Kimmy Suen King on v. Attorney General
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 1986, No. 100 BETWEEN
________________ Coram: Huggins, V.-P., Si1ke & Clough, JJ.A. Date of Hearing: 15th October 1986 Date of Judgment: 28th January 1987 ________________ JUDGMENT ________________ Silke, J.A.: 1. On the 4th June 1981, Mr. Kimmy Suen King On - the Plaintiff - was in a night club with some business friends. In the course of the evening, there was an altercation at a nearby table and the Plaintiff intervened to pacify the participants. Nothing more eventuated until some considerable time later when, with others, he left the nightclub. As he left, he saw lying on the pavement a man covered in blood. This man - Police Constable Poon Chun Wah - was one of those who had participated in the earlier altercation. The Plaintiff was approached by another person present outside the restaurant and an accusation of having organised the attack upon the wounded man was levelled at him. The Plaintiff denied this but at that point another person, who had also been one of the participants in the altercation, came upon the scene, informed the Plaintiff that he was a policeman and directed the Plaintiff to remain where he was. 2. That man had identified himself properly for he was one Chan Chi Fai, a serving police constable. Other members of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force then arrived at the scene and the Plaintiff was taken to Wanchai Police Station. 3. At about 5:25 a.m. on the morning of the 4th, the Plaintiff was interviewed by Constable Chan, was formally arrested by him and was cautioned in respect of his involvement in a wounding offence. The Plaintiff was detained and was later charged with a series of other offences, including c1aiming to be an office bearer of a triad society; the wounding offence; another wounding under s.19 and two offences of assaulting a police officer. He was detained in police custody and on the 5th of June, having been taken before a Magistrates Court, was granted bail. As a condition of that bai1, the Plaintiff was required to surrender his travel documents and to make a report twice per week to the Wanchai Police Station. 4. On the 12th June, the Plaintiff again appeared in the Magistrates Court and his bail was extended. On the 19th June, on his final appearance in the Magistrates Court, the Crown offered no evidence in respect of all of the offences other than the two wounding offences. On the 8th July, the matter having been transferred to the Victoria District Court, the Plaintiff pleaded not guilty to those charges and was remanded upon bail for trial. 5. While awaiting trial, and at some time in late August or early September, Constable Chan contacted the brother of the Plaintiff indicating that the criminal charges in respect of the Plaintiff were "negotiable". In November, Constable Chan indicated that he required $54,000 to influence the evidence he would give at trial. 6. On the 6th November, the Plaintiff and his brother made a report to the Independent Commission Against Corruption. On the 10th November, acting under the instructions of members of the Commission, the Plaintiff and his brother met with Constable Chan. Present then were Poon Chun Wah and two others. The Plaintiff handed over $15,000, which had been provided to him by the Commission, to one of the others. Constable Chan and his companions were arrested. On the 16th November, the Attorney General entered a nolle prosequi in respect of the remaining charges then outstanding against the Plaintiff. In the following year, Chan Chi Fai and Poon Chun Wah were convicted of offences relating to the perversion of justice. 7. The Plaintiff issued his writ on the 9th May 1984 and he pleaded that Constable Chan, purporting to act in the course of his duty
The gravamen of the Plaintiff's complaint is that he was falsely imprisoned for a period of 32 hours on the 4th to the 5th of June 1981. In his Defence, filed in 1985, the Attorney General admitted that Chan Chi Fai was a police officer and admitted that he “wrongfully, maliciously and without reasonable cause arrested” the Plaintiff. The period of detention was also admitted as was the subsequent history of the matter and the convictions of Chan Chi Fai and Poon Chun Wah. 8. The Attorney General relied on a lack of any authority in Constable Chan to make an unlawful arrest, the malice as pleaded taking the servant outside the scope of his employment so that vicarious liability was negatived. 9. In a careful and detailed judgment, His Honour Judge Evans, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, upheld the Attorney General's contentions and dismissed the claim. He accepted that there was no doubt that Constable Chan had grievously wronged the Plaintiff and he accepted that Constable Chan was a Crown servant, a finding which is not challenged. He relied on that which he described as "the well known passage” in Salmond on Torts at page 437 as to the liability of a master for the acts of his servant. That passage succinctly states the law that a master id not responsible for a wrongful act done by his servant unless it is in the course of his employment. It is deemed to be in the course of his employment if it is either a wrongful act authorised by the master or a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master, a master being responsible not merely for what he authorises his servant to do but also for the way in which that servant does it. The passage continues:
10. When considering the actions of a member of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force references to that which I might term “police cases” in other jurisdictions may well be of little use. The method by which they are given authority differs considerably. In Hong Kong such a person is a Crown servant and his authority derives from the Crown. Section 4(3) of the Crown Proceedings Ordinance, Cap.300 makes clear the liability of the Crown in respect of tortious acts committed by its servants. 11. The issue here is whether the malice pleaded, and gratefully accepted by the Attorney General, is sufficient to take what was undoubtedly an authorised act done by-a Crown servant outside the ambit of the course of the employment of that Crown servant. 12. In the Court below, reliance was placed upon Kooragang Investment Pty. Limited v. Richardson & Wrench[1]. I prefer to consider the matter as reported in [1982] A.C. 462. There a valuer, who was the defendants’ servant, carried out valuations on the defendants' behalf for a client group of companies. The valuations were made with the defendants' knowledge and authority. Then the companies failed to pay for the valuations and the defendants instructed their servant not to carry out any more work for that client group. Later the valuer became a director of one of the client group's member companies and thereafter, and without the knowledge or authority of the defendants, carried out about thirty valuations for it. In preparing those valuations, the servant used the premises of the group, the note paper of the defendants and signed the valuations in the corporate name of the defendants. No fee was paid to the defendants. Two of the valuations were passed on to the plaintiffs investment company. They were negligently made and the plaintiffs suffered financial loss. The plaintiffs sought to recover against the defendants as being vicariously liable for the actions of their servant valuer. In the Supreme Court of New South Wales the action was dismissed. The matter came before the Judicial Committee and the plaintiffs' appeal was dismissed. It was held that an employer's actual authority to his servant to do particular act could not be inferred merely from the fact that the act itself was of a class which the employer had authorised his servant to do. The servant valuer’s act was clearly an authorised class of act by itself. But by reason of the instructions given to him in doing the acts complained of and which resulted in financial loss to the plaintiffs against the direct instructions of the defendants he was acting outside the scope of his employment. It is in that factual light that one must view the words of Lord Wilberforce at page 473F:
13. In my judgment, the situation here is not analogous to that in Kooragang1. It is clear that Constable Chan's acts, and indeed the-trial judge so found, were acts which he was authorised and empowered to perform and were within the ambit or scope-of his employment. But the judge then went on to consider whether Constable Chan's act was "excessive" and if so, whether excess was so great as to take his act outside the vicarious liability of his employer. He thought it to be a matter of degree and said:
14. The judge concluded, borrowing as he did so the words of Lord Wilberforce in Kooragang1 where commenting on the issue before the Judicial Committee Lord Wilberforce said that:
that here the excess and abuse of power was in the same category and therefore in such a situation, the employer cannot be held answerable for the acts of his servant. 15. With respect to the trial judge, on the facts of Kooragang1 the comment by Lord Wilberforce obviously lay. On the face of the facts here, it does not. 16. The reference to "excess" stems from a passage from the judgment of Scrutton L.J. in Poland v. John Parr & Sons[2] where he said that:
17. The servant in Poland2 was a carter. He had implied authority to make reasonable efforts to protect his master's goods. He was returning home one lunch time close behind a cart on which there were bags of sugar. A boy was walking alongside that cart with his hand on one of the bags. The servant honestly and reasonably thought that the boy was pilfering or about to pilfer. He gave him a cuff on the neck which felled the boy whose leg was then injured by a wheel of the cart which passed over it. 18. The question there was of a limited authority which raised the issue of an emergency existing or being reasonably supposed to exist - an implied not direct authority. 19. It was held that in the circumstances such implied authority did exist and that the violence exerted was not so excessive as to take the carter's act outside the scope of his authority. The defendants were held liable. Bankes L.J., at page 242, had this to say:
20. I would stress that in this instant ease there is no question of anything other than direct authority. The judgment of Scrutton L.J. went on at page 243:
