Brian Alfred Hall v. Secretary for Justice
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 1201/2008 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 26 April 2013.
1. Under section 27 (1) of the High Court Ordinance (“ Ordinance ”), the court may make an order that no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the court be instituted by the person against whom the order is made. The court may not make such an order unless it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and consistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings.
Cites 10 cases
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HCMP 1201/2008 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1201 OF 2008 ____________
AND HCAL 161/2012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 161 OF 2012 ____________
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_____________ D E C I S I O N _____________ Introduction 1.Under section 27 (1) of the High Court Ordinance (“Ordinance”), the court may make an order that no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the court be instituted by the person against whom the order is made. The court may not make such an order unless it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and consistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings. 2.On 2 December 2008, the Applicant (“Hall”) was declared by Hon Yam J to be a vexatious litigant within the meaning of section 27 of the Ordinance. This was in view of Hall’s history of having instituted more than 100 sets of legal proceedings between 2002 and 2008 against a wide array of public officers and bodies. By his judgment dated 23 January 2009, Yam J further restricted Hall from making more than one application to the court in each period of 3 months, which period was extended to 6 months by Yam J on 11 May 2011. Between December 2008 and May 2011, Hall had made 19 applications for leave to commence legal proceedings, which were all dismissed. 3.Hall is currently an inmate at Stanley Prison, serving a number of sentences: (1) of 18 years imprisonment for trafficking in dangerous drugs, for which he was sentenced on 23 June 1998; (2) of 2 months and 14 days imprisonment for common assault and criminal damage, for which he was sentenced on 2 April 2009; (3) of 7 days imprisonment for non-payment of a fine, for which he was sentenced on 6 April 2009; and (4) of 4 years imprisonment for perverting the course of justice and using copies of a false instrument, for which she was sentenced on 6 January 2012 (which sentence the Court of Appeal increased to 6 years 9 months on 6 March 2013). 4.On 26 October 2012, Hall issued notice of his application under section 27A of the Ordinance for leave to institute proceedings (“section 27 Application”). The orders which he sought were for leave to apply for judicial review and, in so far as is necessary, leave to commence habeas corpus proceedings. 5.Under section 27A(1) of the Ordinance, leave for the institution of “any legal proceedings” by a person who is the subject of an order in force under section 27 shall not be given unless the court is satisfied that “the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court in question, and there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings”. An applicant must show that there are reasonable grounds for bringing a claim, and the court has to consider whether or not the claim has a real prospect of success, taking into account all of the information before it, including evidence as to conduct of the applicant for leave, before and after his being categorized as a vexatious litigant (para 32A/3/1 Hong Kong Civil Procedure). The whole purpose of section 27 is to provide a filter for claims which a vexatious litigant might wish to bring (Ewing v News International Ltd [2008] EWHC 1390, based on section 42 of English Supreme Court Act 1981). In addition to showing that there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings, the applicant for leave must further establish, as required under section 27A(1), that the proceedings in question are not an abuse of the process of the court. 6.At the heart of Hall’s section 27 Application is his challenge of 74 sets of disciplinary proceedings instituted against him whilst in prison, as a result of which his entitlement to remission of sentence was forfeited. In his Form 86 filed with the section 27 Application, Hall claims that there are further disciplinary proceedings in respect of which he had not been provided with the relevant papers at the time of the filing of the section 27 Application in October 2012. On Hall’s case, the total remission purportedly forfeited through the disciplinary convictions was 891 days of remission, equivalent to just under 2 1/2 years additional imprisonment imposed by the officers of the Correctional Services Department (“CSD”). 7.Hall contended that the disciplinary proceedings against him were unlawful because:
Habeas corpus 8.Hall’s claim was that but for the unlawful forfeiture of remission resulting from the disciplinary proceedings, he would have been released by 28 June 2012, and that there was no basis for Hall’s detention thereafter. Hence, Hall claimed that he was entitled to apply for habeas corpus, and should be given leave to make such application. However, due to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in CACC 18/2012 and CAAR 1/2012 which was handed down on 6 March 2013 (“Judgment”), whereby the sentence for the offences in question was increased from 4 years to 6 years 9 months, Hall’s term of imprisonment (even assuming a full one-third remission) will run until 27 April 2014. Hall therefore concedes that his habeas corpus application, as originally intended, is no longer arguable by virtue of the Judgment. 9.Whilst accepting that the habeas corpus application can no longer be argued by reason of the increase in sentence, Counsel for Hall ask that the habeas corpus application be adjourned, as Hall is considering an appeal against the Judgment, and that in the event of his appeal being successful, his habeas corpus application might become viable again, and he would need leave to pursue it under section 27A of the Ordinance. 10.There is no justification to adjourn the application for leave to commence the habeas corpus proceedings, simply on the basis that Hall may appeal against the Judgment. It is clear that Hall is now lawfully detained pursuant to a valid criminal conviction imposing a sentence of imprisonment which has not been fully served. It cannot be argued that Hall is being unlawfully detained, and the habeas corpus application is bound to fail. Accordingly, the section 27 Application to commence habeas corpus proceedings is dismissed. Judicial Review 11.It was argued for Hall that he has an arguable case for judicial review, in seeking:
12.Hall recognizes that the application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Relevant Decisions dating back to June 1999 is out of time. It was argued that it would nevertheless be a wrong exercise of discretion if the court was to reject Hall’s application on grounds of delay, bearing in mind the fact that it raises important questions of constitutional law and breach of the provisions of Articles 10 and 11 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights set out in section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. 13.Article 10 of the Bill of Rights provides for equality before the courts and the right to a fair and public hearing. Under Article 10:
14.Article 11 provides for the rights of persons charged with or convicted of a criminal offence. Article 11 (2) provides as follows:
Wrong standard of proof ground 15.According to Hall, the adjudicators had failed to apply the correct standard proof in the disciplinary proceedings against him. Relying on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wong Tak Wai v Commissioner of Correctional Services [2010] 4 HKLRD 409, it was argued that on the basis of the nature and severity of the sanctions that may be imposed in prison disciplinary proceedings, namely forfeiture of remission, such proceedings involved a determination of a criminal charge within the meaning of Article 10, and that the standard of proof should be beyond reasonable doubt. 16.In arguing that leave should not be granted to Hall to challenge the legality of the Relevant Decisions on the ground that the wrong standard of proof had been applied, Mr Pao for the Putative Respondent highlights the fact that prior to the CFI decision in Wong Tak Wai, the standard of the balance of probabilities had been used in disciplinary proceedings, and that Wong Tak Wai had effectively changed the law by applying the criminal standard of proof to prison disciplinary proceedings. Counsel relies on HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa (2006) 9 HKCFAR 614, to argue that extension of time will not be granted by the court solely on the ground that a previous understanding of the law is incorrect. 17.In his judgment in HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa (at paragraphs 24 - 25), Li CJ stated :
18.In Li Siu Hing v Commissioner of Correctional Services, CACV 277/2009, 19 March 2010, Tang VP (as he then was) affirmed a refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review in respect of a serving prisoner on the basis, inter alia, that a higher standard of proof ought to have been applied in respect of disciplinary convictions. Mr Pao relies on the following parts of the judgment of Tang VP (at paragraphs 9-10):
19.Wong Tak Wai was a decision handed down by the Court of First Instance in August 2009, which was more than 3 years prior to Hall’s section 27 Application in October 2012, by which Hall sought to challenge the disciplinary decisions. The Court of Appeal decision was handed down in July 2010. The first of the disciplinary decisions challenged by Hall was dated 26 January 1999. Others were dated March and October 1999; March and September 2000; January and February 2002; January and December 2003; January, June, October and November 2004; January, April, July, September and October 2005; March, April and July 2006; January, February, June, August, September and December 2007; January, April, May, July and December 2008; April and June 2009; November 2010; January, February, March, May, June, September, November and December 2011. 20.There was a delay of 3 years 2 months from August 2009 to October 2012 when the section 27 Application was made. I can find no exceptional circumstances in this case which justify granting time to Hall to apply for judicial review in respect of these decisions made between 1999 and 2011. 21.Leading counsel referred to a letter dated 29 April 2009 from Hall to Yam J, highlighting the fact that in that letter, Hall had referred to an intended application for leave to apply for judicial review, and that the grounds he had specified included the grounds of wrong standard of proof and of bias in the disciplinary proceedings. It was argued that any delay should be excused in view of the fact that Hall was only able to make one application for leave to commence proceedings in every 6 months, that he had referred to the intended judicial review in his letter of 29 April 2009, and that Hall had been directed by Yam J in July 2009 to pursue the matter by way of misfeasance instead of judicial review. 