Chik Po Yee v. Vocational Training Council and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 59/2005 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 6 December 2005.
1. The Applicant joined the Vocational Training Council, the 1 st Respondent, as a lecturer in 1991. She became a senior lecturer in the Department of Hotel, Service and Tourism Studies in September 1994.
Cited by 3 cases · Cites 2 cases
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HCAL 59/2005 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 59 OF 2005 _____________ BETWEEN
____________ Before : Hon A Cheung J in Court Date of Hearing : 15 November 2005 Date of Judgment : 6 December 2005 ______________________ J U D G M E N T ______________________ Facts 1.The Applicant joined the Vocational Training Council, the 1st Respondent, as a lecturer in 1991. She became a senior lecturer in the Department of Hotel, Service and Tourism Studies in September 1994. 2.In 2005, the Council made a complaint to the Independent Commission Against Corruption against the Applicant for undertaking outside work with various external tourism bodies during office hours without the prior permission of the Executive Director of the Council. 3.After investigation, the ICAC decided not to proceed further with the complaint and investigation. 4.However, in October 2004, the Applicant was notified by the Council that a disciplinary committee had been formed to further investigate two charges against her, namely making false claims for reimbursement of travelling expenses totalling HK$63 and submitting falsified documents in support of the reimbursement claims. 5.Hearing of the Disciplinary Committee of the two charges was convened on 23 November 2004. The Committee decided that the Applicant was not entitled to be represented by counsel at the hearing, after hearing submission by the Applicant’s counsel to the contrary. Thereupon the Applicant and her counsel left the hearing, which proceeded in her absence. 6.The hearing concluded that the 1st charge (insofar as it related to two occasions involving $27 of false claims) and the 2nd charge (submitting falsified documents) were substantiated. 7.On 14 March 2004, the Administration Committee approved the Disciplinary Committee’s report as well as the recommendation of the Executive Director to punish the Applicant with termination of her employment with preserved benefits. Although the amount involved was trivial, it was considered that the Council is “a teaching institution that expects a high standard of staff’s integrity, especially teaching staff who hold positions of trust and who act as role models for [the] students”. 8.By letter dated 4 April 2004, the Applicant appealed against the findings and penalty so imposed to the Standing Committee of the Council, the 2nd Respondent, but her appeal was unsuccessful. The termination took effect on 29 April 2005. Article 35 of the Basic Law 9.In these judicial review proceedings, the Applicant seeks to quash the relevant decisions of the Disciplinary Committee, the Administration Committee and the Standing Committee. While she relies on a number of grounds, undoubtedly her argument based on article 35 of the Basic Law regarding right to legal representation forms the backbone of her arguments in Court. 10.Article 35 of the Basic Law reads: “Hong Kong residents shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to the courts, choice of lawyers for timely protection of their lawful rights and interests or for representation in the courts, and to judicial remedies.” 11.Essentially the Applicant argues that the Disciplinary Committee is a “court” within the meaning of article 35, and therefore she has a fundamental right under article 35 to legal representation before the Disciplinary Committee. She argues that the decision of the Committee to deny her representation by counsel at the hearing violated fundamentally her right guaranteed by the Basic Law, and that decision vitiated the legality of the whole disciplinary proceedings. She relies on the leading local authority on this question of legal representation before disciplinary tribunals, namely New World Development Co. Ltd v. Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd [2005] 2 HKLRD 612, in support of her arguments. New World Development Co. Ltd v. Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd 12.In New World, the Court of Appeal was concerned with whether persons charged with offences before a disciplinary tribunal of the listing committee of the Stock Exchange had an unrestricted right to legal representation before the disciplinary tribunal pursuant to article 35 of the Basic Law, article 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights and/or common law. 13.Not only did the Court of Appeal conclude on the facts of that case that such persons did enjoy the right to unrestricted legal representation pursuant to article 35 of the Basic Law, article 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights as well as common law, the court also analysed the relevant provisions and enunciated principles of general application. 14.The decision of the Court of Appeal is under appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. However, that appeal will not be heard until sometime next year. For reasons given in a separate judgment on 8 November 2005, I have decided not to adjourn the scheduled hearing of this judicial review application pending the result of the appeal to the Court of Final Appeal in New World. The present application for judicial review must therefore be decided according to the law as it now stands. For that purpose, I must apply the principles laid down by the Court of Appeal in New World, which is a decision binding on this Court. 