Leung Kwai Ling v. HK Glory Properties Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCA 347/2013 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 9 May 2013.
1. I refer to my Reasons for Decision handed down on 3 May 2013 in the present action (“ 3/5/13 Reasons ”). For easy reference, I shall adopt the abbreviations therein.
Cites 2 cases
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HCA 347/2013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 347 OF 2013 ____________
________________________ REASONS FOR DECISION ________________________ 1.I refer to my Reasons for Decision handed down on 3 May 2013 in the present action (“3/5/13 Reasons”). For easy reference, I shall adopt the abbreviations therein. 2.9 May 2013 is the return day for D’s Summons, the adjourned P’s 1st Summons and paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of the order sought in the adjourned P’s 2nd Summons. 3.On 6 May 2013, the plaintiff issued an inter partes summons for the following orders (“P’s 3rd Summons”) which was also made returnable before me on 9 May 2013:
4.In support of P’s 3rd Summons and in opposition of D’s Summons, the plaintiff filed 3 affirmations dated 30 April, 6 May and 6 May 2013 respectively. She also lodged her skeleton submissions and list of authorities by fax on 8 May 2013. 5.I will first deal with P’s 3rd Summons:
6.So at the hearing on 9 May 2013, I dismissed paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the order sought in P’s 3rd Summons but without prejudice to P’s 1st Summons and paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of P’s 2nd Summons. 7.In respect of paragraph 3 of the order sought in P’s 3rd Summons (see paragraph 3(c) above), the relief sought is quite similar to the reliefs sought in the summons issued by the plaintiff on 11 March 2013 (see paragraph 2 of my 3/5/13 Reasons), which summons has been dismissed by Master Ho with costs (see paragraph 3 of my 3/5/13 Reasons). 8.The plaintiff claimed that paragraph 3 of P’s 3rd Summons is different from her summons dated 11 March 2013 in that the latter summons sought, inter alia, (a) to transfer the “exhibits” filed by the defendant in HCA 366/2012 to the present action (but save and except for those “exhibits” “declared void and cancelled” by her); (b) to debar the defendant from filing exhibits of voluminous emails with the defendant and JSM which are duplicative, irrelevant and unnecessary; and (c) to debar the defendant from filing exhibits of minutes of meetings which are irrelevant and unnecessary. 9.The plaintiff’s summons dated 11 March 2013 in essence sought to debar the defendant from filing as exhibits in this present action emails and minutes of meeting such as those presently exhibited to the affidavit of Robert Yau Chung Wong filed on 15 April 2013, and to disallow transfer to the present action of any “exhibits” “declared void and cancelled” by her. In short, the relief sought in paragraph 3 of P’s 3rd Summons is in substance the same as or similar to the reliefs sought in the plaintiff’s summons issued on 11 March 2013 which is to prevent exhibits “declared void and cancelled” by her to be used in the present action. 10.P’s 3rd Summons has been dismissed by Master Ho. In the circumstances, paragraph 3 of P’s 3rd Summons is a collateral challenge to Master Ho’s order dated 22 March 2013, and falls to be dismissed. 11.Even if I am wrong and paragraph 3 of P’s 3rd Summons is different from the reliefs sought in the plaintiff’s summons issued on 11 March 2013, I would still dismiss the same. The plaintiff complained that the affidavit of Robert Yau Chung Wong filed on 15 April 2013 in support of the D’s Summons was full of lies and the offending parts including the exhibits thereto were liable to be struck out. 12.In my view, D’s Summons is yet to be substantively argued by the parties and determined by the court. I do not see any sufficient basis for the plaintiff to restrict the defendant’s liberty to file affirmation evidence with exhibits that they consider appropriate to support D’s Summons simply on the basis that the plaintiff herself has declared them to be void, illegal or cancelled. Paragraph 3 of the order sought in P’s 3rd Summons should be dismissed, and I dismissed the same at the hearing on 9 May 2013. 13.In summary, at the hearing on 9 May 2013, P’s 3rd Summons was dismissed but without prejudice to P’s 1st Summons and paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of P’s 2nd Summons. There is no reason why costs should not follow event, and at the hearing on 9 May 2013, I granted costs in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff in respect of P’s 3rd Summons summarily assessed at HK$800.00 to be paid forthwith. 14.Turning to D’s Summons, P’s 1st Summons and paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of P’s 2nd Summons, the hearing on 9 May 2013 was a 15-minute hearing which is plainly inappropriate for hearing substantive argument for these summonses. At the hearing, the plaintiff wanted to deal with the outstanding summonses immediately on the basis that she had a clear sustainable case on the merits, and D’s Summons should be summarily dismissed. I do not agree. Given the affirmation evidence filed by the plaintiff so far (let alone the defendant’s affirmation evidence), it is not possible to properly and adequately deal with the substantive arguments at the 15-minute hearing on 9 May 2013. 15.In the circumstances, I granted the following case management directions at the hearing on 9 May 2013:
The plaintiff appeared in person Ms Melissa Wen Qing Kiang, of Mayer Brown JSM, for the defendant | |||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCA 347/2013