Ma Po Chim, Percy and Others v. Lee Tung Hai, Leo and Others
Read the full judgment text of CACV 160/2007 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 10 July 2007.
1. CACV 160 of 2007 is the 3 rd respondent’s appeal from the order of Reyes J of 4 April 2007.
Cites 1 case
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CACV 160/2007 & CACV 161/2007 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 160 AND 161 OF 2007 (ON APPEAL FROM HCMP NO. 3253 OF 2004) ____________
BETWEEN
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Before: Hon Tang VP in Chambers Date of Hearing: 10 July 2007 Date of Decision : 10 July 2007 _______________ D E C I S I O N _______________ 1.CACV 160 of 2007 is the 3rd respondent’s appeal from the order of Reyes J of 4 April 2007. 2.CACV 161 of 2007 is the 3rd respondent’s appeal against Kwan J’s order of 24 May 2006. 3.Leave to appeal out of time was given in both appeals by Le Pichon JA on 4 June 2007. 4.Under Reyes J’s order of 4 April 2007, the 3rd respondent was required to make full payment, within 21 days of the order, of Horwath Corporate Advisory Services Limited’s costs (“Horwath”) as taxed and allowed by the court pursuant to 4 allocaturs all dated 22 February 2007. The amount of the 4 allocaturs is HK$4,108,096.30. The 3rd respondent was also ordered to pay into court a further sum of $1 million on account of and security for Horwath’s costs. 5.There was also liberty to levy execution against the 3rd respondent’s assets in respect of such costs. 6.The 3rd respondent’s application for a stay pending appeal was dismissed by Chung J on 13 June 2007. His reasons were handed down on 20 June 2007. 7.On 15 June 2007 the 3rd respondent applied to this court for a stay pending appeal and Le Pichon JA ordered an interim stay pending the hearing of this application before me. 8.This is not an appeal from Chung J, however, I find his reasons for refusing a stay helpful. As Chung J has explained in his reasons, the sole basis of this application is that these appeals are almost bound to succeed. 9.A little background may be helpful. 10.This was a section 168A petition brought by 10 members of the 3rd respondent in a dispute over the conduct of the affairs of the Association. 11.Initially, there were 3 respondents. The 1st respondent was the chairman of the 3rd respondent, and the 2nd respondent the company secretary, the 3rd respondent was the Association. 12.On 7 November 2005, at the trial of the petition, the petitioners and the 1st and 2nd respondents compromised their dispute and as a result, a consent order was made by Kwan J. 13.The consent order provided as follows:
14.However, on 7 February 2006, 3 other members of the 3rd respondent applied by summons for leave to have themselves joined as the 4th, 5th and 6th respondents to the petition, and they also applied for:
15.As a result of that application, by order made on 17 February 2006, the 4th, 5th and 6th respondents were added as parties to the petition. And Horwath was appointed to carry out the functions of the Preparatory Working Committee under para. 3 of the order of 7 November 2005. 16.In Kwan J’s decision of 17 February 2006, she gave as one of the reasons for the appointment of Horwath that:
17.She also said:
18.On 28 April 2006, Horwath applied by summons which was supported by an affirmation of Mr Jackson Ip filed on 28 April 2006. In para. 12 he said:
19.That was then followed by several pages dealing with the various difficulties that Horwath had encountered. 20.In the 2nd affirmation of Mr Jackson Ip filed on 18 May 2006, he stated that his professional fees and expenses up to 30 April 2006 was HK$1,616,068 which was made up of:
21.On 24 May 2006, Kwan J made the order which is the subject of the 3rd respondent’s appeal in CACV 161 of 2007. 22.Para. 10 of that order is relevant:
23.This is the subject of several objections. First, that this ignored the capping of fees under the engagement letter, in relation to the 3 general tasks identified in para. (3) of the consent order of 7 November 2005 (“the 3 general tasks”). Secondly, that the costs should have been taxed on a common fund basis instead of on a trustee basis. Thirdly, that the order was made without giving the 3rd respondent an opportunity to be heard. 24.This morning, Mr Kenneth Chan, who appears on behalf of the 3rd respondent, raised a new argument namely that Horwath’s right to remuneration was contractual and as such they should sue for their fees in contract. It is said that the contract was made at the latest on 27 March 2006 when HK$200,000 was paid by the 3rd respondent. It is submitted that that being the case, the court should not have made the order for taxation at all. However, Mr Chan said that he would not go so far as to say that Kwan J had no jurisdiction to make the made order. Mr Chan said that the 3rd respondent is entitled to amend the Notice of Appeal by raising this point. 