The Queen v. Ng Tam-yue

CACC000977/1983

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HONG KONG

(Appellate Jurisdiction)

Criminal Appeal No. 977 of 1983

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Between

Coram: Hon. Addison, J. in Court

Date: 13 OCT 1983

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JUDGMENT

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1. The appellant was convicted of Bribery contrary to section 5(c) of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Ordinance, Cap. 288 and was fined $300. He now appeals against conviction only.

2. The particulars of the offence alleged that on a date unknown in February, 1983 at the Blue Heaven Restaurant he made a gift of $200 to Tam So-kan to induce her to endeavour to procure the return of himself to serve on the Urban Council. The bare facts of the case were these. In February 1983, one month before he unsuccessfully stood for election to the Urban Council, the appellant arranged for a Miss Tam So-kan, who was a reporter for the Sing Po Newspaper,to interview him as a prospective candidate for the election. She kept the appointment and their interview lasted a little over one hour. It was understood by them that she would thereafter publish material on the appellant relative to the forthcoming election. During the interview he offered her a gift of a red-packet saying that although it was but a small token he wanted her to assist him in every possible way. She declined the gift. Subsequently he sought to get a friend of his to deliver it to her but again she refused to accept it. The red packet contained $200. She wrote an article on the appellant which he thought was not flattering.

3. The appellant did not give evidence at his trial but relied solely on a submission of no case to answer. In his Statement of Findings the magistrate said

"The proof of the charge succeeded or fell on the question of whether I could draw the inference that the gift was for the purpose of procuring the return of the appellant to the Urban Council. As Miss Tam was not known to the appellant and the meeting was arranged for the sole purpose of obtaining information for the article I came to the conclusion that no other inference could be drawn in respect of the intent of the gift ....... Accordingly, the only conclusion which I found I could draw from the evidence was that the gift was made in the hope that it would cause her to report on the appellant in a favourable way. I found the charge proved and entered a conviction.

4. Mr. Corrigan who appears on behalf of the appellant filed two grounds of appeal. In his second ground he submitted that the trial magistrate erred in finding that the only inference he could draw from the offer was that it would cause Miss Tam to report on the appellant in a favourable way and he stressed the absence of any express words, arrangement or understanding made between the appellant and Miss Tam as to the content of any article she was to write on him. At the hearing of the appeal however he did not pursue his ground of appeal.

5. The substantive ground of appeal is as follows :-

6. In fact the finding of the magistrate was that the gift was made for the purpose of procuring the return of the appellant to the Urban Council.

7. Mr. Corrigan's additional arguments on the appeal may be summarised as follows :-

8. All these points were part of the overall argument that the conduct of the appellant fell outside the intendment of the section. Mr. Corrigan contended that there has to be some activity which has a direct interference with the outcome of the particular election. He argues that what is caught by the section is conduct which directly influences the way people vote at an election. In short he maintains there is the world of difference between paying another to get electors to vote for a candidate and giving money for good publicity.

9. Thus it seems to me that, granted the inference which the magistrate drew was correct, the question arising for determination in this appeal is : does the conduct of the appellant fall within the ambit of section 5(c) of the Ordinance. This involves a consideration of section 5 and such case law as there is on the section.

10. First I should set out subsections (a), (b) and (c) of section 5. Together with the proviso they are as follows :-

11. These sub-sections are in pari materia with the corresponding sub-sections of section 2 of the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, 1854 which in turn have been re-enacted in England in section 99(2) of the Representation of The People Act, 1949. (See Halsbury's Statutes of England, 3rd Edition, Vol.11, page 638.)

12. Under the 1949 Act a person is guilty of a corrupt practice if he is guilty of bribery and a person is guilty of bribery under section 99(2)(c) if he directly or indirectly

"makes any such gift as aforesaid to or for any person in order to induce that person to procure, or endeavour to procure, the return of any person at an election or the vote of any voter. "

13. In the General Note to section 99 there is the following extract :

"This section does not affect acts which are not done with a view to influencing the voter, or which do not relate to any vote which has been cast or which are not related to the particular objectives enumerated in the section. E.g., payment of an arrested debtor's debts in order to procure his release would be bribery if it were done with a view to influencing his vote (Londenderry (Borough) Case (1869), 1 0'M. & H. 274), but paying an acknowledged supporter's debts to procure his release would not be bribery if the payment of the debt had no effect on his vote (Ashburton Case, Dicker's Case (1859), Wolf. & B.1). ....... "

14. Then there are cited a number of examples of acts not constituting bribery which include lavish personal expenditure for the purpose of gaining infulence and payment to shout for a candidate (Tower Hamlets, St. George's Division Case, Benn v. Marks (1896) 5 0'M. & H. 89, 90).

