HKSAR v. Tam Tung Kee and Others
Read the full judgment text of CACC 550/1999 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment.
1. All three applicants stood trial together in the District Court before Her Honour Judge Poon and were on 16 October 1999 convicted after a trial of conspiracy to defraud, contrary to Common Law. The judge sentenced D1 to imprisonment for 3 years and 8 months; D2 to imprisonment for 2 years and D3 to imprisonment for 20 months. All of them filed notices for leave to appeal against their convictions. D1 and D3 also filed notices for leave to appeal against their sentences. At the outset of the
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CACC000550/1999 CACC 550/1999 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 550 OF 1999 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NOS. 395 & 396 OF 1999)
Coram: Hon Leong CJ/HC, Stuart-Moore VP and Wong JA in Court Dates of Hearing: 26 July, 2000 and 15 March, 2001 Date of Handing Down Judgment: 2 April, 2001 ____________________ J U D G M E N T ____________________ Wong JA: (giving the judgment of the court) Introduction 1. All three applicants stood trial together in the District Court before Her Honour Judge Poon and were on 16 October 1999 convicted after a trial of conspiracy to defraud, contrary to Common Law. The judge sentenced D1 to imprisonment for 3 years and 8 months; D2 to imprisonment for 2 years and D3 to imprisonment for 20 months. All of them filed notices for leave to appeal against their convictions. D1 and D3 also filed notices for leave to appeal against their sentences. At the outset of the hearing before us, D3 abandoned his application for leave to appeal against his sentence and it was accordingly dismissed. Subsequent to the adjournment which we granted to D1, D1 filed a notice abandoning his application for leave to appeal against sentence. 2. D2 and D3 were represented by Counsel before us but D1 was not legally represented. D1 applied for an adjournment so as to enable him to have his case argued by a specific Senior Counsel from whom he had already obtained a written opinion but he was not available at present. We reluctantly acceded to his request and adjourned his case for argument to a date to be fixed. In the meantime we decided to hear arguments from Counsel for D2 and D3 and did so without objection from both Counsel or from D1. The Charge against D1 3. The 1st Applicant, TAM Tung-kee (D1 at trial) faced one charge of conspiracy to defraud (Charge 1). These are the particulars of offence :
The Charge against D2 and D3 4. The 2nd Applicant, THO Ah Sa (D2) and the 3rd Applicant, KWONG Kwong-wah (D3) were jointly charged also with conspiracy to defraud (Charge 2) with the following particulars of offence :
The development of the Hong Kong Station Development Northern Site 5. The two charges arose out of the development and building in 1997 by Central Waterfront Property Development Limited of a commercial complex called the Hong Kong Station Development Northern Site "Northern Site". Central Waterfront Property Development Limited appointed AOKI Corporation as the main contractor. AOKI subcontracted the foundation works of the site to Bachy Soletanche Group Limited and the latter subcontracted the bored pile works to B+B Construction Company Limited. B+B further subcontracted the labour and supervision for the bored pile works to Pak Kee Transportation Company Limited which in turn subcontracted the same work to On Foundation Engineering Company. The sonic logging tests for the bored pile works were subcontracted by B+B to Kwong's Testing Company. Ove Arup & Partners were consultant engineers responsible for the design and supervision of the project at the Northern Site whose duties included verifying the length of the bored piles and that they were properly constructed. Bored piling 6. The foundation works for the Northern Site involved the construction of 107 bored piles. Bored piling is a recognised foundation system that is designed and constructed to be in direct contact with, and safely transmitting loads from the superstructure to the ground. The bored piles at the Northern Site had been designed to bear on the rock stratum and to be embedded into the rock stratum to provide resistance to the downward and uplifting forces respectively. In order to construct a bored pile, a bored hole will be excavated to the prescribed length in accordance with the approved site plan. Steel reinforcement will then be lowered into the excavated hole and the hole will be filled with concrete. According to the core drilling tests, 83 out of 87 bored piles constructed at the Northern Site were shorter than the prescribed length. A concreting process needed to be done after the bored piles were constructed. Normally concreting should start from the founding level to the cut off level of the bored piles and the concrete to be used could be calculated in advance. As the constructed piles penetrated into shorter than prescribed lengths, the quantity of concrete needed would be less than estimated. Each loading of concrete into the piles would produce a corresponding docket and when there was a surplus of concrete delivered but not loaded into the piles, there would not be sufficient dockets to cover the whole delivery. The insufficient dockets would expose the fact that the piles were constructed shorter than designed. In order to avoid suspicion from Ove Arup, Hui Wai-chung, Kwok Chi-hung and Wong Ka-wing (PW1), three of the co-conspirators named in Charge 1 made photocopies of the original dockets, cut and then pasted them to make false delivery dockets to show that all concrete ordered from Redland were loaded into the respective piles. Two foremen from On Foundation were instructed to cut short the measuring tapes which were to be used by engineers from Ove Arup should they come to the site and carry out measurements of the bored piles. Ove Arup, the consultant engineers, also required sonic logging tests to be conducted on 30 per cent of the bored piles. Prosecution Case 7. It was the prosecution case that D1, who was the project manager of B+B, participated in the conspiracy to build bored piles shorter than the prescribed length to defraud the developer and contractors that the bored piles were constructed in accordance with the specifications. D1 not only knew, approved and directed what was going on but actually played an active role to cover the matter up as far as possible from Ove Arup, the consultant engineers. 