HKSAR v. Nanik
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[English Translation – 英譯本] IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 780 OF 2008 (ON APPEAL FROM TMCC NO. 2761 OF 2008) _________________ BETWEEN
_________________ Before: Hon Barnes J in Court Date of Hearing: 16 December 2008 Date of Judgment: 16 December 2008 Date of Reasons for Judgment: 7 January 2009
__________________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT __________________________________
1.The appellant was convicted after trial by the Magistrate on one count of theft, contrary to section 9 of the Theft Ordinance, Cap. 210 of the Laws of Hong Kong, and was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment. The appellant appealed against both conviction and sentence. 2.At the conclusion of the hearing, I allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction and set aside the sentence. I now set out the reasons for my judgment. The prosecution’s case 3.In short, the prosecution’s case was that the appellant, an Indonesian, was employed by the first prosecution witness (PW1) as a domestic helper. On the day in question, PW1 put five brand new $100 bank notes marked with consecutive serial numbers (LE324063 to LE324067) into his waist bag, which he then placed in the ‘sundry room’ in his residence. PW1 later found that one of the five $100 notes was missing. He asked the appellant about it, and the appellant said that she had no idea. She volunteered to let PW1 search her property. She produced her wallet and clothing of her own volition, and they turned up nothing after being searched. When PW1 asked the appellant whether she had other belongings, she took out a handbag from under the bed. Eventually, a brand new $100 note was taken out from the handbag. The note, with the serial number of LE324065, was one of the aforesaid five bank notes. The appellant said that the bank note was given to her by her elder sister and she denied having stolen it. Later, PW1 called the police. The appellant told the police officer the same version of events. The defence case 4.Both the appellant and her elder sister testified. The appellant had a clear record. She denied having stolen the $100 note and said that her elder sister had given her the note. She was unable to explain why the note given to her by her elder sister bore a serial number which was consecutive to those of the other four $100 notes of PW1’s. The prosecution’s stance 5.The prosecution did not have any direct evidence to show that the appellant had stolen the $100 in question. The prosecution submitted that, from all the circumstantial evidence, a reasonable inference could be drawn beyond doubt that the appellant had stolen the said $100. The defence’s stance 6.Although the defence was unable to explain why the $100 note given to the appellant by her elder sister bore a serial number which was consecutive to those of the other four notes of PW1’s, the defence submitted that since PW1’s wife had been dissatisfied with the appellant’s work attitude and PW1’s son and daughter-in-law had also accused the appellant of stealing clothes, someone had planted the stolen item on the appellant and framed her up. Grounds of appeal 7.Mr. Butt, Counsel for the appellant, raised a number of grounds of appeal. In my view, it was necessary to deal only with the first ground. 8.Mr. Butt complained that the Magistrate merely narrated the evidence of the witnesses for both parties and then, without giving any reason, ruled that he disbelieved the appellant and was satisfied that PW1 was a veracious witness. Furthermore, the Magistrate said in his oral verdict that from the stolen property, he could ‘get the melon by following the vine’ and be absolutely sure that the appellant had committed the offence. Mr. Butt submitted that the conviction was unsafe. Discussion 9.An appeal against a magistrate’s decision is conducted by way of “rehearing” on the evidence before the magistrate (supplemented by such further evidence as may be admitted by leave of the appellate court): see Chou Shih Bin v. HKSAR FACC 11/2004. In my judgment, as far as the facts are concerned, the appellate court shall have regard to the fact that the magistrate has had the benefit of hearing and seeing the witness giving evidence, whereas the appellate court can only rely on transcripts. Whether or not a witness was credible and reliable is purely a matter for the magistrate. However, a conviction will be unsafe if the magistrate’s finding of fact is unreasonable, illogical or inherently improbable, or if the magistrate in dealing with the evidence had misquoted, omitted or failed to consider or analyze material matters. 10.When describing the prosecution evidence, the Magistrate said that it was only after repeated questioning that the appellant allowed PW1 to examine her room. However, according to the relevant transcript (Appeal Bundle, page 52 F to H), right after denying having taken the money, the appellant suggested to PW1 that he might go to her room for a check:
It was not the case that the appellant allowed the witness to examine her belongings only upon ‘repeated questioning’. 11.Regarding the appellant’s evidence, the Magistrate had this to say in his oral verdict:
12.As far as the appellant’s case was concerned, she had no idea why the $100 note given to her by her elder sister and the remaining $400 notes of PW1’s bore consecutive serial numbers. She could only suggest that she might have been framed up. The Magistrate said that the ‘implication’ of her evidence was to ‘[foreshadow] a frame-up against you by the witness’s whole family’. As a matter of fact, PW1’s evidence did lend support to the suggestion about the discordant relationship between the appellant and PW1’s family. By making it clear at the outset that the appellant’s evidence served as a foreshadow, the Magistrate gave the impression that he had from the very beginning regarded what the appellant said as incredible. 13.What is more, not only did the Magistrate stress time and again that he ‘had not overlooked’ the appellant’s evidence, but he also said that he ‘all the more dared not overlook’ her evidence. I am at a complete loss as to why the Magistrate said to a defendant that he dared not overlook the evidence. What the Magistrate said at that time gave the impression that he was making sarcastic remarks against the appellant. It would appear that the Magistrate had firmly believed from the outset that the appellant’s evidence was incredible and had gone further by making sarcastic remarks against her. He had not considered her evidence in an impartial manner. 14.Besides, in his oral verdict the Magistrate did not explain why he did not accept the appellant’s evidence. He only mentioned briefly that he ‘still [did] not accept’ the appellant’s evidence. I do appreciate that, given the heavy workload to which he is subject every day, it is impossible for a magistrate to give detailed reasons for decision in each and every case. In the present case, however, given the Magistrate had adjourned the case until the afternoon for verdict and he appeared to have had adequate time to state the evidence of both parties, why could he not give reasons – even if very brief ones – so that the defendant knew why her evidence was not accepted? 15.It is true that the Magistrate had in his Statement of Findings given reasons for not believing that the appellant had been framed up. However, a defendant should not have to wait until the appeal before he is told why his evidence has not been accepted. 16.In his oral verdict, the Magistrate, having found that PW1’s evidence was credible and reliable, merely stated that, taking the stolen property as a starting point, he could get the melon by following the vine and be absolutely sure beyond doubt that the appellant had dishonestly stolen the money. 17.On the face of it, ‘getting the melon by following the vine’ means that one can get the melon if one follows the vine. The Magistrate, being a professional magistrate, ought to have meant that the ‘melon’ was the only reasonable inference. I hope that magistrates will use clear words and expressions so as to avoid misunderstanding or confusion. In the present case, the Magistrate did not state clearly how he followed the vine (i.e. relied on what facts) and got the melon (i.e. arrived at the only reasonable inference). 18.Was the theft of the $100 by the appellant the only reasonable inference that could be drawn? 19.The appellant was employed as a domestic helper at the material time. Her employer’s wife was dissatisfied with her work attitude, and the employer’s son and daughter-in-law had accused her of stealing clothes (although they had never accused her of stealing money). The relationship between the appellant and the family of the prosecution witness could hardly be described as harmonious. One could not discard the possibility that the employer had planted stolen property on the appellant with the intention of terminating the employment contract without having to give notice or pay compensation to her. 20.PW1 put $500 in the waist bag at about 3 p.m. and found money missing at about 8 p.m. The appellant had to work in the meantime. Her room could not be locked up from the outside and could only be bolted on the inside. PW1’s family members had the opportunity to go into the appellant’s room. In other words, other people could have access to the appellant’s handbag. 21.Upon PW1’s inquiry, the appellant made an immediate denial and volunteered to let PW1 search her property. It was not true that she agreed to the search only after repeated questioning. 22.Furthermore, the prosecution only called PW1 to give evidence. None of his wife, his son and his daughter-in-law was called — and they were the very people who were dissatisfied with the appellant, who had accused her of stealing clothes, and who had the opportunity to go into her room. The Magistrate had failed to consider or analyze all the factual circumstances. 23.The mere finding that PW1’s evidence was reliable and credible and that he did not frame up the appellant does not mean that the prosecution had proved the offence against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 24.The presence of the $100 note in question in the appellant’s handbag did put the appellant on suspicion. However, if what she said, namely that she did not steal, were true or might be true, then even though she failed to explain why the $100 given to her by her elder sister had been replaced with the $100 in question, the prosecution would still have failed to discharge the burden of proof. 25.The Magistrate appears to have rejected the appellant’s evidence without considering or analyzing it in an impartial manner. And the Magistrate convicted the appellant on the sole basis of PW1’s evidence, without thoroughly considering all the factual circumstances. The conviction is unsafe. 26.For the above reasons, I have allowed the appeal.
Ms. Catherine Ko, Senior Public Prosecutor, for the HKSAR. Mr. Anthony Butt, instructed by K. Y. Woo & Co., for the Defendant. Translated by the Judgment Translation Unit of the Judiciary and approved by Mr. Edmund Cham, Solicitor. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCMA 780/2008