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LDBM 163/2008
香港特別行政區
土地審裁處
建築物管理申請編號 2008 年第 163 號
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PROFOTO LIMITED |
申請人 |
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THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF HOP SHI FACTORY BUILDING |
答辯人 |
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主審法官：土地審裁處法官黃一鳴
審訊日期：2009 年 2 月 3 日
頒下判案書日期：2009 年 3 月 5 日
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判案書
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背景
1.申請人為香港柴灣利眾街29至31號合時工廠大廈（“該大廈”）8字樓A1及C1室的業主。 答辯人為該大廈的業主立案法團。 申請人的申請主要是要求土地審裁處頒發禁制令禁止答辯人以任何形式限制申請人於每天下午6時至10時使用該大廈的升降機。不過申請人在審訊時，同意答辯人有權就使用升降機作出管理上的安排，並確認只須本席頒令禁止答辯人除了管理費外，不得向申請人在使用升降機時收取任何其他費用。 申請人亦確認不須向答辯人要求損害賠償。
2.申請人的案情是指答辯人於十多年前開始就使用該大廈的升降機作出限制，訂明升降機須於每日下午6時後停用。假若有業主要求下午6時後使用升降機，業主須向管理處繳付使用費，每小時70元, 才可到管理處取鎖匙自行開啟升降機使用。申請人誤以為答辯人的決定是依據法例或公契作出，所以便按規定使用升降機，每月繳付數百元甚至數千元的升降機使用費。
3.於2006年中，申請人在諮詢律師後，翻查該大廈的公契，發覺答辯人收取升降機使用費實屬違反了公契的規定，於是申請人便開始與答辯人展開書信往來，要求延長升降機正常服務的時間。 不過答辯人經三次業主大會討論後，議決繼續限制升降機的服務。 申請人遂向土地審裁處提出是次申請。
4.除了每天限制升降機使用的時間應為下午6時半才開始，答辯人對於申請人提出的事實背景並無爭議。 不過，答辯人提出以下4項的答辯理由：-
（1） 申請人使用升降機的權利不是免費的；
（2） 該大廈的公契給予答辯人收取升降機使用費的權利；
（3） 若果答辯人有違反公契，申請人已放棄權利, 或默許了答辯人收取升降機使用費；及
（4） 根據不容反悔法的原則，申請人不得向答辯人要求損害賠償。
5.不過，由於申請人不再要求損害賠償，答辯人亦不再引用不容反悔法。 本席現就答辯人提出的其餘3項答辯理由作出裁決。
申請人的權利是否免費
6.該大廈公契第3（a）段說明每位業主有使用升降機的權利，其條文如下：-
“3. Each owner shall hold his part of the said building and the said premises subject to and with the benefit of the following rights privileges and obligations namely:-
(a) Full right and liberty to go pass and repass (with and without merchandise) over and along the entrances, staircases, landings, passages and lifts in the said building and (with or without vehicles) the loading and unloading bays, vehicle manoeuvring and vehicle entry and exit facilities within the said premises for all purposes connected with the proper use and enjoyment thereof.”
(底線加上)
7.答辯人認為上述第3 （a）段中所述的權利，即 “Full right and liberty”, 並不是指免費的權利，而事實上公契第3（f）段亦說明使用這些權利是要支付費用的。 第3（f）段的條文如下：-
“(f) All the above rights and privileges are subject to and conditional upon the owner for the time being paying his due share of the management, operating, servicing, maintenance and repairing expenses as hereinafter provided.”
(底線加上)
8.本席同意根據上述公契的內容，申請人使用升降機的權利並不是免費的。第3(f)段已清楚說明這些權利是受制於業主須分攤管理、運作、服務、保養及維修上的開支。不過，這並不等於答辯人可以收取任何費用。答辯人收取的費用必須要符合公契的規定。
答辯人是否有權收取升降機使用費
9.答辯人現時收取每小時70元的升降機使用費並不是根據公契來收取的，而是經業主大會議決來收取的。不過業主大會的議決並不能凌駕於公契之上。答辯人不能說由於使用升降機的權利不是免費的，便可以在業主大會上議決收取任何費用。申請人的權利只是受制於公契的規定。答辯人無權更改公契的收費規定 (見 Kwok Mo Kai Doris v. The Incorporated Owners of Kavin Court, CACV267/2005)。
10.其實公契第3(f)段中“as hereinafter provided”一詞已經清楚說明申請人須分攤的費用須是公契中所述的分攤費。公契中的附表3第(e)段有以下的條文:-
“(e) The cost of operating maintaining repairing servicing and renewing the lifts shall be borne and paid by the owners of Units on the 1st and upper floors of the said building in proportion to the number of 1/42nd shares in the said premises attributable to units on the 1st and upper floors for the time being vested in such owners.”
11.很明顯，上述附表3第(e)段所述的分攤費正是每位業主須就升降機支付的分攤費，亦是第3(f)段所述的其中一項分攤費。答辯人必須根據附表3第(e)段向業主收取有關升降機的運作、保養、維修、服務和更新的費用。答辯人不可能就升降機的服務收取不是附表3第(e)段所述的費用。
12.不過，答辯人引述公契第4段的條文去爭議第3(f)段中的“as hereinafter provided”並不是指附表3，因為若果是附表3的話，第3(f)段便應如第4段一樣寫作為“as set out in the Third Schedule hereto”。第4段的條文如下:-
“4.Each owner shall be bound by and shall observe and perform the covenants provisions and restrictions set out in the Third Schedule hereto.”