15. Is a distinction to be drawn between payment to shout for a candidate and payment to a reporter to shout about a candidate? Is there a distinction between the sandwich-man advertising a candidate or an announcer using a microphone attached to a vehicle praising the candidate's worth during the election campaign and a reporter who is offered money to praise the donor's suitability as a candidate? The answer to this question lies in the section itself.

16. Corrupt and illegal practices at elections has as its root bribery. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol.15 paragraph 767 it is stated that bribery at a parliamentary or local election was and still is an offence at common law as well as a statutory offence.

17. The statute now is the Representation of the People Act, 1949 section 99. The footnote in Halsbury to section 99(2)(c) states :-

"This provision, originally enacted in 1854, was directed against any such extensive bribery as might amount to purchase of a seat and against corrupt agreements with persons whose local influence would enable them to control the return : Coventry Case (1869) 1 0'M & H 97 at 102. Under the different conditions in which elections are now contested, this provision and also the Representation of the People Act 1949, s.99(6) (see para.779, post) do not appear to be of much practical importance. "

18. I do not think a change in the procedure of electoral contests in England can nullify or emasculate the provisions of Cap. 228, section 5.

19. There are no modern cases on section 99 of the Representation of the People Act 1949 so one must turn to the cases on section 2(3) of the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, 1854.

20. In the Coventry Election Petition case (1869) 20 L.T.R.405 Willes, J had many observations to make on the 1854 Act which give an insight into the mischief aimed at by the legislation, the infringement of which led to the election being treated as void. Speaking of "corrupt treating" in the form of providing refreshment he said at page 409 :

"Eating and drinking must go on, notwithstanding an election coming, in the ordinary and usual course. When that eating and drinking takes the form of inviting people for the purpose of inducing them to change their minds and to vote for the party to which they do not belong, then it becomes corrupt, and is forbidden by the statute. Until that arrives the mere fact of eating and drinking, even with the connection which this supper had with politics, is not sufficient to make out treating. "

Then at page 411 His Lordhsip said of the actual bargain struck between Mr. Eaton and Mr. Hill :

"Now is that agreement in itself illegal, taking it first as a matter of law? It is insisted that it is, under the terms of the 3rd clause of the 2nd section of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102 (The Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, 1854), by which it is enacted "that every person who shall directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person, on his behalf, make any gift, loan, offer, promise, procurement, or agreement as aforesaid, to or for any person in order to induce such person to procure, or endeavour to procure, the return of any person to serve in Parliament, shall be guilty of bribery." Therefore, anything, great or small, which is given to procure a vote would be a bribe; and if given to another to purchase his influence at the election, it unquestionably also would be a bribe and would void the election. It would have been bribery in the case of the person who gave, and in the case of the person who received, the benefit; and if Mr. Eaton had agreed to give Mr. Hill £5 - I might say a farthing, in point of law; if he agreed to give him anything, if only a pepper-corn -- for the purpose of purchasing any influence which Mr. Hill had with the electors of Coventry, and of advancing Mr. Eaton's interest as a candidate at the election, it would have been bribery, and it would have avoided the election. The question is whether an agreement by one candidate to pay the expenses of another is or not a bribe. Before referring to the facts, I must conclude the statement of the law, because at the conclusion of the second section there is this proviso, which, it appears to me, has a distinct bearing upon the question : 'Provided always that the aforesaid enactment shall not extend, or be construed to extend, to any money paid or agreed to be paid for or on account of any legal expenses bona fide incurred, at or concerning any election. 'I am quite sure, and it ought to be thoroughly understood, that that relates to the expenses of the candidate, that it does not relate to the expenses of any other person, and (as I shall have occasion to observe by and by) it does not relate to the expenses of voters. To pay the expenses of voters on condition of their voting or abstaining from voting is unquestionably bribery. But the candidate may pay his own expenses ...."