21. This last sentence must, with the greatest respect, be correct. For the fraudulent servant, for whose fraudulent conduct the master is liable, is clearly not "authorised" to act fraudulently. 22. Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co.[3] - a case particular to its facts but which emphasised, with one modification, the general principles laid down in Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank[4]. It made it clear that benefit to the master was unnecessary for liability, for one of the main reasons why Lloyd3 attracted the distinguished judgments that it did was to clarify the Barwick4 principle by holding that the fraud of an agent did not need to be for the benefit of the master before the master could be liable. In this modern era, Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co.3, being the seminal case in this branch of the law, one can ignore the issue-as to whether or not the act of the servant was for the benefit of his master and the dictum of Lopes L.J. in Dyer v. Munday[5] at page 747, where he said:
must be considered in the light of Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co.3 23. Warren v. Henlys, Ltd.[6] turned on whether the subsequent assault by the petrol station attendant was or was not in the course of his dealings, as an employee, with the victim. It is clear that there had been a break in that the transaction which the servant was employed to do had been completed, the car driver had left. He returned, having called the police, and told the employee that he would report him to his employer. It was at that juncture that the assault took place. It was held that that assault was one of personal vengeance on the employee's part and not done in the course of his employment. 24. Here, whatever the motive for Constable Chan's action may have been, all his acts on the 4th and 5th of June were done in furtherance of his employment. There was no break in that employment. The fraudulent servant acts for his own financial benefit and in that sense it would be from a “caprice of the employee” but nevertheless, the master is not absolved from liability given that the class of acts which he was authorised or employed to do. In my judgment so too with malice, with an illegal act and so too with an attempt at a prospective illegal gain. 25. For myself, I think the present case, by its circumstances, is taken outside the Warren v. Henlys, Ltd.6, Riddell v. Glasgow Corp.[7] and Keppel Bus Co. Ltd. v. Sa'ad bin Ahmad[8] line for in all of these there was held to be either a break in the employment or a lack of authority neither of which existed here. 26. In Riddell7 a woman brought an action for damages against the corporation as the result of a slanderous statement made by the municipal tax collector, the corporation's servant. It was held not to be within the scope of his authority, which was to collect police assessments payable and to grant receipts for such payment, to express his own opinion as to the falsity or genuineness of any prior receipt shown to him or to make any statement or comment-upon it. His sole duty, in respect of false receipts, was, on the evidence, to report to his superiors. The claim failed. 27. In Keppel Bus Co.8, where a passenger was travelling on a bus owned by the appellant bus company, there was an altercation between the bus conductor and the passenger. Other passengers intervened and separated them. The bus conductor continued to collect fares but, as he did so, abused the passenger who asked him to desist. The conductor then struck the passenger with his ticket punch. The trial judge held the bus company to be vicariously liable for the resultant, and severe, damage to the passenger. The Court of Appeal of Singapore upheld his finding. 28. The Judicial Committee allowed the appeal by the bus company holding that, although a bus conductor may have a duty to keep order amongst passengers there was no evidence of any disorder at the time of the assault. There was no evidence to justify the ascription of the conductor's act to any authority, express or implied, therefore in assaulting the passenger the conductor was not acting in the course of his employment. 29. Here, where the trial judge, in concluding his judgment, said of an officer deliberately and maliciously abusing his power by making an arrest which he knew at the time to be false and who was motivated, not by any sense of pursuit of duty, but in order to obtain revenge or money:
and consequentially that his acts are taken outside the doctrine of vicarious liability I, with respect, disagree. 30. The constable was abusing his powers but that does not in any way derogate from the fact that he had those powers - his duty was to investigate crime and arrest the perpetrators - and that he exercised them whatever his motivation may have been. I think motive to be irrelevant and the fact that the constable was doing an act which he was fully empowered and directly authorised to do, base though his motives may have been, does not absolve his employer from liability. 31. I would allow this appeal, find the defendant liable and hear counsel as to the course we should take in respect of damages. Sir Alan Huggins, V.-P.: 32. We are called upon to consider the circumstances in which a master can be held vicariously liable for a tort of false imprisonment committed by his servant. 33. The respondent Defendant is sued on behalf of the Crown as the employer of a police constable who - so it was pleaded in the Statement of Claim and admitted in the Defence - wrongfully and maliciously arrested the Plaintiff and charged him with an offence which the constable well knew the Plaintiff had not committed. Following the arrest the Plaintiff was kept in custody for two days before being released on bail. In consequence of his false imprisonment the Plaintiff is alleged to have suffered serious damage. 34. No oral evidence was adduced but it would seem that two statements made by the Plaintiff to' the police were before the judge. The judge proceeded on the basis that the facts were not in dispute and stated them as follows:
