R. v. Kwok Ngai-man
Read the full judgment text of CACC 478/1996 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 29 April 1997.
1. In this application for leave to appeal against conviction we are concerned only with two of the counts to which the applicant pleaded not guilty at trial. At trial he pleaded not guilty to a number of other counts besides the robbery count and the attempted non-consensual buggery count with which we are concerned. There was a third count of robbery to which he pleaded guilty. We will refer again to that count when dealing with the application for leave to appeal against sentence. The first c
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CACC000478/1996 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 1996, No. 478 (Criminal) ________________
________________ Coram: Hon. Power, Ag. C.J., Mayo, J.A. & P. Chan J. Date of hearing: 29 April 1997 Date of judgment: 29 April 1997 ________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ Power, Ag. C.J. (giving the judgment of the Court): 1. In this application for leave to appeal against conviction we are concerned only with two of the counts to which the applicant pleaded not guilty at trial. At trial he pleaded not guilty to a number of other counts besides the robbery count and the attempted non-consensual buggery count with which we are concerned. There was a third count of robbery to which he pleaded guilty. We will refer again to that count when dealing with the application for leave to appeal against sentence. The first count is particularized as follows: that he on 16th of October, 1995 at Flat 15, Chung Kin House, 12th floor, No.80, Kok Cheung Street, Tai Kok Tsui, robbed Lam Chung-shun of $200 cash, one gold necklace, one gold finger-ring and three K-gold finger-rings each set with small stones, Chan Yi-man of cash $700 and Chan Wai-lok of cash $400. The particulars of the non-consensual buggery state that at the same time and place, he attempted to commit buggery with another person, namely Chan Yi-man, who at that time did not consent to the buggery. He was found guilty after trial before Sears J. and a jury and was sentenced to nine years on the robbery count and to four years on the non-consensual buggery count. These were ordered to be consecutive. He was also at that time sentenced to two years on a separate count of burglary which was ordered to be concurrent with the robbery count. In all he was sentenced to imprisonment for 13 years. He now appeals against conviction on the non-consensual buggery count and seeks leave to appeal out of time against the overall sentence of 13 years. 2. The facts upon which the Crown relied were that on 16th October 1995, the applicant had entered Flat 15 through a window in the kitchen. This flat was occupied by a mother, her 13 year-old son and her 18-year-old daughter. He, after entering the flat, twice assaulted the mother, eventually punching her into unconsciousness. She only recovered consciousness in the intensive care ward at the hospital. He then tied up the mother and the son and attempted to bugger the 18-year-old daughter. Before leaving he stole the cash and jewellery particularised in the charge. 3. There is really only one matter urged by Mr. McCoy in the application for leave to appeal against conviction. When dealing with the non-consensual buggery count, the trial judge said:
I have read the whole passage because the flavour of his direction can only be gained if the words about which complaint is made are looked at in context. Those words are: "and starts doing something that is capable of being an attempt". It is submitted that they are vague and uncertain and would have misled the jury into acting upon the basis that having a soft or flacid penis would suffice for an attempt to commit buggery. The argument goes on to suggest that in such circumstances the offence was impossible for want of capacity and that, as the law stood at the time, there could not be an attempt to commit an impossible offence and so the conviction was wrong in law. We have already looked at the paragraph where the judge defined attempt. There is no argument as to the correctness of that definition. The only complaint is as to the words "starts doing something that is capable of being an attempt". The judge however, in the passage set out, was giving no more than an explanatory example which did not relate to the facts of the case. He then went on to deal with the facts of the case saying:
4. We are satisfied that the jury can have been left in no doubt that what they had to decide was whether what the applicant was doing was something more than preparation for the commission of the offence. The judge outlined the evidence for them and they had, of course, already heard. The evidence of the victim and the admissions in the cautioned statement are of particular importance. The applicant in his cautioned statement said:
That came from the applicant himself. He there states unequivocally that his intention was to rape the girl. Her evidence is as follows:
There was clear evidence from the victim that the applicant was attempting to push his penis into her anus. We have no hesitation in holding that the jury was properly directed by the judge and that there was evidence on which they could properly act to find an intention to penetrate and an attempt so to do. The conviction was in no way either unsafe or unsatisfactory. The application for leave to appeal against conviction is, therefore, refused. 5. We turn now to the question of sentence. 6. The trial judge, as we have said, sentenced the applicant to nine years on the robbery charge and to four years on the attempted non-consensual buggery charge, those being consecutive, and to two years concurrent on a separate burglary charge. The judge said when sentencing:
The judge having observed that two years was appropriate for the other offence, the burglary offence, and then said:
He came then to an overall sentence of 13 years. 7. He said on the following day:
The intention of the judge was, it seems to us clear, that the sentence of 13 years which he was imposing should run from the 9th of November 1995. It is not possible to back date a sentence but we think that we should, giving due regard to what the judge intended, put the matter beyond doubt by imposing a sentence which will effect that intention. This can properly be done by sentencing him to an overall period of imprisonment of 12 years from the date on which the sentence was imposed by the judge, i.e. 13th August 1996, and by ordering that it be concurrent with any sentence which he was then serving. 8. The application for leave to appeal against sentence out of time is allowed. The hearing of application is treated as the hearing of the appeal and the sentences are varied as indicated above.
Representation: Mr. Veltro, S.C.C. (Crown Prosecutor) for the Respondent. Mr. McCoy & Miss Corrina Tai assigned by D.L.A. for the Applicant. |
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