22.However, the full correspondence to which Mr Pao has referred demonstrates clearly that it was in fact Hall’s own decision not to pursue the judicial review proceedings to which he had alluded in April 2009. His letter of 29 April 2009 addressed to Hon Yam J was expressed to be a “request for advice/direction”. In the letter, Hall stated that he wished “to apply for leave to judicially review approximately 60 disciplinary decisions against (him) out of time”, and asked for advice as to “how to consolidate” his 60 disciplinary convictions to be “heard together”, and how the application could be heard and completed before 14 September 2009. On 26 May 2009, the clerk to Yam J referred Hall’s letter to the Department of Justice, with the judge’s direction for a response from the Department of Justice. The letter was copied to Hall. 23.On 1 June 2009, Hall wrote to the Department of Justice, with reference to the letter of 26 May 2009, and stated that he “had never applied for leave to commence judicial review out of time”. He stated in the letter that he had been assigned legal aid, and that he would soon be making an application to the court as his lawyers thought fit. On 9 June 2009, the Department of Justice wrote to the clerk to Yam J, with copy to Hall (and to the lawyers assigned to him by then), referring to Hall’s letter of 1 June 2009 and stating that they would not be making any submissions to the court. Consequently, on 10 June 2009, the clerk to Yam J wrote to the Department of Justice, Hall and his lawyers, confirming that no further action was required from the Department of Justice. 24.On 17 June 2009, Hall (acting under legal advice) applied for leave, under section 27A of the Ordinance, “to institute proceedings for misfeasance in public office” against (inter alia) the Commissioner for Correctional Services. It was in these circumstances that the clerk to Yam J wrote to the Department of Justice and to Hall and his legal advisers on 14 July 2009, informing the parties of His Lordship’s direction with regard to the intended proceedings for misfeasance in public office. 25.The misfeasance proceedings were subsequently stayed in November 2009, pending the trial of DCCC 1431/2009 against Hall for perverting the course of justice. Hall claims that it was not possible for him to revive the proceedings until the conclusion of DCCC 1431/2009 or the stay of proceedings was otherwise lifted. Upon his conviction in DCCC 1431/2009 in January 2012, Hall sought to reactivate the application for leave to commence proceedings, and was directed by Lam J (as he then was) in May 2012 to make a new application for leave, thus prompting the section 27 Application in October 2012. 26.It is clear from the history of the case that Hall had, under legal advice, decided for his own reasons to seek leave in 2009 to pursue misfeasance proceedings, and not to pursue judicial review in respect of the disciplinary decisions. I fail to see how the events between April 2009 (when Hall first wrote to Yam J) and October 2012 (when he made the section 27 Application to commence judicial review proceedings) can constitute exceptional circumstances, to justify leave being granted to Hall to pursue the judicial review proceedings notwithstanding the long period of delay. 27.There are further decisions made in the disciplinary proceedings, in respect of which Hall claims (in Form 86 filed with the section 27 Application) that he had not been provided with the relevant papers at the time of the filing of the section 27 Application in October 2012 (“Further Decisions”). These Further Decisions were made in January, March, April, June, July and August 2012 (according to the Supplemental List filed by the parties in April 2013). However, in respect of these Further Decisions, the standard of proof applied was the correct one, beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Hall would have no arguable case for judicial review in respect of the Further Decisions made in 2012. 28.I consider that Hall has no arguable case for judicial review on the ground of the standard of proof. Leave to commence judicial review proceedings on this ground is accordingly refused. Bar to legal representation ground 29.Hall claims that the adjudicators in the disciplinary proceedings had applied a blanket policy of not allowing legal representation to him. Counsel for Hall rely on Lam Siu Po v Commissioner of Police (2009) 12 HKCFAR 237, in which the Court of Final Appeal held that although there is no automatic right to legal representation in proceedings to which Article 10 applies in the context of the determination of a person’s rights and obligations in a suit at law, a blanket bar on legal representation will be incompatible with Article 10, as it removes the discretion of the tribunal to allow legal representation when fairness requires it. 30.In Lam Siu Po, the Court of Final Appeal considered that disciplinary actions concerning civil servants and the professions determine “rights or obligations in a suit at law” within the provisions of Article 10, because such disciplinary proceedings “have a direct and highly adverse impact on the appellant’s civil rights and obligations”. 31.Counsel for Hall also rely on Wong Tak Wai v Commissioner of Correctional Services [2010] 4 HKLRD 409, at p 441, where, in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, Kwan JA held, as follows:
32.In Wong Tak Wai, the Court of Appeal considered that the combined penalty involved for the appellant in the case, of a loss of 98 days’ remission, rendered the disciplinary proceedings in question determinative of a criminal charge. Counsel for Hall hence argue that the disciplinary proceedings against Hall, all of which could result in a loss of remission as a penalty, involve the determination of a criminal charge, and that both Articles 10 and 11 apply. 33.Superintendent Siu Chi Wing (“Siu”), who had served as an adjudicator in many of the disciplinary proceedings against Hall, gave evidence in DCCC 1431/2009. Hall claims that Siu’s evidence confirmed that lawyers were not permitted to participate in the disciplinary proceedings, and that such prohibition was not prescribed by law. According to Hall, the adjudicators had indiscriminately refused legal representation to him in each case when Hall was subjected to disciplinary proceedings, and this suggests either that there was a blanket policy of denying legal representation, or that the adjudicators had never exercised any discretion at all when they determined whether legal representation should be granted. 34.On this basis, it is claimed that the decisions of the disciplinary adjudicators to deny legal representation to Hall were unlawful and in breach of Hall’s right to legal representation under Article 11, and to a fair hearing under Article 10. Hall relies on Lam Siu Po, in which the Court held that the Police (Discipline) Regulations which barred legal representation before the disciplinary tribunal was disproportionate, as it prevented the tribunal from complying with its duty to ensure a fair hearing under Article 10 and the common law. 35.Counsel for Hall also refers to section 9 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance , which provides that “persons lawfully detained in penal establishments of whatever character are subject to such restrictions as may from time to time be authorized by law for the preservation of service and custodial discipline” (emphasis added). In the absence of any restriction imposed by legislation to Hall’s right to legal representation, counsel submitted that the decisions made by the disciplinary tribunal, to deny legal representation to Hall, are all unlawful. 36.The same issue of delay arises in relation to the Relevant Decisions sought to be challenged on the ground of bar to legal representation. Under Order 53 rule 4 (1) of RHC, an application for leave to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose, unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. 37.In Lo Siu Lan v Hong Kong Housing Authority CACV 378 of 2004, 17 December 2004, Stock JA highlighted the following passage in the judgment of Lord Diplock in O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237, 280-281 :
38.In his judgment handed down on 30 June 2006 in HCAL 5/2006, which was an earlier application made by Hall for leave to apply for judicial review, Hartman J (as he then was) had already pointed out that in judicial review proceedings, “delay is a serious issue, one which puts an applicant in peril”. His Lordship also referred to R v Aston University Senate ex parte Roffey [1969] 2 QB 538 and the judgment of Donaldson J ( as he then was ) at p 555:
39.It is recognized that in considering whether there is delay, there must be due regard to context, to the time scales inherent in the particular decision making process and in its consequences. 40.Hall claims that it was only in January 2011 that he discovered, in the course of DCCC 1431/2009, that there was an unlawful blanket policy against legal representation in the disciplinary proceedings. Even if this was true, he did not make the section 27 Application until October 2012. There was neither need nor justification to await the outcome of DCCC 1431/2009 before seeking leave to institute judicial review proceedings for alleged breach of Articles 10 and 11. The charges in DCCC 1431/2009 are totally unrelated to the judicial review proceedings. 41.In all the circumstances of this case, I can see no good reason for extending the time for Hall to apply for judicial review, after the long period of delay from January 2011. Even taking into consideration the fact that DCCC 1431/2009 only concluded on 12 January 2012, there was still delay from January 2012 to October 2012 when the section 27 Application was made. 42.The Further Decisions include decisions made between 27 July 2012 and 14 September 2012 (Ref nos 80 to 83 of the Supplemental List of Disciplinary Decisions). These fall within the 3 month period of the section 27 Application, and I will grant leave to Hall to apply for judicial review of these decisions, on the ground that it is arguable that Hall was deprived of legal representation in the disciplinary proceedings concerned, and that the proceedings were not conducted fairly, such that there was, arguably, a breach of Articles 10 and/or 11. The bias ground 43.Hall argues that Siu was actually biased against him in one particular proceeding in which Siu was involved on the disciplinary panel. As proof of Siu’s actual bias, Hall relies on the transcript of Siu’s evidence in the trial of DCCC 1431/2009. 