21. Willes, J then went on to consider the case of canvassers and added :-

"And unquestionably if the third clause of the second section, to which I have referred, was to be taken in its literal terms, the payment of canvassers under such circumstances, being a payment in order to induce them to procure votes by means of their canvass, would fall within the terms 'in order to induce such person to procure' 'or endeavour to procure' (which would be still more applicable to the employment of canvassers), 'the return of any person to serve in Parliament, or' the clause goes on 'the vote of any voter at any election.' Now here there is a test supplied of the meaning of the third clause. Was it intended to do away with every payment made by a candidate in the course of his election, to a person who might happen to be a voter for his work in the way of taking round advertising boards, of acting as a messenger with the state of the poll, or of keeping the poll-booths clear so as to enable voters to get up to the poll, or such like practices which have been resorted to without objection where the employment of the voters in those various services was not colourable, and that even before the Representation of the People Act 1867, sect.11, to which I have already referred? But to come more nearly to this case it affords a test of whether the third clause was intended to prevent every payment to a person who was to assist the member in, obtaining the election, and in procuring votes at the election."

22. Referring to the Lambeth case in which the position of canvassers was considered he went on to say :

".... and it was held that the system (which was adopted in this city) of dividing the borough into wards, and forming committees among the voters and employing them to send out canvassers, was not objectionable, notwithstanding that there was a payment made to the canvassers for their services in canvassing. It is hardly necessary to point out how exceedingly dangerous the adoption of that system is, both in respect of the payment of canvassers, and also in respect of that which has been held lawful, namely, the supply of fair refreshment to canvassers who have not been paid whilst engaged actually, and not colourable, upon work; and in like manner, refreshment provided to committeemen. It is proper, whenever this system is referred to as not being unlawful in itself, to say that it exposes members to very great danger, and that whenever it is merely colourable it would tend to void the election. I refer to these cases for the purpose of showing that it is not every payment for the purpose of procuring a vote that can be held to be within the third clause of the second section. I do not treat the cases of canvassers as presenting any close analogy to the case of a colleague in a contest for a city. Of course, even the most distant comparison would be a comparison of great things with small, but it is necessary first to ascertain the construction of the clause, to ascertain whether it is to be taken in its literal sense, and, if not, to determine what is its proper application to the case in hand. Its proper application to the case in hand, as it appears to me, is this, that the payment to be made under the third section must be a payment for the purchase of influence; it must be a payment made under the circumstances referred to by Mr. James in his reply; a payment to some person who has great influence in a place in order to purchase that influence; it must be a payment, or gift, or loan of something valuable to him in consideration of his lending his influence or his assistance in the election. As it appears to me, it is not an offence within the third clause for a candidate to bring forward another person to stand as his] colleague. You must show an intention to do that which is against the law before you bring the case within any of those highly penal clauses of the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act 1854. And, forming the best judgment I can, and confessing with an almost painful feeling my own deficiency to decide any great constitutional question, even after the anxious deliberation which I have bestowed upon this, I must pronounce my opinion as I entertain it, that to bring forward another candidate under such circumstances without a view to purchase his influence, with the intention of serving a man's party, and because he does not mind spending his money upon the legitimate expenses of the election of himself and of the other candidate, with the view only to serve his party, and not with a view to purchase influence for himself, does not fall within that third clause to which reference has been made."

23. When coming to the question he had to decide Willes, J asked himself

"The question of fact, therefore remains whether the payment was made for the purpose of purchasing influence ....... It is difficult to distinguish between influence and assistance ......... The inquiry was it a purchase of Mr. Hill's influence? Was it a purchase for Mr. Eaton's individual advantage in the contest? was the agreement entered into by Mr. Eaton with the selfish view of aiding himself by the influence? Or was what he did fairly to be explained by a desire to serve his party without regard to any influence of Mr. Hill ......... "

24. These then are some of the criteria to be considered. In the Coventry Election Petition case it was held that the agreement made between Mr. Eaton and Mr. Hill both of whom were contesting the seat that Mr. Eaton would assume responsibility for Mr. Hill's election expenses and that Mr. Hill would not be liable to pay anything save his own personal expenses was not an agreement within clause 3 of section 2 of the 1854 Act and that it was not an offence within such 3rd clause for a candidate to bring forward another person to stand as his colleague, if it were done with the single desire to serve his party, and not to purchase the influence of such other person.