13.本席認為答辯人這樣的詮譯並不合理。雖然第3(f)段中的“as hereinafter provided”並不一定只是指附表3，但亦包括附表3在內。答辯人不可能說因為第3(f)段不用“as set out in the Third Schedule hereto”，就不用理會附表3。答辯人亦不能因此完全不理會“as hereinafter provided”，而單獨考慮“paying his due share”。 本席認為“paying his due share”及“as hereinafter provided”必須要一併考慮，而當一併考慮時，其意思必定是指業主支付的費用須要按公契去分攤。
14.由於答辯人收取每小時70元的升降機使用費並不是按公契去分攤，答辯人無權要求申請人支付這些使用費。
申請人是否已放棄權利或默許了答辯人收取升降機使用費
15.答辯人認為由於申請人已支付有關的升降機使用費多年，申請人便已經放棄了公契的權利或默許了答辯人收取這些費用。 答辯人引用新基大廈 E & H 座業主立案法團訴陳幹轉， LDBM563/2001一案去說明申請人是應該可以一早取得大廈公契查閱，而若果申請人不去查閱公契而付升降機使用費，申請人可以被視為默許了升降機使用費的徵收。
16.不過，答辯人似乎忽略了本席在新基大廈一案中其餘的裁決。默許是可以就申請人作出某些行動而中止的。 在本案中，申請人現時已反對支付升降機使用費。 雖然申請人不能向答辯人討回已支付的升降機使用費，但申請人有權中止這方面的默許，停止再支付這些費用。
17.上訴庭在上述 Kwok Mo Kai Doris 一案中有以下的裁決：-
“16. Mr Shieh SC who appeared for the Incorporated Owners submitted that the fact that the applicant had made no objection to the management fees charged during the 12 years after becoming an owner was sufficient to entitle the court to infer abandonment. It was said that the period was long enough to bar the recovery of land and amounted to “notorious and avowed acquiescence” in the breach of covenant, citing Fairfax v Attorney General [1995] 2 HKC 617. In that case, the plaintiff sought a declaration that the covenant under a Crown lease restricting development of land to the erection of one or more villa residences could not be enforced against it. A six-storey building that had been erected on the site not far short of 40 years previously manifestly did not comply with the building covenant. On those facts, the court concluded that the Crown as landlord had long since abandoned any legitimate interest in the enforcement of that covenant. But the Fairfax principle is simply not applicable to the present case. The length of time concerned aside, in the present case, the covenant in issue is contained in a deed of mutual covenant affecting all the co-owners of the building. It is the statutory duty of the Incorporated Owners as Manager under section 18(1) (c) of the Buildings Management Ordinance to enforce the obligations contained in the DMC. In my view, the Incorporated Owners may not assert a right that negates or is at variance with that statutory duty particularly when it involves only one of many co-owners: for it would strike at the concept of mutuality which underpins the DMC. Whether that assertion is framed as an application of the Fairfax principle or, in the alternative, as waiver, estoppel and/or acquiescence on the part of the co-owner, the effect of which is to extinguish the co-owner’s rights under the DMC, matters not. The court should not entertain, much less allow, such a claim.
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24. As to the ‘acquiescence’ point, for my part I also would decline to infer from the circumstances the abandonment which Mr Shieh concedes is necessary to get home on this issue; the highest that this reasonably can be put, in my view, is that the period of acquiescence is ‘suspensory’ only, and does not serve to extinguish a co-owner’s rights under the DMC.”
18.上述的裁決已清楚說明申請人不應被永遠當作放棄公契的權利或永遠默許答辯人收取不合公契規定的收費。因此，答辯人這方面的答辯理由不能成立。
總結
19.基於上述理由，本席裁定申請人的申請得直。
20.至於訟費方面，答辯人在審訊時已經提出反對，認為申請人一直要求損害賠償，直至最後陳詞時才放棄，導致答辯人在這方面浪費了預備時間，因為答辯人會就損害賠償提出不容反悔法的爭議。
21.本席同意答辯人這方面的論點，認為申請人的確有浪費答辯人這方面的訟費。不過，就整體而言，申請人是勝訴，答辯人應向申請人支付訟費。本席認為最公平的做法，就是答辯人須支付申請人其四份三之訟費。
22.因此，本席頒令如下:-
(1) 禁制令禁止答辯人、其員工或代理人在任何時間向申請人、其董事或員工徵收升降機使用費 (管理費除外)；
(2) 批准申請人撤回損害賠償之申請；及
(3) 臨時訟費命令︰答辯人須支付申請人其四份三之訟費；如果雙方未能就數額達成協議，則由法庭以區域法院基準釐定；若雙方不在14天內就訟費提出申請，則此項臨時訟費命令作實。
申請人：由鍾沛林律師行陳志華律師代表應訊。
答辯人：由夏佳理方和吳正和律師事務所轉聘李曉華大律師代表應訊。
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