HKSAR v. Wong Yuk Yee

Please refer to CACC205/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.
Case No.HCCC 10/2012
Court
High Court CFI
Date18 May 2012
Judge
Case Document
100%

HCCC10/2012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 10 OF 2012

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  HKSAR  
  v  
  Wong Yuk-yee  

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Before: DHCJ A Pang
Date: 18 May 2012 at 2.38 pm
Present: Mr Edward J Brook, SPP of the Department of Justice, for HKSAR
  Mr Benjamin Chain, instructed by Messrs Hui & Lam, for the Accused
Offence:  Throwing corrosive fluid with intent (有意圖而淋潑腐性液體)

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Transcript of the Audio Recording
of the Sentence in the above Case

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COURT: The Facts

The defendant pleaded guilty before a magistrate sitting in the Eastern Magistrates’ Court to one count of throwing corrosive fluid with intent, contrary to section 29(c) of the Offences Against the Person Ordinance, Cap. 212. She was committed to this court for sentence.

On 23 August 2011, the defendant, now aged 57, attended a hearing at the Family Court in the Wanchai Law Courts Building. She sought to apply for an interest in a property of her former husband, the victim, but she lost the case. At the conclusion of the hearing, the defendant left the courtroom, but she returned almost immediately. At that time, the victim, his counsel, a representative from his instructing solicitor’s firm, and the court clerk were still inside the courtroom.

The defendant then took out a plastic bottle from her handbag, unscrewed the top of the bottle, proceeded towards the victim, and splashed the liquid inside the bottle onto the victim. The liquid went in particular onto the victim’s face. Some of it also went onto the furniture, and a small amount went onto the legal representative, who was then standing next to the victim.

The defendant left the courtroom but was detained by a security guard.

When the police arrived, the defendant admitted that she had splashed the toilet-cleaning liquid over the victim after losing her case.

Under caution, the defendant said, “I did splash it on him. I am weary of life.” During a subsequent video‑recorded interview, the defendant stated that she had bought the liquid from a metalware shop a few days ago. She used half a bottle for cleaning the toilet, and she then put the rest into the plastic bottle which she had brought along to court. She said she had done that as the law could not help her.

When the victim was examined in the hospital, he was found to have redness over his right arm, abrasion wound over his left upper eyelid, cloudy appearance of both corneas with no corneal abrasion. He could only perceive light and finger counting during that examination, and there was marked redness of conjunctiva of both eyes with periorbital swelling.

The victim later underwent medical therapy and left eye amniotic membrane transplantation. The legal representative was found to have mild residual swelling and redness over both upper and lower lips and was discharged on the same day.

The liquid in the bottle was, upon examination, found to contain hydrochloric acid having a concentration of 26 per cent weight by weight. The acid was corrosive and was capable of causing severe burn to skin and permanent damage to eyes.

The Reports

I now have with me the defendant’s background report and her psychiatric report.

The defendant was described as a diligent and ambitious working mother who had worked all her way up to the manager’s position at garment factories in Hong Kong, the mainland, Thailand and the Philippines. She contributed financially to the family, but had little time to spend with her three children.

Between 2003 and 2006, she suspected that her husband had an affair with another woman, and she herself also suffered from breast cancer, which later led to her ceasing employment. In 2007, she petitioned for divorce, and she then got involved in repeated Family Court hearings over the ancillary relief dispute.

It was concluded in the background report that the defendant finally lost her mind when she committed the present offence harming the victim to relieve her stress.

The psychiatric report confirmed that the defendant had not been known to any psychiatric service before. However, her mood deteriorated in May 2011 after she lost her case. She then “had sense of hopelessness and described on and off suicidal wish, but said she would need to retaliate as she could not forgive her ex‑husband”.

The defendant attended the Family Clinic in June 2011, and it was documented in the clinical record on 2 June 2011 that she has “thought of harming her husband”.

The defendant was scheduled to attend a psychiatric outpatients’ clinic in September 2011, but before she attended her first appointment, she had committed the present offence.

