Secretary for Justice v. Chan Tat Ki and Another
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 3786/2008 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 25 March 2011.
1. These proceedings were brought in the name of the Secretary for Justice for and on behalf of the Controller of the Government Flying Service (“ GFS ”). The GFS is a department of the Government and its duties include providing flying services for, inter alia , search and rescue, air ambulance, fire fighting and providing assistance in law enforcement.
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DCCJ 3786/2008 & IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINSTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO. 3786 OF 2008 ___________________ BETWEEN
___________________ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINSTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO. 1543 OF 2010 ___________________ BETWEEN
___________________ (Consolidated pursuant to the Order of Registrar R. LAI dated 1 June 2010) Before: Deputy District Judge Victor Dawes Date of hearing: 25-27 August 2010 Date of handing down judgment: 25 March 2011 ____________________ JUDGMENT ____________________ I. Introduction 1.These proceedings were brought in the name of the Secretary for Justice for and on behalf of the Controller of the Government Flying Service (“GFS”). The GFS is a department of the Government and its duties include providing flying services for, inter alia, search and rescue, air ambulance, fire fighting and providing assistance in law enforcement. 2.The 1st defendant was a former cadet pilot of the GFS appointed on 15 September 2005. His appointment was made pursuant to the terms of an offer letter dated 15 September 2005 (“Offer Letter”). Prior to the commencement of his employment, he executed an undertaking on 26 September 2005 (“Undertaking”). In addition, the 2nd defendant (1st defendant’s mother) executed a guarantee on the same day (“Guarantee”). The plaintiff’s case is that pursuant to terms of the aforesaid documents, the 1st and 2nd defendants agreed to refund the Government a proportionate amount of the expenditure incurred in connection with the training to be provided to the 1st defendant as cadet pilot should his conduct and performance be found to be unsatisfactory by the Controller of the GFS resulting in his termination. 3.The 1st defendant commenced employment with the GFS thereafter and a considerable amount of money was expended on his training and related expenses. However, the GFS alleged that his conduct and performance were found to be unsatisfactory and his appointment as cadet pilot was terminated on 27 October 2007. 4.These proceedings were brought to recover a portion of the training expenditure in the sum of HK$790,902.70 from the 1st and 2nd defendants. The defendants in turn allege that the Undertaking and Guarantee were executed as a result of misrepresentation made by a representative of the plaintiff. By way of counterclaim, the sought declarations that the Undertaking and the Guarantee be rescinded or set aside. II. Background 5.I shall first set out the relevant background which can be divided into 3 phases: (i) the events prior to the execution of the Undertaking and Guarantee; (ii) the 1st defendant’s training and employment with the GFS; and (iii) events after his termination. Save as otherwise indicated, the events summarised in this section are not in dispute. I have attempted to set them out in some detail in order to understand the issues which are in dispute. (A) Events prior to the execution of the Undertaking and Guarantee 6.In September 2005, the 1st defendant was a final year student studying for a Master of Architecture degree at the University of Hong Kong. It has always been the 1st defendant’s ambition to be a pilot and this motivated him to give up his intended career as an architect and he applied to be a cadet pilot with the GFS. 7.The competition for the job was very keen. There were over 2,000 applicants and the GFS decided to retain only 4 of them. The 1st defendant was one of the successful candidates. 8.Before he received the Offer Letter dated 15 September 2005, the 1st defendant together with the 3 other successful candidates were invited to visit the headquarter of the GFS. They were introduced to a Ms Yu Po Yee who was the Departmental Secretary of the GFS. 9.By the Offer Letter dated 15 September 2005, the 1st defendant was offered employment as a cadet pilot in the GFS on probationary terms for a fixed period of three years. The Offer Letter contained, inter alia, the following terms:
10.The Offer Letter was signed by the 1st defendant on 21 September 2005. He indicated that he understood the provisions of the Offer Letter and can assume duty on 12 October 2005. 