Leung Kwai Ling v. HK Glory Properties Ltd

Read the full judgment text of HCA 347/2013 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 April 2013.

1. On 22 February 2013, the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant. On 7 March 2013, the defendant by their solicitors (“JSM”) filed acknowledgment of service giving notice of intention to defend.

Cites 1 case

Case No.HCA 347/2013
Court
High Court CFI
Date30 Apr 2013
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCA 347/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 347 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

  LEUNG KWAI LING Plaintiff

and

  HK GLORY PROPERTIES LIMITED Defendant
____________
Before: Deputy High Court Judge Marlene Ng in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 30 April 2013
Date of Decision: 30 April 2013
Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision: 3 May 2013

_______________________________

REASONS FOR DECISON

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1.On 22 February 2013, the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant. On 7 March 2013, the defendant by their solicitors (“JSM”) filed acknowledgment of service giving notice of intention to defend.

2.On 11 March 2013, the plaintiff filed a summons seeking the following orders:

(a) to debar the defendant from filing “exhibits” filed in HCA366/2012 in the present action but subject to leave being granted to the defendant to “refer to those exhibits”;

(b) to transfer the “exhibits” filed by the defendant in HCA366/2012 to the present action save and except for those “exhibits” “declared void and cancelled” by her;

(c) to debar the defendant from filing exhibits of voluminous emails with the defendant and JSM which are duplicative, irrelevant and unnecessary;

(d) to debar the defendant from filing exhibits of minutes of various meetings which are irrelevant and unnecessary.

3.On 22 March 2013, Master Ho dismissed the plaintiff’s summons with costs.

4.On 15 April 2013, the defendant issued a summons seeking the following orders (“D’s Summons”):

(a) to strike out the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim in the present action under Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of the High Court on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, it is frivolous and vexatious, and it is an abuse of the process of the court, and to dismiss the plaintiff’s present action against the defendant with costs;

(b) to extend time for the defendant to file and serve their Defence until 28 days after the determination of D’s Summons;

(c) to apply for restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) and restricted applications order (“RAO”) against the plaintiff.

5.On the same day, the defendant filed the affidavit of its director Robert Yau Chung Wong in support of D’s Summons.  It is the defendant’s case that the plaintiff’s present action is unmeritorious and similar to other legal actions commenced by the plaintiff against the defendant and others which all concern matters of the “Lai Sing Court Redevelopment Project”.  The defendant says that other legal actions commenced by the plaintiff have all been dismissed by the court.

6.D’s Summons was scheduled to be heard before me on 9 May 2013 (with 15 minutes reserved).

7.On 19 April 2013, the plaintiff made an ex parte application for default judgment and filed her affirmation in support of such application.  On the same day, the plaintiff issued an inter partes summons for leave to enter default judgment against the defendant (“P’s 1st Summons”).  On 22 April 2013, the plaintiff filed her affidavit in support of P’s 1st Summons.

8.At the hearing of P’s 1st Summons on 26 April 2013, Master J Wong adjourned such summons to be heard together with D’s Summons on 9 May 2013 with costs reserved.  Master J Wong also granted extension of time until 9 May 2013 for the defendant to file and serve their Defence and Counterclaim (if any) (“Time Extension Order”).

9.On 26 April 2013, the plaintiff issued an inter partes summons for the following orders (“P’s 2nd Summons”):

(a) to dismiss D’s Summons;

(b) to apply for default judgment against the defendant;

(c) to issue RAO against the defendant “to stop [the defendant’s] current & future RAO and RPO applications against [her], and to stop [the defendant’s] current & future strike out applications in or against [her] cases in court”;

(d) to dismiss all requests for court orders by the defendant, including strike out orders, RAO, RPO and orders for extension of time for filing their Defence.