We are further asked to accept from the Plaintiff's first statement that he left the nightclub at about 3 a.m. 35. In the course of his reply before us counsel for the appellant Plaintiff made it clear for the first time that it was his case that the allegation of malice in the Statement of Claim was surplusage and that the Plaintiff contended it was irrelevant to the case although his own case had been put forward on the basis that the constable was motivated by malice and it is clear from the Judgment in the court below that it was on that basis that the case proceeded. 36. When the judge spoke of, an arrest “motivated not by any sense of pursuit of duty at all but in order to obtain revenge or money as the case may be”, he was not making a finding that the obtaining of revenge or money was the motive in the present case: he was merely giving examples of possible motives for an arrest which might be made by an arresting officer who knew at the time that the arrest was false. It was enough for his purposes that the arrest in the present case was, as appeared from the pleadings, malicious as well as unjustified in fact. 37. I accept that the allegation of malice, supported as it was by detailed allegations of subsequent events tending to show malice, was not material to the Plaintiff's claim. It was, however, vital to the defence sought to be advanced, and the Statement of Defence took advantage of the immaterial allegations in the Statement of Claim by admitting them. What was cantended on behalf of the Attorney General was that the malice of the servant resulted in his moving outside the scope of his employment, so that vicarious liability was negatived. That contention was upheld by His Honour Judge Evans, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court. The Plaintiff appeals. 38. It is common ground that a master is liable for the torts of his servant only where the servant is acting in the course of his employment. The basis of the liability is an actual or implied authority to do the act. The act may itself be wrongful or it may be a lawful act done in a wrongful manner. Where it is the manner of doing the act which is wrongful, the master will be liable unless the manner of doing it is such that the servant can no longer rightly be regarded as acting in the course of his employment. Although a master may never have authorized his servant to act negligently, if the servant does discharge his duties negligently and causes damage to a third party, the master will be liable. Even where the servant takes an opportunity created by his employment to act fraudulently, the master may be liable: Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co. 1912 A.C. 716. That was a case where the party defrauded was entitled to assume that the act done by the servant was being done in the course of his employment. 39. The judge recognized that the presence of malice did not necessarily take the act of every tort-feasor outside the scope of his employment but thought that in the circumstances of the present case it took this particular constable outside the scope of his employment. He relied upon a passage in the judgment of Hilbery, J. in Warren v Henlys Ltd. 1948 2 All E.R. 935, 938H:
However, he said that what was done must not be “from any caprice of the servant” (per Willes, J. in Bayley v Manchester, Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railway Co. (1872) L.R. 7 C.P. 415, 420) and that in the end it was “all a matter of degree” and, as such, a question of fact. He found that for the constable to arrest the Plaintiff not only without reasonable and probable cause but to satisfy his own personal malice did take the arrest outside the scope of his employment. 40. In so finding the judge might appear from the cases upon which he relied to have adopted the approach that making arrests was within the scope of the constable's employment but that in making an arrest in the circumstances of this case he was so far exceeding that authority that the employer was not liable. It was the judge's suggested application of this concept of “excess” which Mr. Litton, on behalf of the Plaintiff, stigmatized as “bizarre”. It is a concept based upon some words of Scrutton, L.J. in Poland v John Parr & Sons (supra) at p.243:
However, in the event I do not think Judge Evans did rely upon an “excess” of power in the sense in which the word was used in that case, for he said:
This was in apparent conflict with his statement that