11.In addition to the Offer Letter, the Undertaking was signed by the 1st defendant on 26 September 2005. The Undertaking provides that if the 1st defendant’s “performance or conduct during the probationary period is unsatisfactory in the opinion of the Controller”, he was obliged to “refund and repay immediately on demand” the expenditure incurred by the Government “in connection with the training provided during the probationary period”. “Unsatisfactory performance or conduct” includes “failure to meet the required standard of the training school and resulting in the termination of training by the Government Flying Service”. “Training” is defined to include “any induction course or academic training or programme of study or practical or operational training or experience or any combination thereof provided during the probationary period required to make [the 1st defendant] eligible for consideration for appointment to the rank of Pilot II”. The Undertaking also set out other events which would trigger the repayment of the training expenses including but not limited to the following circumstances: the failure to sit for any prescribed examination; failure to return to Hong Kong as required by the Government; and leaving the GFS before completion of seven years of service after the completion of training. The estimated training expenses of HK$1.7106M was also referred to in the Undertaking. 12.On the same date, the Guarantee was executed by the 2nd defendant. The conditions triggering the repayment of the expenses expended on the training of the 1st defendant also included the “unsatisfactory performance or conduct” of the 1st defendant “in the opinion of the Controller”. (B) Training and employment with the GFS 13.The 1st defendant commenced training in October 2005. During his probationary period, he was sent to Florida for a Commercial Pilot’s Licence (CPL) Course which commenced in November 2005 and was completed on 8 December 2006. He then returned to Hong Kong and underwent Crew Resource Management Training in December 2006. He was then sent to undergo training for Multi-Engine Instrument Rating (Helicopter) with Helicopter Services Limited (“HSL”) in the United Kingdom commencing 3 January 2007. 14.Upon completion of the aforesaid courses, the 1st defendant obtained his Commercial Pilot’s Licence (Helicopter) and returned to Hong Kong to resume his duty with the GFS on 21 February 2007. He undertook further training with a view to qualify as an operational pilot in the GFS. 15.In the meantime, the GFS was apparently unhappy with the 1st defendant’s conduct and performance and began to issue warning letters to him. This began by a letter dated 19 July 2006 where it was alleged that he was giving out information through the internet to members of the public about matters concerning the GFS cadet pilot recruitment exercise. It was said that he had admitted to this during an interview with Captain Erik Young on 5 July 2006. The letter went on to state that this reflects badly on his judgment and his integrity as a pilot and he was seriously warned. 16.Upon the 1st defendant’s return to Hong Kong, he was informed that his performance was not satisfactory. In the letter from the Controller dated 27 March 2007, reference was made to an interview on 21 February 2007 with Captain Trevor Marshall (Chief Training and Standards Officer) where the 1st defendant was informed that a training programme had been designed to help him improve his personal discipline. The letter also referred to the arrangements that were made for him to attend the Probationary Inspectors Course at the Police College between 2 and 20 April 2007 as part of the training programme. It was said that the course would provide him with an insight into the disciplined service life, and the team work and personal discipline it requires. It was also said that arrangements were being made for him to be enrolled for an Outward Bound Course which would also help him to build up a sense of responsibility and self-discipline. The 1st defendant was also informed by the letter that within the GFS, he was posted to the Air Command and Control Center (“ACCC”). 17.By a letter dated 3 May 2007 from the Controller to the 1st defendant, he received further warning of his performance. The letter states, inter alia, as follows:
18.By a letter dated 17 September 2007 from the Controller to the 1st defendant, it was indicated that on account of his performance during the probationary period, it was the Controller’s intention to terminate his service as cadet pilot. In the letter, the Controller set out the following matters in support of his decision:
19.In his representation dated 24 September 2007, the 1st defendant referred to the following matters:
20.Despite the 1st defendant’s representation, his termination was confirmed by a letter dated 26 October 2007. In the letter he was reminded that as he would be leaving the GFS before completing the probationary period, he was required to refund and repay immediately, on demand of the Government, an amount proportionate to the unexpired portion of the contractual minimum period of service calculated on the basis of expenditure incurred by the Government on his training pursuant to the Undertaking. (C) Events after his termination 21.On 7 November 2007, the 1st defendant was informed by a letter from the Controller that the total expenditure was HK$1,016,481.20. He was required to refund HK$809,121.26. After deducting the monies due to him from the Government, the net amount payable by him was HK$790,902.70. A demand note was enclosed with the letter for the 1st defendant’s settlement. 22.By a letter dated 18 November 2007 from the 1st defendant to the Controller, he requested for a waiver of monies due. In support of the request, he suggested that he had worked hard to improve himself; he had given up his career as an architect to join the GFS; that no aviation company was interested in recruiting him; and that there was deterioration in his health following the termination. He also suggested that his mother who was the guarantor was a “jobless old woman” and her health was affected by the demand for repayment. Finally, he also claimed that it was beyond their ability to repay the amount of money demanded by the Government. 23.The request for waiver was refused and this was communicated to the 1st defendant by a letter from the GFS dated 9 January 2008. Instead, he was reminded that there is a mechanism for him to apply for payment by instalments. This letter was followed by a reminder dated 28 February 2008 from the GFS. 24.The 1st defendant wrote again on 10 March 2008. This is an important letter as this was his first attempt in setting out his case against the Government. The letter consists of 13 pages and they contain, inter alia, the following allegations:
25.As stated above, the 1st defendant attempted to set out his case in respect of allegation of misrepresentation in the aforesaid letter. The relevant part of the letter states is as follows:
26.The matter was subsequently referred to the Department of Justice and a letter of demand was sent to the 1st defendant on 6 June 2008. 27.By a letter dated 18 June 2008, the 2nd defendant replied to the Department of Justice. In addition to referring to the personal circumstances of herself and her son, the description of the misrepresentation made by Ms Pauline Tang was largely consistent with what the 1st defendant said in his letter of 10 March 2008. III. Pleaded Case 28.The plaintiff’s case is straightforward. Reliance was placed on the relevant terms of the Offer Letter, the Undertaking and the Guarantee set out above in order to establish the liabilities of the 1st and 2nd defendants. 29.In the Defence and Counterclaim, it is alleged that the execution of the Undertaking and the Guarantee was procured by the “implied and/or fraudulent misrepresentation and/or non-disclosure of material information” by the GFS and the GFS’s agent, Ms Pauline Tang. In particular, it is alleged that:
30.By way of counterclaim, the 1st and 2nd defendants sought declarations to the effect that the Undertaking and the Guarantee be rescinded/set aside as having been procured by the misrepresentations of the plaintiff. 31.Although the defendants also alleged in the Defence and Counterclaim that the Undertaking and the Guarantee were unconscionable and therefore not binding, it was confirmed by Ms Wong (counsel for the defendants) in her Closing Submissions that these points are not being pursued. The only issues before me concern the allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation. In particular, the relevant issues are:
IV. Evidence from various witnesses 32.The plaintiff called two witnesses. They were Ms Pauline Tang who allegedly misled the 1st and 2nd defendants and Ms Iris Wong who took up the position from Ms Tang on 9 May 2007. Plaintiff’s witnesses (a) Pauline Tang 33.Ms Tang’s evidence was straightforward. She met both the 1st and 2nd defendants on 26 September 2005 and she was the one who explained to the defendants the reason for requiring the Undertaking. She cannot recall any telephone conversation between herself and the 1st defendant prior to the meeting. At the meeting, she went through the content of the Undertaking and the Guarantee with them. She cannot recall any specific comment or questions raised by the defendants on the contents of the 2 documents. Understandably, she cannot recall every word which she said but she would usually congratulate the successful applicants and wish them the best of luck with their overseas training. She was certain that she had never assured them that the provisions of the Undertaking would not be enforced against any cadet pilot whose services was terminated by the GFS or any other statement to that effect. (b) Iris Wong 34.Ms Wong took over the job of Ms Tang on 9 May 2007 and was in charge of the case against the 1st and 2nd defendants since then. She emphasised that the Government has to invest a very substantial amount of money in training a cadet pilot and the need to protect the Government’s interest by requiring cadet pilots to provide the Undertaking. As she was not involved in the training of the 1st defendant, she did not have first-hand knowledge of his performance but she explained GFS’s position from the records available. Defendants’ witnesses (a) lThe 1st Defendant 35.The 1st defendant gave evidence on his decision to apply to the GFS and described being a cadet pilot with the GFS as his dream job. However, when he received the Offer Letter from the GFS, he found the terms in relation to the refund of training expenses unreasonable. He therefore located the telephone number of Ms Yu whom he thought was the Departmental Secretary of the GFS and wanted to speak to her. He eventually got a call from Ms Pauline Tang instead who said she was responsible for recruitment. 