15.In New World, Cheung JA, commenting on the operation of article 35 of the Basic Law, said that in deciding whether the article applies to proceedings other than those held in conventional “courts”, the matter has to be approached on a “case-by-case” basis and the framework of the particular tribunal has to be examined (at page 623B/C). But within the confines of that approach, the following principles are relevant (at page 623C - H):
16.In the same case, Reyes J made a number of observations on the operation of article 35 (at pages 635D/E to 637B/C):
17.The third member of the court, Yeung JA, agreed with both judgments. Vocational Training Council Ordinance 18.It is necessary to take a closer look at the Vocational Training Council Ordinance (Cap. 1130), which established the Council in 1982. The preamble of the Ordinance reads: “To provide for the establishment, functions and management of a Vocational Training Council and for purposes connected therewith.” 19.The Council is a body corporate with perpetual succession (section 4(1)). It is not the servant or agent of the government and does not enjoy any status, immunity or privilege of the government (section 21). 20.The objects of the Council can be found in section 5 of the Ordinance. The section reads:
21.As for the various functions and powers of the Council, they are set out comprehensibly in section 6:
22.Part III of the Ordinance makes provisions for the membership, executive board and committees of the Council. It is fair to say that the Chief Executive has a major role to play in relation to filling up the membership of the Council, the appointment of the Executive Director, the establishment of training boards and general committees of the Council, as well as the appointment of their members. 23.The operation of the Council is essentially funded by the government pursuant to provisions set out in Part IV of the Ordinance. 24.Section 22 of the Ordinance provides that the Chief Executive in Council may give to the Council such directions as he thinks fit with respect to the exercise of the functions under the Ordinance and the Council shall comply with any such directions. 25.Section 20 of the Ordinance gives the Council the power to make rules:
26.Section 34 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance referred to in section 20(3) relates to tabling subsidiary legislation before the Legislative Council for vetting and approval. Disciplinary Rules 27.Disciplinary Rules have indeed been made by the Council. The relevant set of rules are dated 2 May 1995. Rule 2 sets out the circumstances under which disciplinary action may be taken:
28.Rule 3 provides for the giving of a verbal warning or reprimand by the head of any division or section or unit of the Council to an employee of that particular division, section or unit in relation to less serious matters. 29.For more serious matters, rules 5, 6 and 7 set out the procedures for hearings before the Disciplinary Committee, the imposition of penalties and appeals. They read as follows:
Council performs public functions 30.I would make a number of points here. The Council is no doubt established by statute, but not only that – its establishment is to perform functions that are matters of public interest. It concerns, amongst other things, the provision of systematic education and training in technical and industrial fields that are suited to the developing needs of Hong Kong. Therefore unlike many organisations or corporations that are also established by statute, the Council is not essentially concerned with a purpose or function that is primarily private in nature, or is of limited relevance to the society as a whole as opposed to a minority sector thereof. The substantial involvement of the Chief Executive (and his officers) in the functioning and operation of the Council (at least in the macro sense) bears out the public interest dimension of the Council. 31.While education and training are directly concerned with the interests and benefits of those receiving them, those responsible for designing the teaching courses and training programmes and those doing the teaching and conducting the training are, quite obviously, an essential integral part of the whole scheme of things. In relation to their employment and engagement, the conditions and terms of such employment and engagement, as well as the discipline of those so employed or engaged, the Ordinance makes express and specific references: sections 6(2)(n) and 20(1) to (c). Of course, all this falls within the “management” of the Council referred to in the preamble of the Ordinance. 