10.On the same day, the plaintiff filed her affidavit in support of P’s 2nd Summons.  She claimed that D’s Summons should be dismissed under the inherent jurisdiction of the court as an abuse of the court’s process since the contents of D’s Summons were lies and were untrue.  She further claimed that the court judgments and/or orders that struck out her various legal actions (especially those that were listed in her Statement of Claim) contained “major errors” and were “wrong & unfair” due to the lies and untruths contained in the affidavits filed by the defendants in those actions that deceived the courts.  She further claimed that the courts in granting such judgments/orders did not say her previous legal actions were frivolous or vexatious or were abuse of the court process but merely they did not show “enough cause of action”.  She claimed that her present action had full and sufficient causes of action.

11.On 29 April 2013, the plaintiff lodged her written skeleton submissions and list of authorities by fax.  In her written submissions, she referred to inter alia the alleged basis of her claims against the defendant, the various legal actions she commenced previously against a number of defendants, the reasons why she considered the judgments/orders in those legal actions were erroneous, her application for default judgment in the present action, and her disagreement with the reliefs sought in D’s Summons.

12.In my view, the plaintiff’s application for default judgment under paragraph 2 of P’s 2nd Summons (see paragraph 9(b) above) is misconceived.  First, prior to P’s 2nd Summons the plaintiff has already issued P’s 1st Summons seeking exactly the same relief.  Hence, the application for default judgment under P’s 2nd Summons is duplicative and unnecessary, and falls to be dismissed.  Secondly, on 26 April 2013 Master J Wong adjourned the hearing of P’s 1st Summons (ie the plaintiff’s application for default judgment) to be heard together with D’s Summons on 9 May 2013 before me, hence any renewed application for default judgment on 26 April 2013 is premature and unnecessary.  Thirdly, Master J Wong by the Time Extension Order dated 26 April 2013 extended time until 9 May 2013 for the defendant to file and serve their Defence, so the defendant is not presently “in default” in filing and serving their Defence.  In the circumstances, I have at the hearing on 30 April 2013 and without prejudice to P’s 1st Summons dismissed paragraph 2 of P’s 2nd Summons.

13.As regards the other reliefs sought by the plaintiff in P’s 2nd Summons, they are essentially applications to challenge D’s Summons and to prevent the defendant from seeking the reliefs sought in D’s Summons.  Although the plaintiff criticised D’s Summons as unmeritorious and an abuse of process of the court (and I have carefully considered her submissions), it is plainly inappropriate at this stage to deal with the remaining reliefs sought in P’s 2nd Summons when D’s Summons has yet to be adjudicated by the court.  The fact that the plaintiff being a litigant in person did not wish to deal with the affidavit evidence filed by the defendant is not a sufficient reason that justifies a pre-emptive application to strike out D’s Summons.

14.Rather, it is fair and appropriate to grant a case management direction that paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of P’s 2nd Summons be adjourned to be heard together with P’s 1st Summons and D’s Summons at 9:30 am on 9 May 2013 (with 15 minutes reserved), and I granted such order at the hearing on 30 April 2013.

15.Ms Leung, solicitor for the defendant, suggested that directions for filing and serving affidavit evidence in respect of D’s Summons, P’s 1st Summons and paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of P’s 2nd Summons and for fixing the hearing date for argument in respect of those applications could have been granted at the hearing on 30 April 2013 so as to obviate the need for attending the directions hearing on 9 May 2013.  But bearing in mind that the plaintiff is self-represented, I am not prepared to expedite the directions hearing on 9 May 2013.  In the circumstances, parties are to attend the hearing at 9:30am on 9 May 2013 (with 15 minutes reserved) in respect of D’s Summons, P’s 1st Summons and paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of P’s 2nd Summons.

16.Since paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of P’s 2nd Summons have been adjourned to the hearing on 9 May 2013, the issue of costs not dealt with at the hearing on 30 April 2013 is reserved.

(Marlene Ng)
Deputy High Court Judge

The plaintiff acting in person, present

Ms Leung Siu Man Nancy of Mayer Brown JSM, for the defendant