and it seems to me that what he meant was no more than that the constable's acts were of such a nature that they could have been within the scope of his employment in some circumstances. He thought that in the circumstances of this case they were clearly not authorized and that the Attorney General should not be held vicariously liable: they constituted such an “excess and abuse of power” that the departure from the course or scope of the employment “was total”. 41. My anxiety has been to isolate the factors which are relevant to a determination of the question whether an act is, in the words of Scrutton, L.J. in Poland v John Parr & Sons (supra), “one of a class of acts which the person was authorized or employed to do”. Whether or not the constable was nominally “on duty” at the time is relevant, but it cannot be conclusive: a constable who, when lawfully checking that shops have been properly secured at night, finds one unlocked and proceeds to enter and steal from the till could hardly be said to be acting within the scope of his employment. On the other hand, a constable who in purported exercise of his duty (although without authority in fact) asks for property and, having received it, appropriates it to his own use would be within the scope of his employment: see Lloyd v Grace Smith & Sons (supra). In that case Earl Loreburn said at p.725:
It is possible to conceive of a case where a constable making an arrest was known not only by himself but also by the person arrested to be acting purely out of malice and not purportedly in the course of his duty “to take lawful measures to apprehend all persons whom it is lawful to apprehend and for whose apprehension sufficient grounds exists” (sic) s.10 of the 'Police Force Ordinance. It would be unjust that his employer should be held liable for that wrongful arrest. However, in the present case the constable clearly did purport to act as such and used the trappings of his office to execute his malicious design. He not merely said that he was a constable but he summoned the assistance of other constables who acted throughout in good faith; he arrested the Plaintiff within the confines of a police station; he formally charged him there and he had him detained in a cell in the police station. Of course the Plaintiff knew that he was not guilty of the offence charged, but he could not be certain that the constable did not honestly believe him to be guilty, so that he would on any view be acting in the execution of his duty. In those circumstances, it seems to me, the Crown as employer held the constable out as authorized to do what he did, and I too would allow t he appeal. Clough, J.A. 42. As we are differing from the carefully reasoned reserved judgment of the trial judge I consider that I should give my reasons for agreeing with the conclusion, in the two judgments which have been delivered, that this appeal should be allowed. 43. The difficulties that arose in this case stem from the fact that the law regarding the vicarious liability of a master for the wrongful acts of his servant is sometimes easier to state than to apply to any particular set of facts. It is not always easy to reconcile one decision with another. Each case turns on its own facts and distinctions may be fine: compare for example United Africa Co. Ltd. v. Saka Owoade(1) with the earlier case of Cheshire v. Bailey(2). 44. It is settled law that a master is liable for the wrongful acts of his servant committed in the course of his employment. The question sometimes arises, as in the present case, whether or not the relevant act complained of was done in the course of the servant's employment. It is common ground between the parties to the appeal that the Attorney General, as the nominal defendant for the Crown, stands in the same position as regards the issue of the vicarious liability for the wrongful act of the arresting officer in this case, as any other employer who is liable for the wrongful acts of his servant committed in the course of his employment. 45. The crucial question on this appeal is whether, as the judge held, the admitted gross abuse of his powers by the arresting officer in arresting and detaining the plaintiff wrongfully, maliciously and without reasonable cause is a factor of excess which takes the officer is purportedly authorised act of arrest outside the course of his employment. 46. In arriving at this conclusion the judge expressed himself to be relying on authority, including dicta cited by him from the decision of Hilbery J. in Warren v. Benlys Limited(3) who had cited in that case passages from the earlier judgment of Scrutton L.J. in Poland v. John Parr & Sons(4). Both those cases were decided in relation to circumstances in which the servant had resorted to physical violence. In the latter case a carter had struck a boy who he reasonably believed was about to pilfer goods from the carter's employer's vehicle. In the first mentioned case a petrol pump attendant had assaulted a customer after the customer had paid his bill and told the attendant he would report him to his employers for abusing the customer in the erroneous belief that the customer had tried to drive away from the garage without paying or surrendering the required petrol ration coupons. 47. In both those cases the court was thus concerned factually with acts of violence by the servant. In Poland's case Scrutton L.J. had observed at p .243 of the report of that case:-
48. It was held by the Court of Appeal that in the circumstances of the case the carter had implied authority to make reasonable efforts to protect and preserve his employer's property and that in striking the boy he had used violence that was not so excessive as to take his act outside the scope of his authority. His employers were therefore held liable for his acts. 49. In Warren’s Case the attendant's employers were held not liable for the assault committed by the attendant. Distinguishing Dyer v. Munday(5), Hilbery J. held that the attendant's act was one of personal vengeance and was not done in the course of his employment because it was not an act of a class which the attendant was authorised to do or a mode of doing an act within that class. It is clear from his judgment that Hilbery J. was influenced in his decision by his finding of fact that the assault had occurred at a time when the plaintiff's business with the attendant’s employers had been concluded. This is demonstrated by the following passage which occurs at p.937 D-G in the judgment:-