32.Put another way, the employment and discipline of those employed and engaged to design the courses and training and/or provide the relevant teaching, training and education are matters that share the same public interests that underlie the Council and its functions and operation under and pursuant to the Ordinance. Teaching staff is not an ancillary component part of the systematic education and training that the Council is charged with the statutory responsibility to provide. It is an essential integral part of it. In fact, all this is self-evident from the express justification given for the severe punishment that was meted out to the Applicant following conviction in the present case despite the triviality of the amount of money involved, viz., teaching staff members are supposed to be “role models” for the students and a high standard of integrity is expected from them. 33.From all these considerations one can say that the employment, discipline and dismissal/termination of employment of teaching staff of the Council cannot be viewed simply as a purely domestic or private matter. It does involve a public element, which is part and partial of the public interests that underlie the Council as established under the Ordinance. Legal framework of disciplinary proceedings 34.Turning to the legal framework governing disciplinary proceedings, it is clear to me that the matter is not purely governed by private contracts and consensual arrangements between the parties. No doubt contracts of employment are indeed signed between the Council and its teaching staff members. But overriding the contracts are the provisions in section 20 of the Ordinance which give the Council the power to make rules regarding the discipline of persons employed or engaged by the Council. Though for the purpose of section 34 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, the rules so made shall not be regarded as subsidiary legislation, it does not follow that for other purposes, they should not be so regarded, particularly in relation to their legal status. Mr Dennis Law, counsel appearing for the 1st Respondent at the hearing, did not suggest or seriously suggest that the Disciplinary Rules made by the Council do not have the force of law or overriding effect on whatever provisions to the contrary that there may be in the contracts of employment between the Council and its employees. In particular, it is accepted, no doubt correctly, that the Council may at any time make rules or change existing rules relating to disciplinary matters, and the rules so made or as changed will be binding on its employees regardless of their individual consent, in relation to their future conduct. 35.In my judgment, all this is quite clear from the provisions in the Ordinance, and the supremacy of the Disciplinary Rules is quite independent from any contractual provisions in the contracts of employment between the Council and the employees. 36.Put another way, the Disciplinary Rules and the Disciplinary Committee set up pursuant to those rules are an integral part of a legislative framework, i.e. the Ordinance, concerned with and which takes into account matters of public interest. 37.In New World, both Cheung JA and Reyes J laid great emphasis on the fact that the disciplinary tribunal set up in relation to the Stock Exchange was not a domestic and consensual tribunal in coming to the conclusion that it is a “court” within the meaning of article 35 (see pages 625E-626B, 638D/E-I). In the present case, I am of the view that the disciplinary procedure as a whole, including the Disciplinary Committee in particular, operates and functions not so much by reason of contract or individual consent or consensus. It derives its legitimacy and source of jurisdiction ultimately from statute. 38.In my judgment, this is an important, though by no means conclusive, consideration to bear in mind. Disciplinary Committee performs a judicial function 39.The function of the Disciplinary Committee is, in my view, essentially judicial in nature. 40.Take the present case as an example: the Applicant was charged with making false claims for reimbursement of travelling expenses, as well as submitting falsified documents to support those claims. The task of the Disciplinary Committee was to decide whether those charges were true or not, according to the evidence and materials placed before it. If the Committee found the charges to be proven, the next stage in the disciplinary procedure would be for the relevant sentencing authority (determined under rule 6 of the Disciplinary Rules) to consider and determine the appropriate sentence or “penalty”. 41.In my view, the Disciplinary Committee was performing a judicial rather than an administrative function. Both Cheung JA and Reyes J explained in New World that a judicial decision is made according to legal rules and principles whereas an administrative decision is made according to administrative policy, the aim of which is to find what is the most expedient and desirable solution in the public interest (pages 623G, 635H-636C). 42.In my view, this is again a factor weighing heavily in favour of a conclusion that the Disciplinary Committee is a “court” within the meaning of article 35. Consequences of an adverse decision 43.I have mentioned punishment or penalty above. It is also a relevant criterion. Rule 6.4 of the Disciplinary Rules provides for various different penalties that may be imposed on a guilty employee: see above. Before I deal with the various forms of punishment, I should add that for an academic like the Applicant, even without any specific punishment following conviction, the fact of her conviction of charges involving making false claims and submitting falsified documents, and thus dishonesty, is by and of itself a sufficiently serious matter affecting both her reputation and career prospect. That in itself is a serious punishment. 44.On top of this, rule 6.4 provides for 5 different forms of punishment, namely reprimand, fine, stoppage or deferment of increment, termination of service with benefits, and dismissal with forfeiture of benefits. 