25. A further case cited to this court was the Beverley Election Petition (1869) 20 L.T.R.792. The headnote in that case reads

"At the municipal election (which took place about a fortnight before the borough Parliamentary election) persons who had also votes for the borough received bribes very much larger than was usually given at municipal elections, and subsequently voted at the Parliamentary elections for the party which bribed at the municipal election. Held to be bribery affecting the seats of the members returned by such means; that the election was void at common law without reference to the statute."

26. Martin, B in his judgment at page 794 said :

"The law upon this subject is perfectly clear. When persons have conferred upon them the franchise of voting at an election for members of Parliament, or for any other office of trust, the law imposes upon them the duty of exercising that franchise honestly, and without being unduly influenced. It is the duty of every person who obtains the franchise so to act, and his real duty is to endeavour to determine which of the candidates he in his conscience believes to be the best fitted to represent the interests of the country in Parliament, and to vote for that man. Now, no doubt this is a duty of imperfect obligation, and that there are many influences which induce a voter not to act upon it, and which the law cannot prevent. No law could prevent the influence of relationship upon a person when called upon to vote for a relation; no law could prevent a man doting for a friend whom he had long known. Nor could it be possible to prevent gratitude for services conferred from having influence upon a person about to vote. These are influences which will exist as long as human nature exists, and no law could control them. Again, there are other influences which, in the same way, no law can control. The influence arising from high birth; from the candidate living in the neighbourhood of the town, and being known and respected there. This is a sort of influence which will exist, and properly ought to exist; but there have, from the earliest times, been what are called undue influences, and if a voter's mind is affected by an undue influence when giving his vote, the vote is void. A man giving a vote for a member of Parliament under what the law deems undue influence gives no vote at all. It is the vote of a man who is incompetent to give one. The influence is difficult to be got at, but when it is got at it destroys the vote. This is the common law of England; it depends upon no statute. "

27. A little later on in the report at page 796, he added :-

"The conclusion, therefore, that I come to is, that this money was expended in bribery; that that bribery was intended to operate upon both elections, and that it was to such an extent as to be general, that by the common law an election effected by such means was vicious from the commencement, and that no members can hold their seats elected by such a bribed body of people, and that the election is null and void. And it is only right that it should be so. The law contemplates, as I have said, that the electors should give their votes purely and from conscientious motives, and that persons who go to Parliament should be elected by pure and free voters. The member who goes into Parliament does not go merely to represent this town; he is not a member for this town only; he is a member for the British Empire; he is a member to represent the interests of all, and to bind by his legislative acts every individual who lives under the Crown of England, whether within the United Kingdom or out of it; and therefore everyone has an interest in having men returned to Parliamentary pure and honest means. And, again, as has been pointed out in one of the ablest judgments that have been given in these election inquiries, the minority have an interest in respect to this matter. The minority of the electors in a town have a right to have a man sent to Parliament who really and honestly represents honest electors, and they have a right to complain if such means are resorted to as have been resorted to here, for the purpose of influencing voters; and the colour that the bribe was given professedly for the municipal election, and that some witnesses said, 'We received nothing for the borough election,' is of no avail. It is quite true that they did not, in a sense; it was not paid to them the day before they went up to vote, but there was paid to them a fortnight before a sum far above the ordinary bribe, and they well understood what was the meaning of it; it was sworn by several people that it was said on the day what was its meaning. But if there was no such evidence at all, I should draw the conclusion from the fact of such an enormous sum of money being spent for the municipal election, that it was intended to operate, and did operate and did influence the votes at the Parliamentary election.

28. The only other case to which I should refer is the Bristol Election Petition, Britt v Robinson (1869) 5 L.R.C.P. 503. In that case 3 prospective liberal candidates each seeking a seat in Parliament decided to hold a "test-ballot" to see which of them should stand in opposition to the conservative candidate. It was almost a dead certainty that the liberal candidate would defeat the conservative. The test-ballot was taken and R. had a majority of votes. He was ultimately returned to Parliament. A Petition was returned against R. on the ground that two agents of R. gave money, and one gave drink to voters, to induce them to vote for R. on the occasion of the test-ballot. The headnote continues :

"Upon a case stated for the opinion of the Court, pursuant to s.11 of the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c.125), in which it was found that 'such giving was corrupt;' but that 'no bargain was expressly or impliedly made as to their votes on the election, nor did the voters understand or suppose that their votes at the election were bought or engaged, or in any way bargained for '-

Held, that the giving the money and drink for the purpose above described was bribery and treating within s.2, sub-s.3, and s.4, of the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, 1854, and avoided R.'s election.