8. D2 and D3 were not involved in the main conspiracy in Charge 1. They were involved in the conspiracy in Charge 2 to cover up the main conspiracy. They agreed to carry out the sonic logging tests to show that the bored piles tested were in accordance with the specifications. They were fully aware that the results of the tests were false. D3 conducted two out of three tests and the third test was not carried out because by then the offence had come to light. Evaluation and analysis of evidence 9. None of the applicants gave or called evidence. Therefore the judge had only the prosecution evidence to consider. She believed the evidence of all prosecution witnesses including PW1 and found them to be honest and reliable after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence. At the end she found the charges proved against each and every applicant beyond reasonable doubt. The case of D2 in the appeal 10. D2 was represented before us by Mr. Duncan Percy and we will deal with his case first. The perfected grounds of appeal contained three grounds but the real issue in this appeal, as it was in the trial, as Mr. Percy rightly submitted was whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that D2 was a party to a conspiracy with PWl, D3 and others to create false sonic test reports, which he knew full well did not represent the true length of the short piles, and that the false reports were intended to deceive others. Grounds 1 and 3 11. It would be more convenient to deal with these two grounds together. The first ground is :
And the third ground :
Findings of the judge 12. The evidence against D2 was summarized by the judge in her Reasons for Verdict from p.15 to p.18. She identified the evidence in the following way :
13. It is true that neither PW1 nor PW2 had identified D2 as the person by the name of Michael Tho. D2 admitted in his video interview that he was asked by Tomie de Sousa to attend the meeting with PW2 and he did attend. 14. Having made these findings, the judge concluded at p.17Q to p.18H. She said :
15. In our view, the inferences drawn by the judge are legitimate and proper inferences which the judge was entitled to draw and they are fully supported by the evidence. There is no substance to grounds one and three. Ground 2 16. We come now to the second ground. This reads :-
17. This ground was taken from a passage of the Reasons for Verdict at p.6R to p.7B where the judge said :-
18. Both Mr. Percy and Mr. Zervos for the Respondent accepted that this was undoubtedly a correct statement of law. Mr. Percy, however, criticized the judge for only paying lip service without genuine concern for the application of the statement of law which she correctly stated. It was submitted that any evidence or conversation about D2 in his absence without evidence of his identity was hearsay and inadmissible. He complained in particular of the telephone conversation between PW1 and a man claimed to be Michael Tho. Objection was taken at the trial by Mr. Ma who appeared for D2 in the court below. This part of the proceedings and the judge's ruling appeared at p.160 and p.161 of the Appeal Bundle. The judge admitted the conversation to the extent that it took place but not as to the truth of its contents. 19. In our view, the evidence is clearly admissible. Firstly, it amounted to reasonable evidence or a prima facie case of D2's involvement in the conspiracy and the role he played. Secondly, the evidence of the conversations was admissible since the conversations were contemporary evidence of the progress of the offence charged. Thirdly, the evidence of the conversations became compelling evidence of D2's participation in the conspiracy only when considered alongside the other circumstantial evidence, see R v Jones & Others [1997] 2 Cr.App.R.119. Mr. Zervos submitted and we agreed that all the evidence must be looked at in the round and not in splendid isolation. When we approach the evidence as a whole and in its proper context, the evidence against D2 was so overwhelming that the inescapable inference the judge could draw must be one of guilt. 20. There is no merit in this ground and it fails. D3: the findings of the judge 21. We turn to the case of D3. The judge dealt with the evidence against him from p.18H to p.24E of her Reasons for Verdict. She made a total of eight findings of fact in the following order.
Ground 1 22. Mr. Dunn who appeared for D3 before us put forward six grounds of appeal. The sixth and the last one was a general ground that the conviction was in all the circumstances unsafe and unsatisfactory. The first ground being
23. The judge dealt with the voice identification of D3 by PW1 at p.18I to p.20B of her Reasons for Verdict. She ruled the voice identification admissible and rejected submission from defence counsel that the judge should warn herself in terms of the guidelines in R v Turnbull (1976) 63 Cr.App.R 132 holding that it was only in "fleeting hearing" voice identification that such a warning was necessary. The judge clearly had Turnbull in mind and she was also fully aware that there were no distinctive features of D3's voice and the last time PW1 had spoken to or seen D3 was some eight months ago. However, she relied on subsequent events as supporting evidence of the voice identification. On previous occasions, D3 had submitted the two reports to PW1 and had collected the required fees from the latter. There was the evidence of PW4, a technician in Stanger Asia and a colleague of D3 who asked PW4 to conduct two sonic logging tests in the Northern Site. He said that he went with Gary Kwong to the site on two occasions. 24. In our view, the judge was right to admit the voice identification of D3 and she rightly rejected the submission that it was necessary for the judge to warn herself in terms of Turnbull. There was an abundance of circumstantial evidence to conclusively prove that D3 was the person who spoke to PW1 on the phone just before the first test was carried out. We have considered the decisions referred to us by Mr. Dunn in R v Hersey [1998] CLR 281 and R v E.J. Smith [1984] 1 NSWLR 426 and do not find them to be of any real assistance to D3. It was held in both cases that evidence of voice identification is admissible. In the present case, the evidence is such that even without the voice identification, there was ample evidence to support the finding of guilt of D3. The evidence of voice identification is nothing more than a red-herring. This ground fails. Grounds 2 to 5 25. These 5 grounds all relate to attacks on the judge for drawing adverse inferences against D3. They can be considered together and disposed of quickly. The grounds speak for themselves.
