Lau, William John v. Wan, Yuk Lin, Alison and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCA 1255/2006 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. This is an appeal by the Plaintiff against the Order of Master B . Kwan dated 25 th January 2007 (“Master Kwan’s Order”) whereby she struck out his Writ of Summons herein and ordered costs against him.
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HCA 1255/2006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO. 1255 OF 2006 ______________________ BETWEEN
______________________ Before : Mr. Recorder P Fung SC in Chambers Date of Hearing : 15th June 2007 Date of Handing Down Judgment : 22nd June 2007 ______________________ J U D G M E N T ______________________ This Appeal 1.This is an appeal by the Plaintiff against the Order of Master B . Kwan dated 25th January 2007 (“Master Kwan’s Order”) whereby she struck out his Writ of Summons herein and ordered costs against him. The Writ of Summons 2.On 12th June 2006, the Plaintiff acting in person issued the Writ of Summons endorsed with an Indorsement of Claim (“the Indorsement”) against the 7 Defendants herein. The Indorsement is clearly not a Statement of Claim. 3.In the Indorsement, the Plaintiff has set out a large number of claims under different headings in respect of the 7 Defendants. 4.The Plaintiff did not serve the Writ of Summons on the Defendants. Instead, he sent to each of the Defendants by fax a letter which begins as follows : -
He thereafter set out the Indorsement verbatim. 5.On 28th September 2006, the Defendants issued a Summons applying for the following orders : -
6.The Summons was heard by Master B. Kwan on 25th January 2007 who made Master Kwan’s Order in the following terms : -
The Parties 7.The Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant were business partners. Eventually, the two of them came to own almost the entire equity in the 4th Defendant company with the 1st Defendant being entitled to just over 52% and the Plaintiff 47% thereof. There was some discussion between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant about a sell-out but that led to nothing. 8.The 2nd Defendant is the registered holder of 500 out of the 120,000 issued shares in the 4th Defendant. She is also a director thereof. 9.The 3rd Defendant is also the registered holder of another 500 shares in the 4th Defendant. She was a former director thereof. 10.The 5th Defendant is another company in which the 1st Defendant and the 4th Defendant each holds a 50% interest. The Plaintiff was a director of the 5th Defendant at one stage. 11.The 6th Defendant company is a subsidiary of the 7th Defendant company. The 1st Defendant holds a 10% interest in the 7th Defendant. Abandonment of Appeal against 6th and 7th Defendants 12.At the hearing of the appeal, the Plaintiff declared that he was no longer maintaining his appeal regarding the 6th and 7th Defendants. Hence, there is no need for me to concern myself with those two companies any longer. The Indorsement The 1st Defendant 13.Dealing first with the claims set out in the Indorsement against the 1st Defendant, there are 19 paragraphs. I shall cite some examples below. 14.Paragraph (1) reads as follows : -
15.Paragraphs (2) and (3) read as follows : -
16.Paragraphs (4) and (5) read as follows : -
17.Paragraphs (7) and (8) read as follows : -
The Defendant’s Arguments 18.Mr. Chan, Counsel for the Defendants, has advanced a number of points in opposition to the Plaintiff’s appeal. His main points can be summarized as follows : -
The Court’s Findings 19.In my judgment, the Defendants cannot complain about the non-service of the Writ of Summons by the Plaintiff. 20.RHC Order 6 rule 8(1) provides as follows : -
Thus, the Rules of the High Court expressly give a plaintiff a period of twelve months (subject to extension) within which to serve it. The Plaintiff was acting within his right by not serving it and cannot be accused of having abused the process of the Court. Furthermore, the Plaintiff in his faxes to the Defendants made it clear that “I have elected not to serve the Writ of Summons on you for the moment”, thus implying that he would or might do it later. 21.There is also nothing in the point about the faxing of the Writ of Summons by the Plaintiff to the Defendants and Mr. Rozario. A writ of summons once issued becomes public knowledge. In fact, a number of newspapers list out writs of summons issued in the Courts every day. 22.As regards, the adequacy of the Indorsement, RHC Order 6 rule 2(1)(a) provides as follows : -
23.Mr. Chan has drawn my attention to the interpretation of that provision in the case of Sterman V. EW & WJ Moore [1970] 1 Q.B. 596 by Lord Denning M. R. where he said at page 603 C – E as follows :-
24.In my judgment, the nature of the claim and the relief or remedy required are adequately set out in a fair number of the paragraphs in the Indorsement as against the 1st Defendant. 25.Take for example, paragraph (1) of the claims against the 1st Defendant. It is quite obvious that that is a claim under the tort of conspiracy. Although the Plaintiff has not said specifically that he is claiming damages for this item, the very last sentence at the end of the Indorsement reads as follows : -
This sentence is wide enough to indicate that his first claim against the 1st Defendant is for damages for conspiracy. 26.Take another example, paragraphs (7) and (8) of the claims against the 1st Defendant, the Plaintiff would most probably be basing his claims on contract. 27.In this regard, it is first of all to be borne in mind that the Indorsement was signed by the Plaintiff as a litigant in person. The Court would normally grant a greater allowance to litigants in person in the conduct of their cases. The Court would certainly not wish to take technical points against them. In any event, the 1st Defendant does not or cannot say that she really has no idea what the Plaintiff’s claims are about. 28.The Plaintiff himself takes the point that under RHC Order 20 rule 1 he is permitted to amend the Writ of Summons before service without leave. He says that any defect there may have been in the Indorsement could have been corrected by him by amendment of the same before service. That is a valid point. 29.Basically, in my judgment, the Defendants have acted prematurely. What they should have done was to wait for the full Statement of Claim to be served. They could and should have served a notice under RHC Order 12 rule 8A which provides as follows : -
