affecting others” is not the same as a breach of the peace being likely to be caused. 12.On the evidence before me I cannot be sure that the appellant intended a breach of the peace to occur or that one was likely to be caused by his conduct. Nothing in the statement of findings helps me to any other conclusion. The first point is a good one and the appeal must succeed. There was no reasonable ground to apprehend a breach of the peace and none had occurred. It follows that the prosecution could not establish that the officer was acting in the execution of his duty. In fact this is a situation well known to those familiar with the criminal law: whilst arrests are made all over the common law world when citizens are unwise enough verbally to abuse a police officer, no right to arrest in fact thereby arises unless the speaker is drunk or a breach of the peace is likely to be caused. 13.It follows that I do not have to deal with the second line of argument, although I remark that it was based on some powerful points, upon which the contents of the statement of findings afforded no help. 14.I have of course based my decision on the evidence before me. This is not an appeal decided by the respondent's concession. However, I mention that Mr Cheung Wai sun, deputy principal government counsel, had seen the point once he read the transcript and agreed in his written skeleton argument that the appellant could not be guilty of the offence charged. 15.Accordingly, I quash the orders of conviction and sentence made by the magistrate and order that the charge be dismissed. I appreciate that police officers do a difficult job and I have no sympathy for those who swear at them. However, it is important that their reaction is one justified by law. 16.It would be right and proper therefore that in this case the appellant be spared the two weeks’ imprisonment to which he was sentenced. That is not possible because the magistrate took the course of remanding the appellant in custody for a fortnight pending a background report. The appellant was released on the day he was sentenced. He had served his sentence but was effectively denied the prospect of appealing it and was obliged to serve it whatever the merits of his appeal against conviction or sentence. There is nothing on the transcript or in the papers before me that made a remand in custody for a background report appropriate. There is certainly nothing that justified the taking of such a course without giving the appellant or his lawyer the opportunity to be heard on the matter: yet that is what occurred. This appellant might have won his appeal, but I fear his victory is a hollow one.
Mr. W.S. Cheung, Deputy Principal Government Counsel of the Department of Justice for the Respondent Appellant: Wong Chi Hung, in person |
Other judgments that cite this case