26. We have no hesitation to reject these grounds out of hand. The judge was presented with a very strong and formidable case against D3. He conducted two sonic tests with full knowledge that the results of the tests were not the depth of what he found but the correct depths of what the bored piles should have been as contained in exhibit P25. There was also evidence from PW1 at p.378 of the transcript. The following questions and answers emerged during the cross-examination of PW1 by Mr. Wan who appeared for D3 at the trial.
27. When all the evidence was considered cumulatively and not in isolation as Mr. Dunn had suggested, there is no doubt at all that a most powerful case was established against D3. The Case of D1 in the appeal 28. We finally come to the case of D1. We do this last because of the adjournment which we had granted to D1 to brief a Senior Counsel of his own choice. We have now heard arguments from Mr. Wong S.C. on his behalf. The judge's findings 29. D1 faced the first charge. We had set out the particulars at the outset and will not repeat them. The findings of the judge against him were to be found at p.10H to p.12D. This is what the judge had to say. She started with the sub-heading of "Evidence against D1" and continued :
30. Against these findings, Mr. Wong has drafted and developed arguments on a number of grounds of appeal. These are as follows :- 31. The conviction is unsafe or unsatisfactory in that :
32. These grounds and the arguments advanced in support can be disposed of very quickly and briefly. Ground 1 33. It was conceded that there was evidence to prove the existence of the conspiracy alleged but the issue was whether D1 joined the conspiracy and had the requisite intention at the time when he joined that conspiracy. Mr. Wong submitted that it was in this area that the judge fell into error. We are unable to agree. The findings made by the judge at p.10H to p.12D clearly provide an abundance of evidence to prove that D1 joined the conspiracy and did so with the necessary mens rea. In R v Anderson [1986] AC 27 at p.39E, Lord Bridge had this to say :
Lord Griffiths made the same point in Yip Chin-keung v R [1995] 99 Cr. App. R at p.410 :-
34. We are satisfied that there was ample evidence for the judge to draw the inferences that she did and in our view her findings were fully borne out by the evidence and cannot be faulted. This ground therefore fails. Ground 2 35. Although the judge did not make any specific reference to the test of dishonesty laid down in R v Ghosh [1982] 2 All ER 689, it is perfectly plain that the judge had all the ingredients of the offence of conspiracy to defraud in her mind when she considered the case against each individual defendant. For instance, she particularly referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1975] AC 819 in which Viscount Dilhorne gave what has been regarded as the classic definition of the offence of conspiracy to defraud. 36. This is a case where out of 87 bored piles constructed, 83 of them were found to be short. It must be obvious that anyone who participated in the scheme was dishonest in the extreme according to any test, Ghosh or otherwise. 37. In the course of his argument, Mr. Wong drew our attention to the offence of statutory conspiracy created under s. 159A of the Crimes Ordinance Cap. 200. It is not necessary to consider this because it is not relevant to this appeal. D1 was charged under the common law and his case was proceeded with and considered on this basis. 38. There is no substance in this ground and it fails. Ground 3 39. In the concluding paragraph against D1 in her Reasons for Verdict, the judge said at p.11S to p.12D :
40. We are satisfied that the inferences drawn by the judge were proper inferences to be drawn from the facts she had found and there was ample evidence to support her findings. 41. This ground also fails. Ground 4 42. This ground contains nothing and does not take the case of D1 further than the previous grounds. This ground must fail. Conclusion 43. We have not been persuaded that the convictions were in any way unsafe or unsatisfactory. The applications are therefore dismissed.
Representation: Mr. Kevin Zervos, S.A.D.P.P. (on 26.7.2000 and 15.3.2001) and Ms Louisa LAI, S.G.C.(on 26.7.2000), of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent 1st Applicant in person (on 26.7.2000) Mr. Ching Y. Wong, S.C. and Ms. Barbara Cheng instructed by M/s Bosco Tso & Partners for the 1st Applicant (on 15.3.2001) Mr. Duncan Percy, instructed by M/s Au-Yeung, Cheng, Ho & Tin, for the 2nd Applicant (on 26.7.2000) Mr. John Dunn, assigned by the Legal Aid Department, for the 3rd Applicant (on 26.7.2000) |
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