Wide Project Construction (HK) Ltd v. The Incorporated Owners of Yen Dack Building
Read the full judgment text of CACV 136/2006 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 29 June 2007.
1. Yen Dack Building (“the Building”) in North Point was built in 1966. It is a multi-storey reinforced concrete building.
Cited by 3 cases · Cites 1 case
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CACV 136/2006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 136 OF 2006 (ON APPEAL FROM HCA NO. 3759 OF 2002) ___________________________________ BETWEEN
___________________________________ Before : Hon Tang VP, Cheung JA and A Cheung J in Court Date of Hearing : 29 June 2007 Date of Judgment : 29 June 2007 Date of Reasons for Judgment : 6 July 2007 ___________________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ___________________________________ Hon Tang VP (giving the reasons for judgment of the Court): 1.Yen Dack Building (“the Building”) in North Point was built in 1966. It is a multi-storey reinforced concrete building. 2.By the building order dated 13 September 2001 (“the Building Order”), the defendant was required to carry out the following work to the Building:
3.As a result of the Building Order, on 23 December 2001 the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a formal contract (“the Contract”) regarding certain renovation and maintenance work at the Building. 4.One Sunfield Engineering Consultants Limited (“Sunfield”) was the contract administrator. 5.Under the Contract, the plaintiff was employed to carry out the following work:
6.Under the Contract, the plaintiff was entitled to be paid following the issue of Interim Certificates. Two such Certificates, the 5th and 6th for HK$482,278.00 and HK$69,921.30 respectively were unpaid. By letter dated 10 April 2003, the defendant purported to terminate the Contract with immediate effect. As a result, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, for payment under the two Interim Certificates. 7.At trial both parties called two factual witnesses and three experts:
8.In para. 19 of the judgment, the judge identified the defendant’s principal complaints as follows:
9.Of these complaints, the Concrete Repair Works were the most complicated and took up most of the time at trial. 10.Essentially, they concerned 3,060 locations. According to the learned judge:
11.The Blue Locations were identified by the defendant’s expert Mr Tseng (and his staff) by what was called the hammer tapping test. The surface of the internal walls was tapped with a plastic head hammer, and if a hollow sound was detected it would be marked with a blue circle. 12.The Concrete Repair Works would be necessary if the hollow sound was caused by corrosion of the reinforced steel bars in the concrete leading to spalling of the concrete. 13.However, the defendant’s expert did not carry out any inspection or test until March 2004. By which time, the scaffoldings had been removed and the defendant was only able to conduct tests to the interior common areas of the Building. As the learned judge said:
14.The parties accepted that when concrete spalling existed at a location, a hollow sound could be detected by the hammer tapping test. However, that was not the only cause of the hollow sound. 15.Mr Ho, the expert called for the plaintiff, said at para. 3.2 of his report dated March 2005:
16.Further:
17.However, according to Mr Tseng, only 20% of the work at the internal common areas had been properly executed. 18.That was rejected by the learned judge because:
19.For the external walls of the Building, Mr Tseng relied on the infra-red test conducted at exterior walls of the Building and concluded that there were possible defects. It is unnecessary to deal with this aspect of Mr Tseng’s evidence which as the judge said, was “plagued with difficulties” and:
20.The learned judge concluded:
21.The defendant’s case on the Blue Locations depended on the hollow sound being the result of concrete spalling and also that such hollow sound could have been detected in 2002, about two years before Mr Tseng conducted the hammer tapping test. 22.So, not surprisingly the learned judge rejected Mr Tseng’s evidence on both counts. 23.On appeal, Mr Dawes, appearing for the defendant, did not rely on Mr Tseng’s evidence, but he sought to rely on Mr Bell’s evidence to show that the probabilities were that most of the hollowness in the Blue Locations were caused by concrete spalling. 24.He relied in particular on para. 2.2 on Mr Bell’s report:
25.Mr Dawes made the point that in relation to the 56 locations which Mr Bell checked by opening up, the result was that 46 of them was caused by concrete spalling. Since the 56 locations were according to Mr Bell “reasonably representative of the concrete in these public areas”, he asked us to infer that the hollow sound at most of the 2,044 Blue Locations was also caused by concrete spalling. 26.However, Mr Bell’s evidence was not presented to the court nor relied on as evidence from which one could infer that the bulk of the Blue Locations also suffered from concrete spalling . 27.First, as Mr Dawes accepted, Mr Bell did not say so in his report. 28.Secondly, Mr Bell’s evidence was not relied on by counsel appearing for the defendant at trial as evidence from which such an inference could be drawn. Nor did Mr Tseng rely on Mr Bell’s evidence in support of his own opinion that only 20% of the work had been properly done. 29.We did not see how we could conclude on the basis of Mr Bell’s evidence that any percentage of the Blue Locations suffered from concrete spalling which were detectable in 2002. 30.Moreover, the learned judge had concluded in his judgment that in any event he was not satisfied on the evidence of Mr Bell that even if there had been concrete spalling, it could have been detectable in 2002. 31.The judge gave reasons why he did not accept the evidence of Mr Bell. He preferred the evidence of Mr Ho, the expert called on behalf of the plaintiff. Having read their respective reports and evidence, we were not surprised. 32.Mr Dawes has referred us to what Lord Hoffman said in Biogen Inc. v Medeva PLC [1997] RPC 1 HL at 45:
33.We were also reminded of what Bokhary PJ said in Ting Kwok-keung v Tam Dick-yuen and Ors [2002] 5 HKCFAR 336 at 350 E-F:
34.We could see no basis upon which we could interfere with the learned judge’s conclusion. 72 Locations 35.Nor were we satisfied that the judge was wrong so far as the 72 Locations are concerned. The Red Locations 36.The judge preferred the evidence of Mr Chan on behalf of the plaintiff. The learned judge said:
Painting of External Walls 37.Mr Dawes’ criticism was directed at para. 95 of the judgment:
38.Mr Dawes’ complaint was that the judge should not have rejected the evidence of Mr Tseng on this aspect of the matter simply because he had found him to be unreliable in other aspects. 39.Mr Tseng was an expert witness. His evidence had been found by the learned judge to be unreliable. Mr Dawes did not challenge those findings. 40.Having regard to the judge’s assessment of Mr Tseng’s reliability, we believe that the judge could not be faulted for having dealt with the evidence so briefly in relation to the painting of the external walls. Waterproofing works 41.The learned judge had also rejected Mr Tseng’s evidence on the waterproofing works on the roof and the roof plant room top. We would only refer to the learned judge’s conclusion on the waterproof of the roof. He said:
Conclusion 42.To conclude, the defendant sought to challenge findings of primary facts by the learned judge. We are satisfied that the learned judge had dealt with each of the issues raised carefully and correctly, and there was no basis upon which we could possibly interfere. 43.For these reasons, we dismissed the appeal with costs.
Mr Victor Dawes, instructed by Messrs Peter Lau & Co., for the Defendant. Mr Kenny C P Lin & Mr Louie Chan, instructed by Messrs Li & Partners, for the Plaintiff. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment