Attorney General v. Marples International Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 803/1987 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. This is a case stated by Michael Jennings, Esq., at the request of the Attorney General, the appellant.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG (Appellate Jurisdiction) MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 803 OF 1987 ______________ BETWEEN
______________ Coram : Hon. Bewley, J. in Court Date of hearing : 24th November 1987 Date of delivery of judgment: 16th December, 1987 ______________ JUDGMENT ______________ 1. This is a case stated by Michael Jennings, Esq., at the request of the Attorney General, the appellant. 2. The facts were that:-
3. The respondents were convicted under Regulation 38P(1)(a) of the Construction Sites (Safety) Regulations, made under the Factories and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance, Cap. 59, which provides:-
4. On review, counsel for the appellant contended that, because the ultimate destination of the rocks from the Borrow Area was the reclamation work at Kellett Bay, the Borrow Area itself was a construction site. 5. The latter is defined by regulation 2 of the above regulations as "a place where construction work is undertaken and also any area in the immediate vicinity of any such place which is used for the storage of materials or plant used or intended to be used for the purpose of the construction work". 6. "Construction work" is defined in section 2(1) of the Ordinance as:
7. “Reclamation” is one of the works specified in the Third Schedule. 8. The magistrate rejected Counsel's contention, being of the opinion that the concluding words of section 2(1)(b) 'including laying of foundations and excavation of earth and rock prior to laying of foundations' make it clear that the preparatory work intended to be covered by the definition of "construction work" is work on the site where the reclamation is to take place and not the Borrow Area, which is not contiguous or adjacent to such place. 9. The questions of law posed by the magistrate for this court are:
10. Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Bruce, points out that the same contractor is involved and that all the rock fill from the Borrow Area had the same destination and purpose. He submits, therefore, that the two areas, although physically separate, are so wholly and intimately bound up together that the Borrow Area may properly be said to be a construction site. 11. Mr. Pennicott, for the respondent, concedes that the words "including the laying of foundation and the excavation or earth and rock prior to the laying of foundation" are not words of limitation and are only examples of what goes on during construction work but argues that, if that is the law, it could lead to absurdity where the Borrow Area was dual purpose, in the sense that when it supplied fill for reclamation it would be deemed to be a construction site and therefore must be fenced, but when it supplied rocks for crushing for some other purpose it would be in law a quarry, to which different regulations apply. 12. Mr. Bruce says that, in those circumstances, it could not be regarded as a construction site, because the rock would not be used wholly for purposes within the 3rd Schedule. He limits his argument to sites so closely bound up with reclamation as this one. 13. The objection to that argument is that subsection (6) uses the words "any work". In Mr. Pennicott’s hypothesis excavating the rock to be used for reclamation would amount to "any work". The Borrow Area would thus be a construction site. However, when it was excavating rock for the crusher, it would be a quarry. 14. I think, therefore, that the legislation does not contemplate work in a different location as being part of the same construction site. Had that been intended, it would have been easy for the draftsman to have said so. 15. For these reasons I would answer the questions in the affirmative and dismiss the appeal.
Mr. A.A. Bruce, Senior Crown Counsel and Mr. Stephen Wong, Crown Counsel for Crown Appellant Mr. Ian Pennicott, inst I d by M/S McKenna & Co., for Respondent |
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