29. Bovill, C.J. in his judgment at page 510 of the report said :-

"On such a finding in the case, that the money and the drink were given corruptly and for that purpose, if the test-ballot was to determine virtually the return to parliament of the candidate at the head of the ballot, it seems to me impossible to escape from the conclusion that the money and drink were thus given corruptly, in order to endeavour to procure the return of Mr. Robinson to serve in parliament.

If that be so, the case is brought directly and distinctly within the 3rd clause of s.2 of the Act of 17 & 18 Vict. c.102. That Act of Parliament was intended to prevent corrupt practices in the election of members of parliament. Throughout the clauses the legislature has made it penal and illegal to commit the corrupt practices which are mentioned, "directly or indirectly." It was very well known that, in matters of this kind, persons could do indirectly and did indirectly that which would have exposed them to penalties if done directly; and every sort of scheme and contrivance from time to time had been resorted to for the purpose of evading the law against bribery. Almost every section of this Act prohibits the doing of the matters which are referred to,directly or indirectly. The 3rd clause of s.2 enacts that 'every person who shall directly or indirectly make any gift to any person, in order to induce such person to endeavour to procure the return of any person to serve in parliament,' shall be deemed guilty of bribery. I have left out the intermediate words; but that is the enactment. Then, after the words, "endeavour to procure the return of any person to serve in parliament," are the words 'or the vote of any voter at any election." The last words of that clause distinctly shew that it is bribery to endeavour by gifts to procure the vote of a voter. The votes of voters are the direct means of obtaining the return of a member to parliament. But the earlier part of the section seems to me to be directed to larger objects, viz. to prohibit the doing directly or indirectly of certain acts in order to procure or endeavour to procure the return of a person to serve in parliament, by means other than those of procuring the vote of a voter. That is the construction which I place on the 3rd clause of the section. And that being, as I think, the true construction of the Act, it would apply to and include the present case. There was here a corrupt doing of certain acts, viz. the payment of money and the giving of drink for the purpose of attaining the object which Mr. Robinson had in view, viz. being returned to parliament. The object of the test-ballot was, to determine who should be the member; the fact being that the test-ballot would virtually determine the election, at least in the estimation of Mr. Robinsion and his agents. And his agents, with that knowledge, and for the very purpose of securing his return to parliament, by placing him at the head of the test-ballot, corruptly paid this money and gave the drink. If such a case as this does not come within the Act of Parliament, it is impossible to say what consequences might not follow. If, as is contended, the legislature has not directed its attention to practices of this kind, and included them within the Act, it would be perfectly competent to any number of persons to institute a test-ballot, and for the man who had the largest and heaviest purse always to obtain the ascendency on the test-ballot, and thus secure his return against those not able or not willing to devote their money to purchasing corruptly, as was done in this case, the votes of the electors at the test-ballot. It seems to me that the Act of Parliament is abundantly sufficient to meet such a case, and that this case is brought within the 3rd clause of s.2 of the Corrupt Practices Act. "

30. Willes, J at page 512 voiced his agreement by saying :

"I quite agree with what was urged by Mr. Mellish, that the early part of that section, where it speaks of inducing such person to procure or endeavour to procure the return, is to be read with reference to the alternative 'or the vote of any voter at any election;' and, reading the words 'to procure or endeavour to procure the return,' in an alternative construction, where that alternative occurs, the result is not that you limit the first branch of the alternative to matters which fall within the second, but that you read the first branch of the alternative, expressed in general words, as covering all the genus which the species struck at in the other branch of the alternative does not include. Therefore, 'to procure or endeavour to procure the return of any person to serve in parliament,' in the first branch of the alternative means, to procure or endeavour to procure the return otherwise than by operating upon the vote of a voter under the second branch of the alternative