50. The judge in the present case observed:-
51. I accept that this proposition is supported by the authorities to the extent that excessive physical violence used by a servant in executing an authorised act may take the servant's act out of the course of his employment and absolve his employer from vicarious liability for the servant1s wrongful act. However it is well settled that a master is liable for the wrongs of his servant committed in the course of his employment whether that wrong be fraudulent or otherwise: Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank(6) as explained and applied in Lloyd v. Grace Smith & Co.(7) The same principle was applied by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in United African Company Limited v. Saka Owoade(1) at p.l44 where Lord Oaksey observed:-
52. It follows, in my judgment, that if it is once determined that when a servant committed a wrong against a third party he was acting in the course of his employment, then it is immaterial whether or not the servant acted fraudulently, maliciously or merely by reason of honest mistake. It also follows that fraudulent or malicious intent, as distinct from physical violence, cannot by itself constitute excess for the purposes of taking a servant's wrongful act out of the course of his employment. 53. The matter can also be tested by reference to the principles applicable in relation to damages where there is vicarious liability for wrongful arrest by a servant. Thus in Hussien v. Chong Fook Kam(8) where liability fell on the Government of Malaysia for the wrongful arrest of the respondents Lord Devlin had this to say at p.950 about the scope of damages for which the Government and the arresting officers were liable:-
54. Accordingly, in my judgment, the degree of high-'handedness and unreasonableness involved in making a wrongful arrest is material as to damages but a high degree of high-handedness or unreasonableness does not take the wrongful act of the servant out of the course of his employment, it merely aggravates the wrongful act and gives the complaining party grounds for claiming exemplary damages. 55. Citing Kooragang Investments Property Limited v. Richardson & Wrench Limited(9) the judge concluded that the “excess rind abuse of power” of the arresting officer made this a clear case of departure from the course or scope of employment. It is clear to me from the judge's findings of fact referred to in the judgment of my Lord Huggins V.-P. and from the concluding passage in the judge's judgment that he would have held that the arresting officer was acting in the course of his employment when he arrested the plaintiff had it not been for the admitted fact that the officer had grossly abused his powers at the time. If the officer had been acting bona fide but mistakenly at the time the decision would have been different because the judge considered the law to be as follows:-
56. In my judgment the judge here fell into error because he failed to bear in mind that, as Barwick’s Case established many years ago, the law draws no distinction between bona fide mistake on the one hand and deliberate criminal intent on the other hand when determining as a question of fact whether or not the wrongful act of a servant was done in the course of his employment. 57. It seems to me to be an inescapable conclusion that the arresting officer was acting in the course of his employment when he arrested the plaintiff. A crime had been committed in the presence of the arresting officer. The plaintiff had been required to go to the police station where an investigation was taking place in which the plaintiff was a suspect. The arrest took place in the police station in the course of the police investigation of the crime. In fact the officer was using the authority conferred upon him by his employer for his own purposes, as was the fraudulent clerk in the Grace Smith Case, but he was undoubtedly employed about his employer is business at the time of the arrest. His personal motivation and malice was not therefore relevant. 58. The judge was understandably reluctant to hold the Crown vicariously liable for the malicious wrongful arrest effected by a police officer in what the judge termed “a disgusting situation”. For my part I understand the underlying principle of the law to be that if an employer vests his servant with express or implied authority to do an act on the employer's behalf, and the servant does such an act in the course of his employment, the employer is vicariously liable if the act is done wrongfully, whatever may be the degree or character of the wrong. In the case of a breach of the subject’s constitutional right to liberty this seems to me to be an eminently just result. 59. I would therefore allow the appeal. Henry Litton, Esq., Q.C. & Robert Whitehead, Esq. (Haldane Midgley & Co.) for Appellant/Plaintiff. Stephen Franklin, Esq. for Attorney General/Respondent. [1] [1981] 3 All E.R. 65 (1) [1955] A.C. 130 (P.C.) |
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