25.I will proceed on the basis that this point is available to the 3rd respondent. I am also prepared to proceed on the basis that this point may succeed on appeal. 26.The order of Reyes J, the subject matter of CACV 160 of 2007 was made as a result of the application of Horwath made on 22 March 2007 which was supported by the 5th affirmation of Mr Jackson Ip dated 22 March 2007. Basically, Mr Jackson Ip’s complaint was that notwithstanding the allocaturs, no payment had been received apart from the interim payments in the sum of HK$500,000 which had been previously made. 27.Reyes J also ordered that the costs of that application be taxed on a trustee basis. The same objections were taken to Reyes J’s order. 28.Mr Kenneth Chan accepted that a mere arguable appeal is insufficient for his purpose. He submitted, however, that the 3rd respondent could demonstrate that the appeal was almost bound to succeed, and that would be the basis for a stay. 29.He accepted and I would add that even so, it remains a matter of discretion whether a stay of execution should be granted. 30.In my opinion, the court should be slow to encourage applications for a stay of execution based on the submission that the appeal is in the opinion of the appellant almost bound to succeed. The time and costs involved in such an exercise would be a wasteful use of resources. Since ex hypothesi, refusal of a stay would not result in any prejudice to the appellant, I see little advantage in encouraging such applications. 31.In this case, there is no suggestion that the 3rd respondent is unable to pay or that payment would cause the 3rd respondent any hardship. Nor is there any suggestion that when paid, there is any risk that Horwath would not be in a position to repay. 32.In such circumstances, in the exercise of my discretion, I would not grant a stay unless it is absolutely clear that the appeal is bound to succeed. 33.Here, a firm of public accountants have been appointed by the court because of serious differences between warring factions in order to resolve a deadlock. The court must be careful to ensure that the deep seated animosity within the Association should not spread to and embroil the public accountant. For that purpose the court must take a common sense view of the matter. 34.Chung J has dealt fully with each of the submissions relied on by the applicant, with the exception of the new argument which was raised before me. I agree with Chung J and do not propose to repeat those reasons. 35.Sufficient it is for me to say, that I am far from satisfied that the appeals are bound to succeed. 36.Mr Scott SC, who appeared for Horwath, has, in his well-prepared skeleton submissions, pointed out that the difference between a common fund taxation and a trustee taxation is likely to be small. Nor am I satisfied that it was not within the learned judge’s discretion to order costs on a trustee basis. 37.Looking at section 168A of the Companies Ordinance, the court has wide power under that section to make such orders as it sees fit. Mr Chan made no submissions on the ambit of Kwan J’s power under section 168A and whether that would have entitled her to make the order which she did. 38.As for capping the fees at HK$400,000, I believe, it is arguable that it was not binding or that it had been overtaken by Kwan J’s order. And more importantly, I am not satisfied that it is an argument on which the 3rd respondent is bound to succeed, either standing on its own or when taken together with other submissions. 39.As for the argument that the 3rd respondent had no opportunity to be heard, I wish only to add to what Chung J has already said that as a result of the appointment of Horwath, it was possible for a proper meeting of the 3rd respondent to be held and officers elected. The appointment was obviously in the interest of and for the benefit for the 3rd respondent. I think such an order would have been made, with or without the benefit of hearing the 3rd respondent, with costs to be borne initially by the 3rd respondent. The 3rd respondent may have a claim for an indemnity against other persons in respect of such costs. That is not a matter that I need to address today. 40.As for the new argument, as I have said I am prepared to proceed on the basis that the argument is open to the 3rd respondent, and that it is an argument which may succeed. But I am not satisfied that it is an argument which is almost bound to succeed. Far from it, in fact, but in any event, as I have said, in my discretion, I would not grant a stay on this basis in the circumstances of this case. 41.As I have said, It is a matter of discretion. I would exercise my discretion against a stay in the circumstances of this case. 42.Therefore I would dismiss this application.
Mr Kenneth C.L. Chan and Mr Dickson T.S. Fong, instructed by Messrs Peter Mo & Co., for the 3rd respondent. Mr John Scott, SC, and Mr Douglas Lam, instructed by Messrs Kennedys for Horwath Corporate Advisory Services Limited. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CACV 160/2007