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HCSA 15/2010
香港特別行政區
高等法院原訟法庭
民事司法管轄權
高院小額錢債審裁處上訴案件2010年第15號
（原小額錢債審裁處申索2008年第26693號）
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| 申索人 |
朱沛明
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對 |
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| 第一被告人 |
SUNG WAI KIU 宋衞僑 |
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| 第二被告人 |
LI PUI WAN 李佩雲 |
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主審法官：高等法院原訟法庭法官鍾安德內庭聆訊
聆訊日期：2010年6月10日
判決書日期：2010年6月15日
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判決書
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1.申請人不服小額錢債審裁處 (“審裁處”)在2010年4月13日作出的裁斷，倚仗香港法例第338章《小額錢債審裁處條例》第28條，以該裁斷在法律論點上有錯為由，提出本申請，要求原訟法庭批予許可以提出上訴。
2.申請人乃審裁處申索編號26693/2008的兩被告人。
3.申請人及申索人均為荃灣麗城花園的業主。申索人的住宅單位，位處申請人的住宅單位的下一層。
4.申索人的申索書指，申請人的住宅單位內的廁所的去水喉滲漏，令申索人的住宅單位受損。申請人否認申索人的指稱，並指申索人未能提出充分證據，確立其申索。
5.審裁處經審訊後，裁定申請人敗訴，並命令申請人支付共約$32,000。
6.本申請的申請書所載的上訴理由，可歸納為：-
(a) 申索人在審裁時呈交的專家報告，並非由出庭作供的專家證人親自撰寫；
(b) 故此，審裁處信納的，僅屬傳聞證供。審裁處應要求申索人呈交重新撰寫的專家報告；
(c) 無論如何，該專家報告的結論，衹屬猜測，並不能確定斷定滲漏的真正源頭；
(d) 索償項目未經專家核實。該等項目的索償數額，與市價相距極遠；
(e) 作供的專家證人未能答覆申請人簡單的提問，審裁處不應信納他的證供；
(f) 審裁處沒有考慮申請人指，他的廁所的去水喉的“隔氣”（或稱去水螺栓體），位處於申索人的住宅單位內的天花。申索人曾私自更換該“隔氣”，這可能是導致滲漏的原因。
7.本申請所涉的申索，在2009年12月6日及18日進行審訊。原判決在2009年12月18日宣布。該申索在2010年4月13日進行覆核。
8.審裁處依第338章第18條以書面記錄的裁斷，長達21頁。申請人在前第6(a)至6(f)段簡述的論據：-
(1) 性質屬針對審裁處就證供可信性及/或如何評定及/或衡量涉案事實的裁斷的論據；
(2) 已在審裁處的書面裁斷中逐一處理。
9.在行使普通法的各地法院的上級法庭在多宗案例中說，要成功地令上級法庭對原審法庭這種性質的裁斷作出干預，上訴人(或申請人) 需顯示：
(a) 原審法庭在法律論點上，作出錯誤指示；或
(b) 原審法庭的裁斷，完全沒有相關的證據基礎支持；或
(c) 原審法庭的裁斷，完全違背已呈交的證據所顯示的結論。
10.英國上議院在Edwards v. Bairston [1956] AC 14一案中說：-
“When the case comes before the court it is its duty to examine the determination having regard to its knowledge of the relevant law. If the case contains anything ex facie which is bad law and which bears upon the determination, it is, obviously, erroneous in point of law. But, without any such misconception appearing ex facie, it may be that the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the determination under appeal. In those circumstances, too, the court must intervene. … there, too, there has been error in point of law. I do not think that it much matters whether this state of affairs is described as one in which there is no evidence to support the determination or as one in which the evidence is inconsistent with and contradictory of the determination, or as one in which the true and only reasonable conclusion contradicts the determination. Rightly understood, each, phrase propounds the same test. For my part, I prefer the last of the three, … ” (上文獲強調之處，由本席後加) (第36頁)。
11.英國上議院其後在Griffiths v. J P Harrison (Waterford) Ltd. [1963] AC 1一案中亦說：-