45.The power to impose a fine, as has been forcefully submitted by Mr Kenneth Chan appearing together with Mr David Chum for the Applicant at the hearing, is a feature that merits special comment. The power to impose a fine quite clearly goes beyond what normally the law of contract would allow a contracting party to have under a consensual arrangement. Any such purported power to impose a fine would, generally speaking, be struck down as being penal in nature. Yet the Disciplinary Rules made pursuant to specific statutory power conferred under section 20(1)(c) of the Ordinance give the relevant sentencing authority under rule 6 the power to impose a fine against a guilty employee. That highlights the nature of the disciplinary procedure and the function that the sentencing authority is charged with, namely a judicial function. The fine that may be imposed is plainly punitive in nature, particularly in light of the separate power under rule 6.5 to require an employee to make good any loss or damage of property caused by him or her – which would be compensatory in nature. 46.Looking at the possible penalties that may be imposed, the more severe ones may indeed have a serious and significant impact on a guilty academic’s reputation or career. 47.For the above reasons, a consideration of the matter from the punishment point of view would also tend to support the conclusion that the procedure in question is really a judicial rather than an administrative one, and the Disciplinary Committee is a “court” within the meaning of article 35. Composition and procedure of the Disciplinary Committee 48.I have also considered the composition of the Disciplinary Committee and the procedure it adopts. While it may not have all the powers that a conventional court of law may have in relation to the holding of hearings, such as the calling of witnesses and the taking of evidence on oath, and while its procedure may not be identical to that adopted in a court of law such as sitting in public, I think on the whole, proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee resemble much more judicial proceedings than administrative ones. 49.In any event, the more important thing is that the Committee follows a prescribed set of procedures, which obviously aim at (amongst other things) providing a fair hearing to the employee charged. 50.I do not find the separation of functions regarding liability and sentencing to be of great significance in determining whether the Disciplinary Committee, in performing the former function, is a “court” within the meaning of article 35. 51.Mr Law argued that the sort of disciplinary procedure adopted by the Disciplinary Committee under the Vocational Training Council is a very common and well established procedure, in which legal representation is excluded. The procedure aims at the informal and quick resolution of disciplinary matters. It is concerned with purely internal disciplinary matters and the hearing is held in private. The result of the hearing is not published. Counsel argued that to hold that legal representation should be allowed would wholly upset the well-established procedure. 52.I would not say that all these considerations are wholly irrelevant. Nor do I intend to upset the status quo merely for the sake of doing so. But after 1997, the Basic Law is the fundamental law of the Special Administrative Region which governs all areas of life in the society. Any non-conformity with the requirements under the Basic Law must be changed. That is a fact of life. The court is only charged with the duty to implement the law, as it now stands. The New World decision is binding on this Court. Having said that, as the Court of Appeal has emphasized in New World, the application of article 35 must be approached on a case-by-case basis. 53.The fact that the Disciplinary Committee is manned by non-lawyers is, in my judgment, of little significance in relation to the question of whether the Committee is a court within the meaning of article 35. 54.As regards the argument that legal representation would defeat the purpose of having a quick resolution of disciplinary charges, I think this argument has been rejected by Reyes J in New World, where the judge rejected the suggestion that lawyers will prolong hearing by taking unmeritorious technical points and spinning out their examination (see page 641B to I). 55.I do not think the facts that the proceedings are not held in public and the result will not be generally published are really important considerations. In my judgment, of greater importance is the possible effect of an adverse decision will be on the alleged offender, in terms of reputation and career prospects. See the judgment of McEachern CJSC in Joplin v. Chief Constable of the City of Vancouver [1982] 2 CCC(3d) 396, 409, which was quoted by Reyes J in his judgment in New World at page 640B to E. Trapp v. Mackie 56.Both parties have referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Trapp v. Mackie [1979] 1 WLR 377 on the question of whether the Disciplinary Committee is a “court”. At page 383D to H, Lord Diplock pointed out no less than 10 characteristics which the tribunal in that case shared with a court of justice. 