36.He asked Ms Tang whether he will have to refund the training expenses if he really wanted to continue his employment with the GFS but the GFS insisted on terminating his employment. He also asked if the GFS will demand for repayment if he cannot continue his employment for health reasons. Ms Tang told him not to worry and said the GFS would consider the matter on a case by case basis. He claimed that although he was keen on taking up the job, he would not have accepted the offer if he was informed by Ms Tang in the said telephone conversation that the relevant terms would be enforced. 37.On 26 September 2005, he turned up at the headquarter of the GFS with his mother. When asked whether the training expenses were repayable if his employment was terminated by the GFS against his will, Ms Tang allegedly said that the amount is definitely repayable if: (i) the 1st defendant resigns on his own volition; (ii) he deliberately fails to turn up at his assessment(s) during training and thereby failing the assessment; and (iii) if he fails to turn up at work habitually. She also said the Government uses a lot of resources in training cadet pilots and assured him that they have never demanded repayment in the situations described by the 1st defendant. 38.He claimed that if the answer from Ms Tang was that the relevant terms in the Undertaking/Guarantee would be strictly enforced, he would not have taken up the offer. 39.He then went on to describe incidents supporting his satisfactory performance during training. He claimed that he obtained the highest score in his class when he received his training in the United States and that his assessor said he was one of the best he had seen recently. He also received positive comments from the Outward Bound School. 40.In support of his case on the alleged representation made by Ms Tang, he gave a call to Jeremy Lok on 22 January 2008. Jeremy Lok was a fellow cadet pilot who was also terminated by the GFS before the completion of training. He claimed that Jeremy Lok had also asked similar questions on the repayment of training expenses and got the same answer as he did from Ms Tang. Although Jeremy Lok was not called as a witness, the 1st defendant’s telephone conversation with Jeremy Lok was recorded and a transcript of the conversation was produced by the defendants. 41.After his termination by the GFS, his parents wanted him to complete his studies as an architect but he insisted on finding a job as a pilot. He was subsequently retained as a helicopter pilot by a company in Shenzhen. In March 2008, he was employed by Cathay Pacific as a Second Officer. (b) 2nd Defendant 42.The 2nd defendant’s evidence was largely consistent with that of the 1st defendant. In particular, she adopted the evidence given by the 1st defendant in respect of what Ms Pauline Tang said at the meeting on 26 September 2005. V. Discussion Whether the condition triggering the liability to repay in the Offer Letter, the Undertaking and the Guarantee had materialised 43.The Offer Letter, the Undertaking and the Guarantee all provide that the 1st defendant can be dismissed if his conduct and performance during the probationary period is considered unsatisfactory “in the opinion of the Controller”. Under the Undertaking and the Guarantee, “Unsatisfactory performance or conduct” includes “failure to meet the required standard of the training school”. 44.The aforesaid documents conferred a discretion on the Controller of the GFS to decided whether the performance of the 1st defendant was considered to be “unsatisfactory”. In this regard, my attention was directed at Abu Dhabi National Tucker Co. v. Product Star Shipping (“The Product Star”) (No. 2) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 397 at 404 (col. 1) where Leggatt LJ said:
45.In Paragon Finance plc v. Nash [2002] 1 WLR 685 at 702, Dyson LJ was of the view that the word “unreasonably” in Leggat LJ’s judgment must be understood in a sense analogous to unreasonably in the Wednesbury sense as in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 KB 223. 46.In Société Générale Bank & Trust Hong Kong Branch v. Mike Panjawani (HCA 725/2009, unreported, 25 November 2010), To J. agreed with the statement of principle contained in the judgment of Leggatt LJ but went on to comment at paragraph 50 that the Court must have regard to the contractual provision conferring the discretion in question. It is said that if on a true construction of the contract, an absolute unfettered discretion was intended, it is not for the court to fetter what the parties have reached on their own bargain. 47.It is accepted by Ms Sit for the plaintiff that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the discretion of the Controller was exercised in good faith. She went on to submit that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to discharge that burden. 48.It was submitted on behalf of the defendants that the 1st defendant’s actual performance and conduct at the GFS are highly relevant and it is for the plaintiff to establish that: (i) the 1st defendant has failed to meet the required standard of the training school; and (ii) that the failure to meet the required standard of the training school caused a termination by the GFS. Although the GFS’s decision and the reasons for terminating the 1st defendant were summarized in the correspondence referred to in the judgment, the individuals with personal knowledge of the 1st defendant’s performance were not called as witnesses and the documents recording the 1st defendant’s performance, including the technical pilot information file for cadets were not disclosed in these proceedings. The defendants also pointed to the fact that there was no rebuttal or denial of what is contained in the 1st defendant’s letter dated 10 March 2008 which contain responses to most of the allegations regarding unsatisfactory performance and conduct. It was submitted that it would be extremely dangerous for the Court to rely on the disputed matters contained in the correspondence to conclude that the discretion of the Controller was exercised honestly and in good faith and that the plaintiff had failed to discharge the burden in doing so. 49.I disagree with the defendants’ submissions. This is not a case where the employer is required to prove that a dismissal was justified. The issue here is whether the discretion of the Controller was exercised “honestly and reasonably”. As accepted by the defendants, the relevant provisions gave the Controller of the GFS a discretion as to whether the 1st defendant had failed to meet the standard of the training school. Whilst the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the ultimate decision was made in good faith, the Court is not required to assess the performance of the 1st defendant afresh and to decide whether the 1st defendant’s performance met the standard of the training school. This is a matter for the Controller. The question for the Court is whether the decision to terminate the 1st defendant was made honestly and in good faith. 50.I am of the view that it is clearly demonstrated in the correspondence before the Court that the Controller’s decision was one made with proper basis and could not be criticized as irrational or perverse. For example, it is common ground that the 1st defendant had failed in the first and second attempts of his Level I Proficiency Check. Even if one is to accept the explanations provided belatedly by the 1st defendant in his letter of 10 March 2008, the decision of the Controller cannot be described as arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and I find that the plaintiff had more than adequately discharged the burden in the present case. 51.Having concluded that the Controller has exercised his discretion honestly and in good faith, there is no basis for me to challenge the exercise of discretion of the Controller. There is no need for me to find whether the explanations provided in the 10 March 2008 are genuine or justified. However, I should add that I would have no hesitation in rejecting most of them if I was required to do so. Fraudulent misrepresentation 52.The issue is whether Ms Pauline Tang made the misrepresentation as alleged. This is one of the main issues in this case. I approach the matter from 3 perspectives: (i) testimony of the witnesses; (ii) contemporaneous documents; and (iii) inherent probability. 53.Firstly, the relevant issue is a matter of fact which turns on what was said or not said at a meeting. My assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is of vital importance. 54.The evidence given by Ms Tang was clear and straightforward. Although she cannot recall the exact words used in her conversations with the 1st and 2nd defendants, she firmly rejected the suggestion that she made the representations as alleged. 55.In contrast, the 1st defendant’s evidence was unsatisfactory in a number of respects. By way of example:
56.In respect of the 2nd defendant, she religiously adhered to the alleged misrepresentation set out in her witness statement and had very little to add. On the whole, I prefer the testimony of the plaintiff’s witnesses in respect of the alleged representation. 57.I should add that I attach no weight to what was said by Jeremy Lok to the 1st defendant about the representations allegedly made to him by Pauline Tang before he signed the relevant agreements. What Jeremy Lok managed to recall is not entirely clear. In addition, the assertions made by him were never tested by cross-examination as he is not a witness. 58.In terms of contemporaneous documents, I have already referred to the letter from the 1st defendant to GFS dated 18 November 2007 where the alleged misrepresentation was not recorded. The alleged misrepresentation was not recorded in writing until 10 March 2008, i.e. some six months after GFS indicated that the 1st defendant was going to be terminated for performance-related reasons. 59.Finally, I have also considered the inherent probability of Ms Tang making the alleged misrepresentation in the circumstances of this case. It is common ground that the Government uses a lot of resources for the training of cadet pilots and it obviously wants to protect its financial position. Although the chosen candidates obviously performed satisfactorily during the selection process, there was no lack of applicants for this attractive job. There were in fact a number of candidates on a wait-list who could replace the 1st defendant if he declined to accept the appointment. It is difficult to imagine that the Deputy Departmental Secretary would want to limit the effect of the relevant terms of the Undertaking and/or the Guarantee immediately before the 1st and 2nd defendants were asked to sign these documents. This is particularly so when there is little incentive for them to do so. I find the suggestion of the defendants inherently improbable in light of the circumstances of this case. 60.To sum up, I prefer the evidence of Ms Tang over that of the defendants’ and I find against them in respect of the alleged misrepresentation. The effect of the Offer Letter 61.In any event, it is not disputed that the 1st defendant signed the Offer Letter on 21 September 2005, i.e. 5 days prior to the alleged misrepresentation on 26 September 2005. The meeting on 26 September 2005 was arranged after the GFS received the signed Offer Letter. The 1st defendant attempted to justify this by asserting that his telephone conversation with Ms Pauline Tang took place before he signed and returned the Offer Letter. 62.Even assuming that Ms Pauline Tang did say what the 1st defendant alleged in their telephone conversation, the 1st defendant had confirmed that he received no definite answer concerning his questions. However, he was perfectly content to accept the terms of the Offer Letter. There is no suggestion that the Offer Letter was also procured by misrepresentation but there is an argument on whether the terms therein are binding. 63.It is submitted on the defendants’ behalf that the Offer Letter “might not” reflect the true intention of the parties at the material time. Ms Wong submitted that it would be difficult to believe that the Government or the GFS would consider itself bound by the terms of the Offer Letter if the defendants did not subsequently attend the GFS office to sign the Undertaking and the Guarantee. What I understand the defendants to be submitting is that the terms of the Offer Letter were not binding unless the Undertaking and the Guarantee were also signed. 64.Whilst the Offer Letter did refer to the fact that the 1st defendant and his guarantor would be invited to GFS to sign the Undertaking, it does not impose any obligation on the 1st defendant to procure the Guarantee or sign the Undertaking. 65.I see no basis to support the submission that the terms of the Offer Letter are somehow not binding unless the Guarantee and the Undertaken were executed subsequently. The terms of the Offer Letter were clear and unambiguous. On the face of the Offer Letter, there was equally no basis for the GFS to refuse to honour the terms therein if the defendants refused to enter into the Guarantee or the Undertaking. The counterclaim 66.In view of the above, the defendants’ counterclaim must fail. Order 67.Judgment is entered in favour of the plaintiff against the 1st and 2nd defendants in the sum of HK$790,902.76 together with interest thereon at 1% above HSBC prime rate from the date of writ until today. Interest from today runs at the judgment rate until full payment. 68.The counterclaim is dismissed. 69.There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. I therefore make an order nisi that the plaintiff shall have the costs of the consolidated action, including the counterclaim and any costs reserved. Costs shall be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for counsel. 70.In the absence of any application to vary within 14 days, this costs order shall become absolute.
Ms Eva Sit instructed by the Department of Justice for the Plaintiff Ms Peony Wong instructed by Messrs Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum for the 1st and 2nd Defendants | |||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under DCCJ 3786/2008