“Harrisons appealed to the High Court seeking to get the decision of the commissioners reversed. Now the powers of the High Court on an appeal are very limited. The judge cannot reverse the commissioners on their findings of fact. He can only reverse their decision if it is “erroneous in point of law.” Now here the primary facts were all found by the commissioners. They were stated in the case. They cannot be disputed. What is disputed is their conclusion from them. And it is now settled, as well as anything can be, that their conclusion cannot be challenged unless it was unreasonable, …. It is not sufficient that the judge would himself have come to a different conclusion. Reasonable people on the same facts may reasonably come to different conclusions, and often do. Juries do. So do judges. And are they not all reasonable men? But there comes a point when a judge can say that no reasonable man could reasonably come to that conclusion. Then, but not till then, he is entitled to interfere. ….” (上文獲強調之處，由本席後加)。
12.故此，要成功地作出這一類推翻原審裁斷的申請，申請人要顯示的是：-
“ … when the question is asked whether the evidence upon which the commissioner could arrive at their findings, I take it that this means whether (to adapt the words … in Edwards v Bairston) the contrary conclusion is the true and only reasonable one.” (上文獲強調之處，由本席後加) (英國上議院在Griffiths一案中第10至11頁的用詞)。
13.此外，香港終審法院在Ting Kwok Keung v. Tam Dick Yuen & Others (2002) 5 HKCFAR 336 的判案書中，引用英國上議院上訴委員會在Biogen Inc. v. Medava Plc [1997] PRC 1, 45的判詞中，就上級法庭應如何看待原審法庭的判詞所作的論述：-
“The need for appellate caution in reversing the trial judge’s evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance … of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judge’s overall evaluation”。
14.香港終審法院在Ting Kwok Keung的判案書中亦說：-
“Where the judgment turns on an issue of fact, the Court of Appeal must have regard to the nature of that issue of fact. And it must have regard to the advantages enjoyed by a trial judge who received the evidence on such an issue at first-hand, in other words, in whose presence the whole of the evidence unfolded in its living state. Such advantages can be, as Lord Shaw of Dunfermline put it in Clarke v Edinburgh Tramways [1919] SC (HL) 35 at p 36, ‘sometimes broad and sometimes subtle’. The question for the Court of Appeal is whether, even though it does not enjoy the advantages enjoyed by the trial judge who received the evidence at first-hand, it is nevertheless satisfied that his conclusion on the facts is plainly wrong. The Court of Appeal should intervene if so satisfied. But if not so satisfied, the Court of Appeal should defer to the trial judge’s conclusion even if in some doubt as to its correctness” (第42段)。
亦參看Wide Project Construction (HK) Ltd. v. The I.D. of Yen Dack Building, CACV 136/2006 (2007年7月6日)，第32及33段; Tam Shair Leung v. Tam Cheung Shiu, CACV 215/2004 (2005年4月20日)，第35段。
15.審裁處在作出不利申請人的裁斷時，已充分考慮與訟雙方所提的證據及論據。因此，該等裁斷全屬審裁處基於已呈堂證據而可作出不利申請人的裁斷的範疇，並不涉及法律論點。
16.基於上述各點，本席無需在此就前第6(a)至6(f)段；再一一作出論述。
17.但為方便理解，本席會就其中幾點，扼要地覆述審裁處書面裁斷中的相關部分。
18.就前第6(a)至6(b)段，出庭作供的專家證人：-
(1) 為執業建築師，具專家證人資格；
(2) 是發出專家報告的公司的董事；
(3) 曾與撰寫專家報告的黃女士及其他職員，同到現場進行勘察及測試，而且報告內的照片，是由該證人拍攝。
19.就前第6(c)段，審裁處信納專家證人指，專家報告的結論，是經考慮及排除各種其他可能性後達致。
20.因此，本席判定：-
(a) 並無香港終審法院在Ting Kwok Keung的判案書中指，原審法庭在裁斷涉案事實時明顯錯誤；或
(b) 並無審裁處的裁斷，在法律論點上有錯，
的情況。
21.本席故此駁回本申請。
第一被告人：無律師代表，自行應訊
第二被告人：無律師代表，由第一被告人代表應訊
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