57.But it must be remembered that Trapp was a case of defamation and concerned with whether absolute privilege attached to evidence given at a local inquiry. While what has been pointed out by Lord Diplock in terms of characteristics is of some general relevance and has therefore been taken into account, I do not think that those characteristics are by and of themselves determinative of the question of whether a particular disciplinary tribunal or committee is a “court” for the purpose of article 35. Disciplinary Committee is a “court” 58.Having borne all arguments and relevant considerations in mind and looked at the matter in the round, I am of the view that, as the law now stands, the Disciplinary Committee is indeed a “court” within the meaning of article 35 of the Basic Law. Breach of article 35 59.This, by itself, should not be the end of the matter, because one would still need to decide whether the right under article 35 has been transgressed. Determining that a particular tribunal or committee is a court is just the first step. 60.However, on the facts of the present case, the task of the Court is made less difficult by the fact that the Disciplinary Committee has decided from the outset to deny any legal representation at the hearing at all. 61.The Disciplinary Committee was the primary fact-finder in the whole disciplinary procedure. The charges turned on facts and, borrowing from criminal law parlance, mens rea. Consideration of documents as well as examination of factual witnesses (including the Applicant herself – if she had stayed behind and taken part at the hearing) were required. Moreover, given that in essence dishonesty was being alleged, a critical examination of the evidence was called for. It is quite impossible to say that the Applicant’s defence of the charges would not have benefited from representation of counsel at the hearing. On the facts, the total denial of legal representation at the Disciplinary Committee’s hearing is plainly a serious matter. 62.In my view, such a denial falls foul of the right conferred under article 35 for representation in the courts. 63.In other words, there has been a fundamental breach of the Applicant’s right guaranteed under the constitution. In my judgment, it vitiates the decision of the Disciplinary Committee, and a fortiori, the subsequent sentencing decision and appellate decision. This is determinative of the present judicial review application. Article 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights 64.For these reasons, I do not want to dwell on the other points also relied on by the Applicant. 65.In particular, in relation to article 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, which was also dealt with in New World, I would simply say that on balance, I think there has also been a breach of that article, although I confess that the decision of Mayo J (as he then was) given in R v. Hong Kong Polytechnic, ex parte Jenny Chua Yee-yen (1992) 2 HKPLR 34 did give me some difficulty in reaching my above conclusion. 66.In that case, the court applied the considerations summarised by Webster J in R v. Home Secretary, ex parte Tarrant [1985] 2 QB 251, 285 to determine whether the right to a fair hearing conferred by article 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights had been infringed by denying legal representation at the relevant hearing. The judge concluded that on the facts of that case, the student’s right to a fair hearing had not been infringed although the disciplinary committee of the Hong Kong Polytechnic refused to allow her legal representation at the relevant hearing. 67.For my part, I would observe that unlike article 35, article 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights is concerned with the right to a fair hearing which may or may not include, in a particular case, the right to legal representation or full and unrestricted legal representation at a relevant hearing. On the other hand, article 35 is directly concerned with the right to legal representation at the hearing. 68.For article 10, in order to decide whether the right to a fair hearing has been infringed by reason of the denial of legal representation, by the nature of things, the facts and particular circumstances in an individual case must be closely looked at. 69.On the other hand, in considering whether a case falls foul of article 35, very often, the crucial focus is on whether the tribunal or committee in question is a “court” within the meaning of article 35, and that question has to be determined “on a level of generality” without regard to the facts of the particular case (New World at page 638C, per Reyes J). 70.Of course, if one concludes that the particular disciplinary tribunal or committee is a court, the next question will arise as to whether the right under article 35 has been infringed and the facts must be looked at. But in a case like the present where the “court” simply disallowed legal representation at the hearing at all, generally speaking the answer to this last stage of enquiry would be rather obvious. 71.By comparison, in determining whether the same facts (i.e. a denial of legal representation) would infringe the right to a fair hearing conferred under article 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, the various considerations that have been pointed out by Webster J in ex parte Tarrant, which are really fact-sensitive factors, as well as any other relevant matters, would have to be looked at. 72.As I said, I do not wish to rely on article 10 as my main ground for decision in the present case, although with some hesitation, on reflection, I am inclined to think that article 10 has also been infringed in the present case, having borne in mind the relevant considerations pointed out by Webster J in ex parte Tarrant, insofar as they are relevant and applicable to the present case, and having compared the facts in the present case with that in ex parte Jenny Chua. Non-disclosure of documents etc. 73.As to the other reasons relied on by the Applicant, I see no real substance in the complaint about non-disclosure of documents or the failure to answer questions prior to the commencement of the hearing before the Disciplinary Committee. This case does not involve any secret communication with the Disciplinary Committee. I do not think Mr Kenneth Chan has gone so far as to suggest that there is a general duty to supply what in a criminal case would be called “unused materials” to the Applicant for the purposes of preparation of her defence at the hearing. 74.As for the documents disclosed and made use of at the hearing for the first time, they did not constitute secret communication with the Disciplinary Committee because if the Applicant had chosen to remain at the hearing, no doubt she would have been supplied with the documents and in that event, she could have, if necessary, applied for an adjournment to consider her position in light of the further documents. 75.In any event, there has not been any real prejudice resulting from this complaint even if, which is not my view, it were a valid complaint. Lack of opportunity to mitigate 76.As regards the lack of a mitigation opportunity prior to sentencing, I think the bottom line is fairness. 77.As Lord Mustill has pointed out in a well-known passage in his Lordship’s judgment in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, 560F/G, what fairness will often require is that a person who may be adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representation on his own behalf “either before the decision is taken with a view to producing a favourable result; or after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification; or both”. 78.Here, after sentencing, the Applicant had a right to appeal and she did exercise her right and lodge an appeal. In her letter of appeal, she did not put forward any mitigating submission, apart from pointing out the lack of an opportunity to do so before. 79.On the facts of the present case, there is nothing to suggest that the appeal procedure is limited in scope or that the appellate body is restricted in its jurisdiction or powers as regards sentencing. 80.So far as this Court can see on the materials before it, no resulting prejudice whatsoever has been suffered by the Applicant. I would not base my decision in this case on this ground of complaint. 81.For the sake of completeness, I should add that the complaint about the lack of an opportunity to mitigate aside, there is no challenge against the punishment on the ground that it was perverse, unduly oppressive or otherwise objectionable as such in this judicial review application. Mr Kenneth Chan expressly confirmed his client’s position to that effect with the Court at the hearing. Hearsay evidence 82.As regards the complaint relating to the admission of hearsay evidence by the Disciplinary Committee, I do not accept the complaint. I agree with Mr Law’s submission in this regard. Re Lo Wing-tong [1990] 1 HKLR 325 is authority for the general proposition that the rules of evidence, including those against hearsay evidence, do not apply in administrative proceedings (see pages 329E to 330J). Failure to give reasons etc. 83.There is also the complaint that the Standing Committee in dismissing the appeal did not give any reasons. I do not accept the argument. The Standing Committee obviously agreed with the reasons given below and did not find it necessary to give any separate reasons of its own. 84.There are other minor and miscellaneous arguments that do not merit any specific mentioning. Suffice it to say I do not accept them. Outcome 85.In short, I would mainly base my present decision on article 35 of the Basic Law. Insofar as may be necessary, I would also base my decision on article 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. 86.For these reasons, the Applicant succeeds in the present judicial review application. 87.I make orders of certiorari to bring up and quash respectively the decision of the Disciplinary Committee dated 23 December 2004, the decision of the Administration Committee made on 14 March 2005 (which approved the Disciplinary Committee’s report and the Executive Director’s recommendation to terminate the Applicant’s employment) and the appellate decision of the Standing Committee which was communicated to the Applicant by letter dated 28 April 2005. 88.I also order that the costs of these proceedings be paid by the Respondents to the Applicant, to be taxed if not agreed, counsel for the parties having agreed that costs should follow the event. 89.I thank counsel for their assistance.
Mr Kenneth C L Chan and Mr David Chum, instructed by Messrs Yeung & Chan, for the Applicant Mr Dennis Law, instructed by Messrs Wilkinson & Grist, for the 1st Respondent Messrs Wilkinson & Grist, for the 2nd Respondent, absent at the hearing (having agreed to abide by the result herein) Appeal allowed: see CACV78/2006 dated 25 April 2007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
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Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 59/2005