All that the Court has to inquire, then, is, whether what was done in this case in paying money to voters and giving them drink to vote at the test-ballot, was in order to induce them 'to endeavour to procure the return' of Mr. Robinson. It was paid directly to induce them to vote at the test-ballot. If Mr. Robinson had not been returned at the head of the poll on the test-ballot, he could not have been returned to serve in parliament at the election; for, by the agreement, which is part of the machinery with which we have to deal, each of the other two liberal candidates, one or the other of whom alone could stand in the way of his election, was to retire if not at the head of the poll. Therefore, Mr. Robinson could not have been returned unless he had been at the head of the poll; and the voter was paid for endeavouring to place him at the head of the poll.

and a little later he added :

31. Montague Smith, J. in his judgment said :

"It seems to me that this was an endeavour to procure the return to parliament by means of purchased votes which should place Mr. Robinson at the head of the poll at the test-ballot. It certainly does not seem to me too remote from the return, because the direct and immediate result of being placed at the head of the test-ballot was, if not to secure his election, at all events very greatly to further it. Therefore it was, as it seems to me, in the words of the Act, an endeavour to procure his return.

Mr. Mellish has argued that this section is aimed at the corrupt practice of persons giving money to any one to secure the influence of such person at the election. Assume that that is so, it seems to me that the money was given here to the voter to secure such influence as he had and could use for the purpose of procuring the return. His influence was important. It was, not his vote, which could only be given at the election, but his voice at the preliminary ballot, which was an influence, and a very powerful influence, that he could use in order to put Mr. Robinson in a position where his return was reasonably certain. It seems to me, therefore, according to that view of the Act, there was a purchase of the influence of the voter for the purpose of the test-ballot.

One mode of trying this would be, to suppose the case to have occurred which I suggested during the argument, that Mr. Robinson had purchased, or that an agent for him had purchased, the votes of 200 electors, with a distinct agreement that they were for the test-ballot only, and that they were free to vote for anybody they liked at the election. Such a purchase might, under given circumstances, have put the purchaser at the head of the test-ballot. It would not be a gift in order to procure the votes at the election itself, but certainly, as it seems to me, it would be purchasing the influence of all those persons, and therefore it would be giving money to those persons for the purpose of inducing them to endeavour to secure the return. It appears upon the case that there were not here any corrupt practices on the wholesale scale I have adverted to; but, in order to test whether there are corrupt practices within the Act, it is necessary to look not only at what is the effect of the acts which were done in this case, but what might be the effect of such acts, if the Court were to sanction them either on a small or a great scale. "

32. It seems to me that this is a criterion for determining whether the conduct under consideration falls within section 5(c) of the Ordinance.

33. Mr. Howard who appeared on behalf of the Crown contended that the competency or otherwise of Miss Tam to influence would-be voters is not relevant. He argued that the offence was committed if the appellant intended her to seek to use her influence over them and thus endeavour to procure his return. He said there was nothing to prevent the appellant from buying space in the newspaper and publishing an article under his own name setting out his qualifications for election. In these circumstances the reader would know it was the equivalent of honest campaigning. The article which Miss Tam was to write was to have every semblance of an independent report. Readers would have imagined it was a fair and genuine assessment of the appellant coming from the independent mind of a responsible reporter. He pointed there was all the difference in the world between such a report and a canvasser or sandwich-man. In the case of a canvasser one knows his persuasion and can take his cri de coeur with a pinch of salt. The report sought by the appellant was to be dressed in the garb of an unbiassed, non-partisan report whereby he would be stealing a march on his competitors. The appellant, he claimed, tried unfairly to influence Miss Tam in what she wrote and thereby gain an undue influence over others standing for election.

34. I am satisfied upon a full consideration of the reports which have been extensively cited above that the appellant did bribe Miss Tam in order to induce her to endeavour to procure his return to serve on the Urban Council. That was the finding of the magistrate and it was an inference which he was entitled to draw from the evidence. The Urban Council carries out important duties which have an influence on the well-being of us all and, as was said by Montague-Smith, J. in The Bristol Election Petition Case one must look at the act done and ask oneself what might be the effect of such acts, if the Court were to sanction them on a small or great scale? In Hong Kong one shudders to think.

35. For these reasons I am satisfied that in law the appellant's conduct was not outside the ambit of section 5(c) of the Ordinance and that the conviction was not entered in error. Accordingly this appeal against conviction is dismissed.

Representation:

Mr. C.R. Howard, Counsel for the Crown.

Mr. A.J. Corrigan (Shun & Yeung) for the Appellant.