44.Hall also complains that adjudicators who had convicted him of disciplinary offences in the past had continued to sit on panels in later proceedings, notwithstanding that they had disbelieved Hall and found him an incredible witness in earlier proceedings. Hall claims that these adjudicators lacked an impartial and open mind, and should have been automatically disqualified from judging Hall in later disciplinary proceedings, to ensure an impartial and fair trial under Articles 10 and 11. Alternatively, it is claimed that these adjudicators were required, but failed, to give due consideration to the question of their apparent bias. 45.Finally, Hall claims that there was a structural lack of independence in the adjudication system of prison disciplinary proceedings. The prison disciplinary machinery places the senior CSD officer within a prison, who was responsible for maintaining discipline in the prison as well as for supporting his /her junior officers’ frontline work, in the role of adjudicator in relation to charges typically involving the word of one of his /her subordinate officers against that of a prisoner. In Wong Tak Wai, it was argued before the Court that there was no structural independence between those charged with the roles of prosecution and adjudication of prison disciplinary offences. Various officers of the CSD handled the reporting of the disciplinary offence, the drafting and the laying of the charge, the determination of the charge and punishment, and all of them were responsible ultimately to the Commissioner. In the Court of First Instance, Fung J found that this entailed a lack of structural independence, which resulted in a breach of the right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. On appeal, the Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal on this point, although for different reasons. 46.Kwan JA considered, in Wong Tak Wai, that a case of apparent bias was established, but that the determination process as a whole, including appeal to the Commissioner under the Prison Rules and through recourse to judicial review, removed that element of unfairness at the level of hearings conducted by a superintendent. Decisions which did not comply fully with procedural unfairness requirements could be cured, if the person affected had recourse to a further hearing or appeal which itself provided fairness. Her Ladyship considered that the safeguards for a fair adjudication were met and that the process overall was compliant with the requirements for a fair hearing. 47.Cheung JA agreed that any lack of structural independence was fully cured by the prisoner’s access to the court, which was fully independent, through judicial review. However, Cheung JA did not agree that there was apparent bias. He explained this, at paragraph 137 of his judgment:
48.Counsel for Hall accepts that this court is bound by the Court of Appeal decision in Wong Tak Wai, on the question of the structural independence of the adjudication of prison disciplinary offences. It follows that I cannot find Hall’s intended judicial review of the Relevant Decisions to be arguable on the ground of the alleged breach of Articles 10 and 11 for lack of structural independence in the adjudication process. 49.As for the argument of Siu’s actual bias, Hall had appealed to the Commissioner in relation to Siu’s decision. The appeal was dismissed, and there is no evidence or allegation that the appeal decision was biased. 50.Further, in relation to the complaints of actual or apparent bias on the part of Siu and any others of the adjudicating officers, Hall had in 2006 sought to challenge 25 of his past disciplinary convictions by judicial review in HCAL 5/2006. The grounds he argued in HCAL 5/2006 included that the adjudicating officers “were biased because in every case they were judges in their own cause”. The application for leave was refused by Hartman J (as he then was) on 30 June 2006. 51.Under section 27A of the Ordinance, leave for the institution of proceedings shall not be given unless the court is satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court in question. Having made a blanket application by HCAL 5/2006 to review 25 disciplinary convictions on the general ground of bias, I consider that it is an abuse for Hall to attempt to re-litigate these matters on the same ground of alleged bias. I refuse leave under section 27A. The parallel proceedings ground 52.It was argued on behalf of Hall that various disciplinary proceedings were taken against him and heard contemporaneously with DCCC 1431/2009, the trial of which commenced on 9 December 2009 and concluded on 12 January 2012. It is claimed that this was in breach of his rights against self-incrimination, that the disciplinary proceedings sought to try the very issue then before the criminal court in breach of the sub judice principle, and that the disciplinary proceedings were in all the circumstances unfair. 53.On behalf of the Putative Respondent, Mr Pao argued that the charges in the disciplinary proceedings were all unrelated to the charges in DCCC 1431/2009, such that there was no justification to stay these proceedings pending the criminal trial. 54.Bearing in mind that the Relevant Decisions in question to which the disciplinary proceedings relate were made between May 2011 and November 2011, I consider that there is undue delay in making the section 27 Application. I can see no good reason in this case to extend time and to grant leave to Hall to make the judicial review application. Conclusion 55.For the above reasons, I only grant leave to Hall to institute judicial review proceedings in relation to the decisions referred to in paragraph 42 above.
Mr Gerard McCoy, SC & Mr Timothy Parker, instructed by Messrs Tso Au Yim & Yeung (assigned by the Director of Legal Aid), for the applicant Mr Jin Pao, instructed by Department of Justice, for putative respondent | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCMP 1201/2008