Lu Shang Chang v. Kingroup Ltd.
Read the full judgment text of CACV 106/1995 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 27 June 1995 before Litton V.-P., Bokhary JA, Liu JA.
Civil procedure – interlocutory application – application to discharge or vary interim order of single judge – pending appeal – second distraint of goods – whether goods liable to be distrained a second time – practical justice – Supreme Court Ordinance s.35(3) – application dismissed – order of Mortimer JA upheld – conditions including payment of HK$200,000 into court and removal of machinery to remain in place
Legal issues: Application to discharge or vary interim order
Outcome: Application to discharge or vary the interim order of Mortimer JA dismissed.
Cited by 7 cases
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CACV000106/1995 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 1995, No. 106 ____________
____________ Coram: Hon Litton, V.-P., Bokhary and Liu, JJ.A. Date of hearing: 27 June 1995 Date of judgment: 27 June 1995 __________________ J U D G M E N T __________________ Litton, V.-P.: 1. This is an interlocutory matter. We are asked to discharge or vary an order of a single judge of this court made on 25 May 1995, pending the hearing of an appeal at the end of September this year. 2. The applicant before us is the respondent to the appeal and is the landlord of premises on the 1/F of Longlife Industrial Building at No. 15 Ko Fai Road. These are premises in which items of machinery were located. These items of machinery now belong to the appellant. He had bought them at an auction on 18 January this year; an auction organized by the bailiff upon the respondent levying distraint as landlord upon those goods. 3. The question on the appeal will be whether the goods were liable to be distrained a second time. Apparently what happened was this. Within about three weeks of the goods having been purchased by the appellant those goods were seized again. They had been left upon the premises, it is said, by the appellant by arrangement with the tenant. The appellant says that the second distraint is unlawful. The respondent disagrees. 4. On 18 April 1995 the notice of appeal was lodged, pursuant to leave having been given by the District Court. Apparently, the reason why the District Judge dismissed the appellant's claim to the goods was because the District Judge found that he had abandoned his ownership of the goods. If the appellant be right in his contention that the machinery was not liable to be distrained a second time, it follows that the second distraint was unlawful and the appellant's claim should succeed. None of these matters however are for our determination on the present application. 5. The only matter before us is whether Mortimer JA was right to order, as he did on 25 May, to this effect: that the bailiff should not proceed with the second sale of these goods, acting upon the second warrant of distress, upon conditions Mortimer JA imposed as follows:
6. The sum of $200,000 represented in effect the value of the goods purchased by the appellant at the auction as the highest bidder in January and this sum we are told has now been paid into court. 7. Mr Chain for the applicant asks that the order of Mortimer JA be discharged altogether or be substituted upon such terms that, as from 19 May 1995, the expenses incurred by reason of the bailiff not selling the goods to be the appellant's responsibility. 8. This is a variant on the first conditions which Mr Chain formulated in opening this application: they were in very different terms. 9. When Mr Chain was invited to formulate the precise terms of the order which he seeks from this court should we refuse to discharge Mortimer JA's order altogether, he produced a draft minute of judgment to the following effect:
10. As can be seen, this formal order leaves a number of points yet to be determined. For instance, the amount to be paid for the use and occupation of the premises; and by this order we would be asked to make an order directing the bailiff to do something, though he (the bailiff) is in fact not a party before this court. In my judgment Mr Chain's proposed order leaves far too many loose ends to be tied up and I am by no means satisfied that, at the end of the day, it necessarily produces a result which would be fairer to the parties than the one actually made by Mortimer JA. 11. This is an interim matter. What the court tries to do is practical justice, not perfect justice. Mortimer JA had, before him, the parties represented by counsel. The matter was fully argued and he made the best order he could in the circumstances as he saw them. I see no reason to differ from the view he took and in my judgment we should not accede to the application. I would dismiss the respondent's application made pursuant to s35(3) of the Supreme Court Ordinance. Bokhary, J.A.: 12. I concur in the judgment which has just been delivered. Liu, J.A.: 13. For the reasons given by my Lord the Vice-President I, too, would dismiss the application.
Representation: Mr K M Chong (M/S Charles S.C. Yeung & Co.) for Appellant/1st Claimant Mr Benjamin Chain (M/S Peter W.K. Lo & Co.) for Respondent/Plaintiff (Applicant) |
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