When the defendant was seen on 30 April 2012, the psychiatrist considered that she was not psychotic and she expressed no suicidal or violent thoughts. The psychiatrist is of the opinion that the defendant has been suffering from an adjustment disorder since May 2011, but her condition has improved, and further in-hospital treatment is not required.

Mitigation

In mitigation, Mr Chain submitted that the relatively low concentration level of hydrochloric acid found in this case, when compared with the others in which sulphuric acid with a much higher concentration level was used, should be taken in the defendant’s favour. Mr Chain also submitted that the commission of the offence was completely out of character, and that the defendant was merely pushed to her limit as she was in a very depressed mood, and she thought that the legal system had let her down. By that time the defendant had also had operations in respect of her breast cancer and cervical canal tumour, and she had been forced to leave her garment factory job.

This morning, letters written by the defendant, her children and her relatives were submitted to the court. All spoke well of the defendant, saying that she had worked hard for the family, but at the end she ended up having poor health and getting a divorce.

Sentencing Considerations

I should state at the outset that throwing corrosive fluid with intent is a serious offence. In the recent case of HKSAR v Sin Wa Chiu CACC161/2011, 19 January 2012, unreported, the Court of Appeal referred to what Hartmann JA said in HKSAR v Chi Chi Hong, Ken CACC299/2010, 25 November 2011, unreported:

“There is however no ‘tariff’ in cases of this kind. The appropriate sentence to be imposed in each case is to be determined by the particular facts of that case. What can be said is that the legislature recognises that the crime has such awful potential for causing lifelong suffering to its victims, maiming them and causing them terrible disfigurement, that it has seen fit to impose a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.”

Moreover, the circumstances under which the present offence took place did not merely arise from marital discord, but also from the defendant’s dissatisfaction with a court order. The very place which the throwing of corrosive fluid occurred was in the courtroom at a time when the court clerk and the victim’s legal representatives were all there. Nevertheless, the defendant still went forward to the victim, and despite that the representative of the solicitors’ firm was only next to the victim, the defendant splashed the corrosive fluid onto the victim, thus causing some of the liquid to land on the representative. It was fortunate that no serious injuries were caused to the representative as only a small amount had gone the representative’s way, causing mild swelling and redness over his lips.

Although, no doubt, the defendant was dissatisfied and felt hopeless at that time, she had however brought along the bottle to court and had thrown the corrosive fluid inside a courtroom.

I regard this as an aggravating factor. It needs no elaboration that no one should take the law into his or her own hands. The use of violence in a courtroom to ventilate one’s anger or dissatisfaction must be deterred, be it violence exerted on the opposite party or anyone else present.

Now turning to the defendant, she is of a clear record, and the psychiatrist considers her to have been suffering from adjustment disorder since May 2011. Further, as revealed in the background report, the defendant had worked very hard in order to contribute to the family, and she felt betrayed by the victim. However, the report also described the defendant as being “bossy and mean to confront the victim and throw object while the victim had been unresponsive and apathetic”.

As regards the present condition of the victim, his attending ophthalmologist reported at his latest follow‑up on 2 April 2012 his left eye cornea showed mild corneal scar while the right eye cornea was clear. Best corrected visual acuities were 0.2 for the right eye and 0.1 for the left eye. According to the victim himself, he still could not see with his left eye, but he had regained about 40 per cent of eyesight in his right eye. He also confirmed that he has fully recovered from his other injuries, leaving no scars.

Mr Chain referred to the younger son’s letter and stated that the victim could go out on his own and could lead his life relatively normally. However, Mr Chain did not dispute the medical findings, and that is the basis upon which this court would proceed when considering the extent of the injuries caused to the victim.

The Sentence

Having taken into account all the relevant facts, including the aggravating factors identified above, I consider that a starting point of 11 years is called for in this case. However, in view of the personal circumstances of the defendant and the fact that she must have felt depressed and helpless at the time, I am prepared to reduce the starting point to one of 9 years.

The defendant pleaded guilty, and she will be given a one‑third reduction for her plea. Other than that, there is nothing which will further reduce the sentence.

The defendant is therefore to serve a term of 6 years for this charge.

Please refer to CACC205/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.