If they had issued such a notice giving, say, 15 days to the Plaintiff to serve the Writ of Summons on them, the machinery would have been set in motion whereby the Plaintiff would have become obliged to serve his full Statement of Claim within 28 days from the date of service of the Writ of Summons. The Defendants would then be able to see how the Plaintiff would formulate his various causes of action and base any strike-out application thereon. 30.A period of about 3½ months had elapsed between the date of the faxes, i.e., 12th June 2006, and the date of the Summons to strike-out, i.e., 28th September 2006. The matter would most probably have been resolved more satisfactorily one way or the other within that period. 31.The Plaintiff plainly admits, and I agree, that some of the claims are not satisfactorily drafted. Even taking into account the claims which are not satisfactorily drafted, I certainly do not take the view that it is plain and obvious that the Plaintiff’s claims against the 1st Defendant are totally bad and are bound to fail. Furthermore, the same are not so bad as to be incapable of being cured by an amendment. Moreover, Mr. Chan in the course of his submission has also accepted that not all the Plaintiff’s claims as set out in the Indorsement should be struck out. 32.Mr. Chan has relied on the case of Marchioness of Huntly V. Gaskell [1905] 2 Ch 656 for the proposition that, if some of the claims in an indorsement of claim are bad, then the entire action should be dismissed. In my judgment, that case is distinguishable from the present case. In that case, it is plain that the issue of the writ and the registration of the lis pendens were for the purpose of trying to stop an impending sale of a property in an estate by personal representatives. It is also obvious in that case that the plaintiffs could be defeated on a jurisdictional ground. 33.Having examined the claims against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, I take the view that the same considerations apply to them as to the 1st Defendant. 34.As regards the 4th Defendant, although on analysis it seems that the Plaintiff should not be claiming any relief against that company, yet if he is claiming relief against the personal Defendants on the basis of a derivative action, the 4th Defendant should properly be made a defendant in the action. 35.The same considerations apply to the 5th Defendant company. There is just one complication about the 5th Defendant in that although the Plaintiff is a shareholder of the 4th Defendant, he is not a shareholder of the 5th Defendant. He claims an interest in the 5th Defendant only by reason of the fact that the 5th Defendant is 50% owned by the 4th Defendant and that he is a shareholder of the 4th Defendant. It is what is known as a “double derivative action” situation. 36.Mr. Chan has referred me to the decision in the case of Waddington Ltd. V. Chan Chun Hoo [2006] HKLRD 896 where the Court of Appeal in Hong Kong adopted the “double derivative” approach. The Court of Final Appeal has granted leave to the appellant, Chan Chun Hoo, on 4th June 2007, to appeal on the “reflective loss” and “multiple derivative action” issues (FAMV No. 16 of 2007). The validity of the Plaintiff’s joining of the 5th Defendant as a party in the action is therefore, at least, arguable. Conclusion 37.In my judgment, in all the circumstances, although some of the claims of the Plaintiff are not clearly drafted, taking a broad-brush approach (as suggested by Mr. Chan), I am not satisfied that the 1st to 5th Defendants have discharged the burden of showing that the Plaintiff’s claims against the 1st to 5th Defendants are incurably bad and are bound to fail so that it is plain and obvious that the Writ of Summons should be struck out on any of the grounds under RHC Order 18 rule 19(1). 38.I therefore allow the appeal against Master Kwan’s Order in part, taking into account the abandonment of the appeal by the Plaintiff against the 6th and 7th Defendants. 39.The Plaintiff seeks an extension of the validity of the Writ of Summons under RHC Order 6 rule 8(2) on the ground that after Master Kwan’s Order he could not really proceed with the action and the service of the Writ of Summons. 40.I am prepared to extend the validity of the Writ of Summons up to and including 3rd July 2007. 41.If the Plaintiff is serous about the action, he will no doubt serve the Writ of Summons as soon as possible. This will also oblige him to serve his Statement of Claim in accordance with the time-table laid down by the relevant provisions of the Rules of the High Court. The Defendants can then decide whether to take out another strike-out application. 42.As regards the question of costs, since the Plaintiff has succeeded in part of his appeal and abandoned another part of it, I am of the preliminary view that it is fair to order that the costs of and incidental to the Plaintiff’s strike-out application, including the proceedings before Master Kwan and this appeal, be costs in the cause. I make an order nisi to that effect. Order 43.I make the following Order : -
Plaintiff, in person, present. Mr. Pat Lun Chan, instructed by Messrs. Horvath & Giles , for the Defendants. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCA 1255/2006